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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on Relationships in International Trade
by
Ryan Monarch
Chair: Andrei Levchenko
In a time of greatly improved long-distance transportation technology, low tariffs, and
continued strengthening of economic links between countries, scholars of international
trade have turned to their attention to factors influencing companies that take part
in international business. This dissertation consists of three studies that explore how
relationships these firms have with other firms around the world influence trade flows
and prices, as well as company-level employment, wages, output, and which products
to buy.
The first chapter, “It’s Not You, It’s Me: Breakups in U.S.-China Trade Rela-
tionships” uses confidential U.S. Customs data on U.S. importers and their Chinese
exporters to investigate the frictions from changing exporting partners. High costs
from switching partners can affect the efficiency of buyer-supplier matches by im-
peding the movement of importers from high to lower cost exporters. I test the
significance of this channel using data which identifies firms on both sides of an inter-
national trade relationships. I propose and structurally estimate a dynamic discrete
choice model of exporter choice. Halving switching improves match efficiency and
leads to a 12.5% decrease in the U.S.-China Import Price Index.
xiii
The second chapter, “Gains from Offshoring? Evidence from U.S. Microdata”,
joint with Jooyoun Park and Jagadeesh Sivadasan, assesses how offshoring impacts do-
mestic firm-level aggregate employment, output, wages and productivity. Offshoring
firms are on average larger and more productive compared to non-offshorers. How-
ever, we find that offshorers suffer from a large decline in employment and output
relative to their peers even in the long run.
The third chapter, “Learning and the Value of Relationships in International
Trade”, joint with Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, explores the value to firms of being in
relationships. Over half of the time importers adjust their source for a product, it
is to a “familiar” exporter, meaning either an exporter used for that same product
previously, or to one used for separate product purchases. 43% of new product pur-
chases also come from familiar exporters. These results point to the importance of
reputation and information asymmetries. We explore this channel through a model
of supplier learning, creating estimates for the extent to which relationships influence
trade flows.
xiv
CHAPTER I
‘It’s Not You, It’s Me’: Breakups in U.S.-China
Trade Relationships
1.1 Introduction
An influential literature has studied the effects of misallocated resources on ag-
gregate productivity: major improvements in productivity could theoretically be
achieved by raising the marginal products of capital and labor of producers in devel-
oping countries to U.S. levels (Hsieh and Klenow 2009). However, a firm matching
with a suboptimal supplier is another source of potential inefficiency, in particular
if the supplier being used has high prices or poor quality. An anecdote illustrates
that buyer-supplier mismatches are a significant bottleneck in international trade. In
2008, David Wei, CEO of e-commerce giant Alibaba.com announced a “Gold Sup-
plier” identification program in order to clearly flag reliable exporters in China, with
the explicit goal of making foreign sourcing decisions easier.1 However, three years
later, wide-scale fraud under this program came to light, resulting in Wei’s resigna-
tion.2 That a behemoth like Alibaba.com was both aware of the difficulties involved
1“[T]he initiatives we announced today are aimed at ... accelerating user growth and customer
acquisition. Our Quality Supplier Program will allow buyers to trade with greater confidence while
the Gold Supplier Starter Pack will appeal to a wide range of potential new customers.” – David
Wei, CEO, Alibaba.com, 11/3/2008
2“Alibaba ... reported that 2,326 high volume sellers who pay a fee to the company to peddle
their wares on the site - ‘gold suppliers’, as they’re called- defrauded customers over the course of
1
for buyers matching with suppliers and unable to resolve them in a satisfactory way
demonstrates that finding the right supplier is not easy. If an importer is unaware of
identical but lower-priced alternatives to its current supplier, or unwilling to bear the
costs and uncertainty involved in such a change, then this creates the potential for
inefficiency. Testing the importance of this channel is challenging, however, as data
on relationships between final producers and their suppliers is sparse.
This paper utilizes confidential U.S. Customs and Border Protection data on U.S.
importers and their Chinese exporting partners to explore the costs involved in chang-
ing partners and their impact on import prices. The database includes information for
firms on both sides (U.S. and foreign) of an international trade transaction, allowing
the study of these “switching costs” for U.S. importers. Empirical results indicate
that such costs are likely to be substantial: from 2003-2008, 45% of arm’s-length
importers maintain their partner from one year to the next, even with an average
of 35 available exporters selling the same product.3 Nearly half of the total value of
U.S. imports from China is concentrated among those importers who used the same
exporter year-to-year. Furthermore, there is remarkable geographic inertia among
importers who do change their partner: one-third of all switching importers remain
in the same city as their original partner, even with an average of nine available cities
to purchase their product. Finally, importer switching decisions are correlated with
prices: those importers who paid the highest prices are much more likely to change
their partner. Thus there is reason to believe in the potential for efficiency gains by
reducing frictions to importer switching.
Guided by the above empirical regularities, I develop a dynamic discrete choice
model of exporter choice. The importing firm decides which exporter to use by
two years, with the assistance of nearly 100 Alibaba.com employees... As a result of the scandal,
Alibaba.com CEO David Wei, and his deputy, COO Elvis Lee, both resigned yesterday.” – Fortune
Magazine, 2/22/2011
3I use the term importer to refer to a firm-HS10 product pair. Thus a firm that imports two
HS10 products is considered to be two separate importers. HS10 is a ten-digit product code, the
most disaggregated product code used by U.S. firms.
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comparing partner-specific profits across all possible choices, including its current
match. Considerations of which exporter to use depend not only on the price and
quality of each exporting firm, but also per-unit switching costs, both at the partner
and the city level. The key tradeoff that the firm faces is that switching to either a
cheaper or a higher quality exporting partner raises profits, but changing one’s current
exporter or geographic location is costly. The model produces closed-form expressions
of choice probabilities for each potential outcome, which allows computation of the
switching cost parameters via maximum likelihood. I compute exporter quality using
a procedure similar to the “control function” estimator of unobserved heterogeneity
from Kim and Petrin (2010) and the quality ladder estimation of Khandewal (2010).
I then use the Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC)
techniques developed by Dube´, Fox and Su (2012) and Su and Judd (2012) to solve
the model. I estimate the parameters of the model industry-by-industry.
The main quantitative results can be summarized as follows. First, model esti-
mates of switching costs are large, heterogeneous across industries, and match the
underlying data well. Based on model estimates, in order to be indifferent between
its current partner and another partner in the same city charging the same price, the
average importer would require a positive shock to profits of two standard deviations
higher than average from the new partner. Industries with low switching costs have
high amounts of switching, and products that are less substitutable tend to have
higher switching costs. Second, the impact of switching frictions on importer prices
is sizable. Using a randomly selected sample of 50 industries, I perform the following
counterfactual: match importers with different exporters by altering switching cost
parameter values, then construct the U.S.-China Import Price Index to determine ag-
gregate price changes arising from these new matches. I find that reducing frictions
by half reduces the Import Price Index by 12.5%, a reduction achieved by shrinking
the percent of staying importers from 57% to 18%. Thus there is a substantial effi-
3
ciency gain involved in lowering the cost of switching export partners. On the other
hand, tripling the barriers to switching results in a 7.62% increase in the Import Price
Index, and 90% of importers remain with their partner year-to-year. Third, changing
one friction without changing another has differential effects on prices. Eliminating
geographic frictions while maintaining partner switching costs reduces the Import
Price Index by 7.37%. However, keeping only the geographic switching cost reduces
prices by 15.20%. Finally, I estimate the trade flow to a newly available supplier
which is not subject to any geographic switching friction from the same random sam-
ple of industries. If that supplier charges the median price among Chinese exporters
within its product category and produces a high-quality variety, this collection of
prospective suppliers (one per industry) would be able to attract approximately 4%
of all imports from China. A supplier that can be switched to without geographic
frictions is one way to consider a potential new U.S. supplier, but the median price
among Chinese exporters is approximately 57% lower than the price charged by U.S.
exporters for the same product mix. This demonstrates that there are substantial
barriers to “re-shoring” Chinese imports back to U.S. suppliers.
The results described above demonstrate a significant effect of switching costs on
exporter choice and import prices. There are a number of interpretations for what
these switching costs represent. Allen (2012) shows the importance of information
frictions, especially geographically, for Filipino farmers searching for buyers of their
product. Thus one way to view the high cost of switching partners and additional
cost of geographic switching is that importers are simply not aware of other low-price
options that are available. A policy that reduces switching frictions is one that would
reduce information asymmetry, such as a“gold standard” directory of all available
exporters and prices put forth by both the U.S. and China, or the creation of an
exporter marketplace for importers to utilize and select partners. A second inter-
pretation is the existence of long-term trading contracts such as in Kleshchelski and
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Vincent (2009), that reduce uncertainty in product prices, quality, or lead time, but
prevent more efficient matching. In this dimension, an overall improvement in con-
tracting institutions leading to more widespread use of short-term contracts would be
consistent with reductions in switching costs discussed above. A third explanation
for high switching costs is related to the overall logistical difficulty in adjusting one’s
suppliers in response to short-term changes in purchasing prices even with knowl-
edge of other alternatives and a freedom to use them, as in Drozd and Nosal (2012).
Here, the experiments described above are best thought of as more widespread use
of intermediaries- companies specializing in connecting importers with exporters. In-
deed, intermediaries play an important in the Chinese export market, as described
in Ahn, Khandewal, and Wei (2011) and Tang and Zhang (2012). In summary, the
above quantitiative exercises have direct interpretations, and the result of policies that
reduce matching frictions will be a significant improvement in productive efficiency
at the firm level.
Although the field of international trade has focused on numerous aspects of firm-
level participation in international activity, including especially the decision to ex-
port, import, engage in FDI, or use intermediaries, the study of individual exporter-
importer relationships remains relatively sparse. Empirical work on this question
began with the study of networks in international trade: Rauch (2001) surveys the
potential for transnational cultural networks to help smooth international trade and
reduce barriers to entry, while Rauch and Watson (2004) present a general equilib-
rium model through which economic agents can use their supply of networks to either
produce/export more efficiently or to become an intermediary. Recent work has made
use of the U.S. Customs database used in this work, which provides information about
U.S. importers and their foreign exporting partners. Eaton et. al. (2012) study the
relationship between Colombian exporters and the number of U.S. importers they
partner with over time and calibrate a search and matching model to match exporter
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decisions, including sales, number of clients, and transition probabilities. Kamal and
Krizan (2012) use U.S. Census trade transaction data to document trends in the for-
mation of importer-exporter relationships. Kamal and Sundaram (2013) use the same
U.S. import data to determine how likely textile producers in Bangladeshi cities are
to follow other exporters in their same city to export to a particular partner. They
find “importer-specific” spillovers are an important part of the general information
spillovers that characterize exporting. Each of these puts the onus on the exporter
to undertake searching behavior buyer by buyer, while I model matching as an im-
porter’s choice given information about each exporter. Other work takes advantage of
two-sided trade data to study the effects of heterogeneity on trade: Bernard, Moxnes,
and Ulltveit-Moe (2013) develop a model of relationhip-specific fixed costs to export-
ing using Norwegian buyer-supplier trade data, while Blum, Claro, and Horstmann
(2010) use exporter-importer pair data on Chile to study the effects of intermediaries.
Alessandria (2009) is a model of search frictions in international trade that, like my
model, generates deviations from the law of one price, without distinguishing im-
porters within a country. Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009) also construct a model of
switching frictions, where firms and customers form long-term relationships, showing
that prices stabilize as the number of repeat buyers increases. Antra`s and Costinot
(2011) and Petropoulou (2011) model the effects of trade with costly search frictions,
and Allen (2012) estimates a buyer search model on agricultural trade inside the
Philippines. I combine the theory of partner choice with data on importer-exporter
relationships and geographic location, through which I am able to determine the
effects of switching frictions on import prices.
The way I measure these frictions is with a structural demand model that in-
corporates the factors underpinning importer-exporter switching behavior, including
geographic components. To do this, I use a model of dynamic discrete choice, pi-
oneered by Rust (1987) in his study of bus engine replacement. I implement the
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problem in a similar way, using the Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium
Constraints (MPEC) methodology for solving discrete choice problems found in Su
and Judd (2012) and Dube´, Fox, and Su (2012). As in those studies, my model in-
cludes costs entering into a firm’s profit function, where in my case, the costs are
supplier switching costs at both the partner and city level. Estimates are retrieved
through maximizing a likelihood function based on observed outcomes for importer-
exporter switching. The model I estimate is most similar to the model of employer
choice utilized by Fox (2010) in his study of Swedish engineers. Similar to the use
of wages as a driving force behind employee switching behavior, in my context, one
of the main components of the “stay or switch” decisions is the price offered to U.S.
importers by a Chinese supplier. The model also shares some similarities with Lincoln
and McCallum (2012), who produce estimates of exporting fixed costs that broadly
measure the frictions involved in entering the export market that are comparable
across industries. More generally, there have been a number of studies that estimate
the effects of relationship networks in other contexts: Joskow (1985) studies contract
length among coal suppliers and power plants, while Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson
(2012) measure the extent to which firms rely on subsidiaries versus outside firms
for intermediate input purchase. Egan and Mody (1992), and Kranton and Mine-
heart (2001) present models on the formation of buyer-seller networks and how the
properties of these networks affect economic outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data
sources used in this paper and summarizes the empirical results. Section 1.3 presents
the dynamic discrete choice model with supply chain adjustment costs. Section 1.4
describes the implementation of the model and summarizes the baseline results. Sec-
tion 1.5 describes the quantitative experiments used to determine the importance of
the supplier-switching channel. Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Data and Stylized Facts
1.2.1 Importer-Exporter Data
The database I work with is the Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transaction Database
(LFTTD), which contains confidential information on all international trade trans-
actions by U.S. firms, and is maintained jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and U.S.
Customs. Every transaction of a U.S. company importing or exporting a product
requires filing a form with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the LFTTD
contains the universe of these transactions. In particular, the import data consists of
all the information included in customs documents provided by U.S. firms purchasing
goods from abroad, including quantity and value exchanged for each transaction, HS
10 product classification, date of import and export, port information, country of
origin, and a code identifying the foreign supplier firm. Known as the manufacturing
ID, or MID, the foreign partner identifier contains limited information on the name,
address, and city of the foreign supplier.4 Through a variety of “external vailidity”
checks outlined in Appendix 1.A, I find substantial support for the use of the MID as
a reliable, unique identifier, both over time and in cross-section. I use this variable
to provide stylized facts for the amount of churning in U.S.-China trade relationships
and the geographic elements of switching behavior.5
At this stage, I perform an initial cleaning of the LFTTD, using methods out-
lined in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) and Pierce and Schott (2009). As in
4Specifically, the MID contains the first three letters of the producer’s city, six characters taken
from the producer’s name, up to four numeric characters taken from its address, and the ISO2 code
for the country of origin.
5The results below depend on the validity of the MID as both a cross-sectional unique identifier
and as a panel variable tracking foreign exporters over time, which I check using external data.
Separately, one may also be concerned about whether U.S. firms are constructing the MID as re-
quired - what I call “internal validity” - with potential issues including miscoding, unclear rules for
construction, or the possibility of capturing intermediaries rather than firms actually producing the
traded product. For this reason, I undertake an in-depth exploration of this variable, including its
construction, the relevant laws surrounding information provided in trade transactions. These issues
are also explored in Appendix 1.A.
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Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2009), I drop all transactions with imputed quantities
or values (which are typically very low-value transactions) or converted quantities or
values. I also eliminate all related-party transactions, as exporters who are importing
from separate branches of the same firm will likely have very different relationship
dynamics than arm’s-length exporters. I concord HS codes over time according to
the methodology in Pierce and Scott (2009). In addition, I clean up unreasonable
values for the MID specifically related to U.S.-China trade. I restrict the sample
to importers with a firm country identifier of China (meaning the producing firm is
located in China). Due to the entrepoˆt nature of Hong Kong’s international trade
flows, I concentrate solely on Mainland China - deleting any observation that has any
appearance of coming from Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan. For example, a city code
of “HON”, even with a country code for mainland China, is likely referring to Hong
Kong and thus dropped.6 Finally, I drop any firm that has a three-letter city code
that is not in the top 300 cities of China by population.
1.2.2 Stylized Facts
The starting point of my analysis is to use the exporting partner MID to illustrate
the extent of partner-switching. My unit of observation is a U.S. importer (firm-HS10
product combination). Some importers have more than one exporter, so I define an
importer’s main exporter in any time period to be the one from which the largest
percentage of imports were delivered7. I define a firm as “staying” with one’s partner
6Other dropped city codes: “KOW” for Kowloon, Hong Kong; “MAC” for Macau; “AOM” for
the Chinese Pinyin spelling of Macau, “Aomen”; “KAO” for Kaohsiung, Taiwan.
7This simplification introduces the potential for “false switching”, where an importer uses the
same exporter in two periods, but changes the source of the plurality of its imports. Analysis of
the LFTTD indicates that U.S. importers typically import a very large share of their total imports
from only one partner. The average share of imports that come from a U.S. importer’s main
Chinese partner is 83.9%, with a standard deviation of 22%. Furthermore, multiple importers do
not dominate in the data. Kamal and Krizan (2012) present some basic statistics on the number of
exporting relationships that a U.S. importer may be in: across all U.S. importers, the average number
of exporting partners for a U.S. importer is 1.8, and the average number of exporting partners for a
“polygamous” U.S. importer is 4.
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if its main exporter remained the same over time8. I track the universe of U.S.
importers from China in 2003-2008, and determine whether they (a) also imported
one year previously, and if so, (b) whether they continued to import from the same
exporting partner or geographic location as in the previous year. Figure 1.1 plots the
fraction of importers staying with their partner, staying in the same city, and staying
in the same province.
Two facts are clear from Figure 1.1. First, there is a significant share of U.S.
importers who maintain the same partner over time. Even though the number of
potential exporting choices is increasing over this time period, the share of importers
using the same supplier is 45.9% over this time. As a benchmark, given that there
are an average of 30 Chinese exporters to the U.S. per HS10 product in the data, if
importers were choosing their partners randomly each year, the probability of switch-
ing partners would be 29/30, or 97%. Thus path dependence is far higher than
would be expected if importers were choosing their partner randomly. These staying
importers account for 44.9% of the total value of arm’s length imports from China
over this time period, which shows these are not simply very small importers who
are switching. Secondly, among those firms who do choose to switch, approximately
one-third of all importers remain in the same city as their original partner. Using the
same benchmark as above, random exporter selection would imply an 86% chance
of switching city.9 Thus there is strong inertia keeping firms in their original city,
even if they choose not to use the same exporting partner as before. There are many
8All results are robust to different definitions of “staying”, including staying with any one of the
set of partners, or staying with the entire set of one’s partners.
9There is an average of 9 cities for each HS10 product, but the number of exporters are not
distributed equally across cities. I thus compute the probability of switching city for any one importer
in the data if they were choosing their partner with the following formula:
Pr (CSwitch) =
∑
i
∑
cMic
(
1− Xic∑
cXic
)
∑
i
∑
cMic
where product i and city c have Mic importers and Xic exporters. The term in parentheses is the
probability of an importer in city c switching city, which I then weight by the number of importers
in that city. The denominator is the total number of U.S. importers from China.
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potential explanations for such a finding, including local network formation, efficient
distribution channels centered on a particular geographic location, or agglomeration
on the export side. In sum, the year-to-year figures show that supplier choices are
highly correlated with previous supplier usage, and decisions of whom to switch to
are highly dependent on geographic considerations. It is these stylized facts related
to switching, both geographically and over time, that govern the dynamic discrete
choice model I lay out in Section 1.3.
The stylized facts about importer-exporter relationships described above are ro-
bust to a number of alternative checks and specifications. Firstly, Figure 1.2 shows
that the tendency to stay with one’s exporting partner is not concentrated among
only small or large importers: even as the share of total imports from China increases
dramatically from 2003-2008, the share of imports from importers keeping their same
partner remained at about 40-45% of total imports, very similar to the overall share
of importers remaining with their partner. Secondly, one may be concerned that
switching is driven by exit on the exporter side: given the structural changes in the
Chinese economy over this period, including entry into the WTO, it is likely that
many exporters are entering or exiting. To eliminate this channel, I recreate the
results using only those matches where the exporting MID is found in both years.
These results are found in Figure 1.3 Panel A. Mechanically, the percentage of firms
staying with their partner must increase, but the two main stylized facts described
above carry over: a significant share of (but not all) importers stay with their part-
ners, with previous geographic location an important factor in the decision of where
switching importers move to. I also check that the results are not driven by my defi-
nition of an importer as a firm-HS10 product combination. Indeed, it is possible for
one firm to appear multiple times in Figure 1.1. In particular, if one firm imports
multiple products, then the counts may exaggerate or understate the effects of firm
switching behavior. I thus perform the same decomposition considering a firm as the
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unit of analysis, rather than a firm-HS10 product combination. Even with this much
more sparse assignment of switching firms, Figure 1.3 Panel B shows that the results
remain very similar: now, close to two-thirds of continuing importers stay with their
partners, with considerable geographic stickiness. These stylized facts are robust to
a number of other specifications, including using only importing firms classified as
manufacturing firms, an importer defined as a firm-HS6 product combination, indi-
vidual year trends, different definitions of switching, and the share of importers not
adjusting their supply network over a longer time frame than one year. These are
described in greater detail in Appendix 1.B.
1.2.3 Reduced-Form Regression Results
I next analyze the factors that govern the stay-or-switch supplier decisions. There
are a number of potential explanations for switching behavior that I can measure using
the LFTTD data. Using U.S.-China trade data from 2002-2008, I use the following
linear probability model to estimate the relationship between the decision of a U.S.
importer to switch Chinese exporting partners and a variety of potential explanatory
variables, including price, size and age of the Chinese partner, U.S. importer size, and
the date of entry into importing.
Stayji,t,t+1 = α0 +
10∑
k=1
αk1 [StandardPriceCati,t = k] + γ1ExpChar
j
i,t+
γ2ImpChar
j
i,t + fj + ft + vi,t (1.1)
As above, I define importer i importing product j as staying (Stayji,t,t+1 = 1) with
its export partner if it maintains the largest percentage of imports from the same
supplier in time t and t + 1. I define the “standardized price” (StandardPrice) to
be the “unit value” from the LFTTD, minus its HS10 product mean and divided
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by the standard deviation. Thus prices are comparable across industries. I allow
for non-monotonic effects of price on staying by including it as a categorical variable
StandardPriceCat representing each of ten deciles. I omit the 5th decile in the
regression, in order to check the effects of having both very low and very high prices.
I use both exporter characteristics (ExpChar) and importer covariates (ImpChar).
For exporters, I calculate the “Supplier Size” of a Chinese exporter by summing
together its total exports to the U.S., and similarly calculate the ”Supplier Age” of a
Chinese exporter by calculating the first year a MID appears in the trade data. On
the importer side, I constuct importer size by summing together total imports from
China, and the first year of its entry into the Chinese import market by calculating its
first appearance in the Chinese import data. All of the above covariates are assigned
using their values in the prior year, using later year data only to determine whether
or not an importer switched exporting partners. Finally, I include HS10 level fixed
effects fj and year fixed effects ft. The results of the Linear Probability Model (1.1)
are reported in Table 1.1. Standard errors are clustered at the HS10 level.
I begin with the effect of price on the partner staying decision. It is clear that the
higher the price a firm paid in a previous year, the lower the probability that it would
stay with its original (plurality) partner firm. Though the effect is not significant
for prices near the middle of the distribution, the results in Table 1 make it clear
that the importers who received the highest prices were 2-3% more likely to switch
their partner than the omitted group (5th decile). Those importers paying the lowest
prices were also more likely to stay with their partner when accouting for importer
and exporter characteristics, as can be seen in Columns (2)-(4). Figure 1.4 contains
the same story as Table 1, and is generated using the results in Table 1 Column 4.
The shaded regions are 99% confidence intervals for the category-specific coefficients.
Those importers paying the highest prices are much more likely to switch their partner
than those in the middle and low price regions, while those paying the lowest prices
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are more likely to stay with their partners. Table 2 repeats the analysis simply using
price entering the regression linearly, demonstrating again that higher prices make
importers more likely to switch.10
The effects of the various importer and exporter characteristics are themselves of
interest. Table 1.1 makes clear that the older and/or larger a Chinese exporting firm
was, the lower the probability that a U.S. importer would switch. In addition, larger
U.S. firms were most likely to stay with their partner. Thus there is substantial room
for exporter and importer heterogeneity in explaining the staying decision for U.S.
importers with their Chinese exporters.
In conclusion, price is an important factor in the decision of an importer to switch
partners, especially the magnitude of the price paid in the previous year. Exporter
and importer characteristics more generally are also important factors in the decision
of whether or not to stay with one’s partner. I use these results to guide the modeling
of the exporter choice problem below.
10The results are unchanged by estimating (1.1) using only one year of data, as I do in Appendix
1.B.
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1.3 Model
This section lays out a dynamic discrete choice framework used to model U.S.
importer decisions of exporter choice. Different exporters set different prices for
the same product j and have heterogeneous quality. Importers of products in that
industry make a decision each period about which firm to import from, a decision that
is based both on their current exporter and information about other price/quality
menus that are available. Switching exporters involves payment of a set of costs,
including both an overall switching cost and an additional cost to be paid if an
importer finds a new partner in a previously unused city. Each individual exporter of
product j at time t is denoted xj,t, and exporters are distinguished both by the price
they charge px,j,t and by the quality of their individual variety λx,j,t. If importer m
chooses the exporter indexed xj,t, I denote this match as x
m
j,t and the price paid in
that match as pmx,j,t.
1.3.1 Importers
Importers are final good producers, and demand for the variety m has a constant
elasticity of substitution demand curve.
Qm = Bp
−σ
m
In the above equation, B is a demand shifter, pm is the final good price for variety m
and σ is the elasticity of substitution.
Final good producer m requires J inputs, indexed j = 1, ...J , in order to pro-
duce its final good, and production of final good is Cobb-Douglas in labor and those
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intermediates:
Qm = L
α
(
J∏
j=1
I
γj
j
)1−α
Although the production function and final demand for its variety are fixed, im-
porter m can choose which exporter to use to import its necessary inputs. At time t,
final good producer m has a choice of which exporter xj,t to obtain its quantity of in-
put j. By considering all possible exporters in the market, importers are able to make
a profit-maximizing decision between exporters. There are a number of components
that affect the decision of which exporter to use.
Firstly, importers make a decision based in part on the expected price they will pay
from any exporter, E
[
pmx,j,t
]
. In particular, importers use their previously paid price to
form expectations about the price from their original partner, and average price from
each other exporter to form expectations about the price from that exporter.11 Since
the expectation differs depending on what partner was used, this expectation is both
importer-specific (m) and exporter-specific (xj,t), which allows the same exporter to
charge different prices to different importers. I describe the calibration of this density
in the next subsection.
Secondly, there are frictions involved in finding a different supplier in the following
period, modeled as an additional component of the price paid. There is a cost that
is paid from switching exporters ζx,j. Reflecting the geographic nature of switching
discussed above, I also include an additional geographic cost ζjc,j that is paid if an
importer uses a separate partner in a separate city.
I define importer m’s expected per-unit cost of purchasing intermediate j from
supplier xjt at time t, incorporating the frictions involved in searching for a supplier
11This assumption allows each firm to observe the entire spectrum of prices, even though the
observed data on prices is a selected sample, namely, only successful importer-exporter matches.
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in the following manner:
p¯mx,j,t = E
[
pmx,j,t
]
exp
{
ζx,j 1{xmj,t 6= xmj,t−1}+ ζc,j 1{cmj,t 6= cmj,t−1}
}
(1.2)
where p¯jx,t is the expected cost from purchasing one unit of the intermediate from
seller xmj,t, and the indicator functions are equal to one if an importer picks a different
partner xjt from its current match x
j
t−1, or another different city c
j
t from its current
partner cjt−1. If final good producer m chooses a new partner in the same city (ct−1)
as its old partner, then only ζx,j is paid, while if an exporter in a separate city is
chosen, ζx,j + ζc,j is paid. This means that the cost of an input bundle will differ
depending on what supplier is chosen, not just because of a higher or lower offered
price, but also because of costs of switching one’s current partner.
Let Xmt =
{
xmj,t
}J
j=1
be the vector of supplier choices made by importer m for each
input j = 1, ...J at time t. Then with wage w, the expected cost of an input bundle
for the final good is:
cm (X
m
t ) = w
α
(
J∏
j=1
[
p¯mx,j,t
]γj)1−α
Producing one unit of the final good for a final good producer with productivity
φ requires 1
φ
input bundles, each with cost depending on the vector of suppliers
Xmt . I assume that the productivity of a final good producer depends on factors
unobserved by the econometrician (such as the quality of the supplier’s product)
that are particular to its individual supplier match. In particular, productivity for
producer m is multiplicative in a common element for that producer and λx,j,t, the
17
“quality” of the variety from exporter x.12
φm (X
m
t ) = ψm
J∏
j=1
λνx,j,t
The marginal cost of an importer m with productivity φm is:
MC (Xmt ) =
1
φm (Xmt )
cm (X
m
t ) (1.3)
Maximizing expected profits at time t means that importer m must set the price
of their final good optimally and make its vector of exporter choices Xmt :
pimt = max
pm,Xmt
pmQm −MC (Xmt )Qm
Using the assumption of CES demand, the optimum price of the final good for
producer m is a markup over the marginal cost, pm =
σ
σ−1MC (X
m
t ). Plugging this
and our expression for marginal costs (1.3) into the above profits equation gives the
following equation:
pimt = max
Xmt
1
σ
B
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
[φm (X
m
t )]
σ−1 cm (Xmt )
1−σ (1.4)
Taking logs of (4) implies that the decision of where to obtain input j is additively
separable from the choice of where to obtain all other inputs. Doing so, and defining
the log expected profits attributable to using input j as ln pimj,t gives the following
12Given the richness of data available, I implement a model that takes explicit account of “quality”
considerations, in particular, those characteristics of an exporting firm that are observed by the
potential importer, but unobserved by the econometrician and tend to be correlated with the price.
I use the control function approach of Kim and Petrin (2010). I specify the estimating procedure in
Section 1.4.1.1 below.
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expression:
ln pimt = A+ ln pi
m
j,t +
∑
k 6=j
ln pimk,t
where
lnpimj,t = max
xmj,t
ν (σ − 1) lnλx,j,t
+ (1− α) (1− σ) γj
[
E
[
ln pmx,j,t
]
+ ζx,j1{xmj,t 6= xmj,t−1}+ ζc,j1{cmj,t 6= cmj,t−1}
]
(1.5)
and A = ln
{
1
σ
B
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
wαm(1−σ)ψσ−1m
}
captures all the terms not associated with
the cost of an input bundle for the final good.13 14 Importer m will choose the
supplier xj,t that gives the highest input-specific profits. Since the decision of input
j is wholly separate from the decision of other inputs, I now focus attention only on
the market for one input and drop the j subscript.
How does an importer decide which exporter maximizes profits? It is a maximiza-
tion problem of discrete choice, so expected profits are calculated for each choice,
and the partner with the highest expected profits will be chosen. Dividing Equation
(1.5) through by (σ − 1), I define the exporter-specific expected log profit term for
any choice xmt as pi
m
t (x
m
t ,β):
pimt (x
m
t ,β) = ξ lnλx,t + βpE
[
ln pmx,t
]− βx1{xmt 6= xmt−1} − βc1{cmt 6= cmt−1} (1.6)
where ξ = ν, βp = − (1− α) γ, βx = (1− α) γζx, and βc = (1− α) γζc. I summa-
rize the vector of unknown parameters as β = {βp, βx, βc, ξ}.
Equation (1.6) is the cornerstone of my estimation strategy. Starting from a
13In Equation (1.5), I use Jensen’s Inequality and the fact that the expected price is almost-surely
constant to assert that the log of the expected price is equal to the expected log price.
14Intuitively, for elasticities of substitution σ > 1, higher quality λx,j,t leads to higher profits,
while higher prices lead to lower profits.
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general model of importing behavior, I have derived a choice-specific profit equation
that can be estimated using techniques of structural industrial organization15. To
summarize this equation in words, if importer m chooses a different exporter than
they used in the previous period, then this firm must they must pay a fixed cost
βx, while if they use a different exporter in a different city, they pay βx + βc. The
parameter βp is a measure of how sensitive switching is to changes in price. Estimating
{βp, βx, βc} by industry will provide a measure of the frictions firms face in switching
partners and locations, and enable the posing of counterfactual experiments.
Estimating the unknowns in Equation (1.6) can be achieved by calculating ex-
pected log profits from each exporter, using observed outcome data to find the most
likely values. Given the previous period state variables {xt−1, pt−1}, it is possible to
rank an importer’s expected profits from choosing any exporter xt. The observed
exporter choice in the data should be the one such that expected profits from that
exporter are higher than all other potential choices. As in Rust (1987), I allow for
a stochastic profit shock from choosing xt that is observable to the importer, 
m
x,t,
which helps the model match the data16. I use data on observed outcomes, prices,
and estimated exporter quality to solve for the parameters via maximum likelihood
estimation.
1.3.2 Prices
1.3.2.1 Exporters
Within any product category j there are numerous exporters x producing indi-
vidual varieties. They set the price for their variety at time t based upon their firm-
specific marginal cost, which in turn depends on their quality choice λx,t. I follow
15This equation resembles the worker utility function from choosing different employers discussed
in Fox (2010).
16Appendix E lays out a version of Equation (1.6) that accounts for the possibility of serial
correlation.
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the same functional form for exporter quality as in Hallak and Sivadasan (2011), and
continue to drop the j subscript. I assume monopolistic competition, fixed markups
over marginal cost, and a random difference in prices across importers it serves ρmx,t:
pmx,t = µMCx,tρ
m
t = µ
1
zx
(λx,t)
β ρmx,t (1.7)
where z is the idiosyncratic productivity of exporter x, and λ is quality. Exporters
simply set a price and wait to be chosen by importers. This simple setup allows me
to set up the expected price function importers use.
Taking logs, and assuming that the year-to-year changes in quality of an exporter
is small over time, we obtain a transition rule for prices.
ln pmx,t = ln p
m
x,t−1 +
(
ln ρmx,t − ln ρmx,t−1
)
(1.8)
1.3.2.2 Price Evolution
In this section, I use Equation (1.8) to specify a simple one-step ahead process
for prices, f (px,t|px,t−1, xt−1, xt) that is known to importers. Thus I can specify every
exporter price that an importer faces.
Importers know both what prices were paid by other firms in previous periods,
and the distribution of shocks to those prices in the next period. Guided by Equation
(1.8), the basic formula I apply is as follows: firms expect to pay the price they paid
last period if they keep their partner, while they expect to pay the average price
all other importers paid from a given supplier if they switch to that supplier. In
addition, importers are aware that prices in a given geographic area will change by a
given amount from one year to the next, and know that change perfectly.17 However,
there is also a stochastic element to the price with a known mean and standard
17In terms of Equation (1.8), one component of the
(
ln ρmx,t − ln ρmx,t−1
)
is a known increase in
average prices across the entire city. If Importer A chooses to stay with Supplier Z in city Q, they
expect the price paid last period plus the increase in prices in city Q.
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deviation.
If importer m stays with its current partner x in city c, the price process is:
pmx,t = p
m
x,t−1 + ηc,t + u
m
x,t, u
m
x,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2x,t
)
(1.9)
Importing firms know there is a city-specific change in prices ηc,t, as well as the
distibrution of an exporter-specific realization of a shock. The city-specific price
shocks are correlated for firms in the same city, so there is a city component and an
exporter-specific component.
If importer m decides to use a different partner x˜, then the price process is:
pmx˜,t =
1
N
N∑
n=1
pnx˜,t−1 + ηc˜,t + u
m
x˜,t u
m
x˜,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2x˜,t
)
(1.10)
N is the number of firms who imported from firm x˜ from the previous period, and
they are indexed n = 1, ...N . Each price paid by importer n is pnx˜,t−1. As above, there
is both a city shock to prices and an importer-specific realization of the exporter price
shock.
Given the specification of these different prices based on shocks calibrated to data
in period t−1 and t, I can write down a density function for prices f (px,t|px,t−1, xt−1, xt).
In other words, given state variables p and x, and future choice x′, the price p′ from
that x′ can be predicted by any importer. The parameters {ηc,t}Cc=1 are the mean
changes in price for any city, and are known by the importing firm. I assume the
stochastic parameters umx,t are normally distributed with mean zero and standard de-
viations σx,t (each exporter has a particular distribution of price shocks known to
importers, but the specific value of which is observed only after the match occurs). I
use the LFTTD data to calibrate the parameters {{ηc,t}Cc=1, {σx,t}Xx=1} by using ob-
served prices in both pre- and post-periods and estimating equations (1.9)-(1.10) for
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each industry18.
1.3.3 Value Function
Individual importers make their choice of exporter based on price concerns, quality
concerns and any added costs involved from changing their current exporter. Entering
period t, importer m has two state variables that affect its choice, given by pimt (x
m
t ,β)
in Equation (1.6): the exporter used last period, xmt−1 with location c
m
t−1, and (in order
to form price expectations) the price paid to that exporter pmx,t−1. Based on these state
variables, knowledge about prices in other locations, and the costs of switching one’s
current exporter, the importing firm must choose which exporter to use in the current
period, xt. Upon making this choice, the state variables and profit shock 
m
x,t evolve
according to the joint density h (px,t, t|pt−1, xt−1, xt, t−1).
Infinitely-lived importer m chooses an exporter x in each period in order to max-
imize the present discounted stream of expected profits. With single-period expected
profits described by Equation (1.6), the infinite-time problem for any importer (drop-
ping the m superscript) is summarized by the following value function:
V (pt−1, xt−1, x,t−1) = max{xt,xt+1,...}
E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t (piτ (xτ , pτ−1, xτ−1,β) + x,t)
]
(1.11)
where the expectation operator is taken over the possible evolution of (pt, t), governed
by the density h (pt, t|pt−1, xt−1, xt, t−1) at every period t. Recall that the price from
choosing exporter xt is not known before making the choice, but is predicted based
on px,t−1, xt−1 and xt, according to the density function f (px,t|px,t−1, xt−1, xt).
Writing the one-step ahead value of any variable a as a′, the value function in
18If no prior year information is available for a potential supplier- i.e. an importer chooses a
supplier that did not exist in the previous year- I allow the expected price to be the average price
among all exporters in that city in the previous period. If there is no city information in the
previous period, I drop that exporter. If an exporter is only found in the pre-period, then I calibrate
{ηc,t, σx,t} using all other firms and use them to form the expected price from using that exporter.
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(1.11) can be rewritten as a Bellman Equation:
V (p, x, ) = max
x′
pi (x′, p, x,β) + x′ + δEV (x′, p, x, )
for
EV (x′, p, x, ) =
∫
p′
∫
′
V (p′, x′, ′)h (p′, ′|p, x, x′, ) dp′d′. (1.12)
At this point, I make a key assumption about the joint density of the state variables
and the profit shock: that they evolve separately from each other.
Assumption 1. (Conditional Independence) The joint transition density of pt and
t can be decomposed as:
h (pt+1, t+1|pt, xt, xt+1, t) = g (t+1) f (pt+1|pt, xt, xt+1)
I also assume that the profit shock  is distributed according to a multivariate
extreme value distribution, with known parameters:
Assumption 2. The profit shock is distributed Type I Extreme Value (Gumbel). The
cumulative distribution function G is
Pr (t < y) = G (y) = exp {− exp {−y − γ}}
for γ = 0.577... (Euler’s constant).
These two assumptions permit the computation of choice probabilities for any
particular outcome :
Proposition 1. Let the value of a present time variable a one period ago be written
as a−1, and one period in the future be written as a′. Given Assumptions 1 and
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2, and grouping together the state variables as s = {p−1, x−1}, the probability of
observing a particular exporter choice xC conditional on state s and cost parameters
β, P
(
xC |s,β), is:
P
(
xC |s,β) = exp [pi (xC , s,β)+ δEV (xC , s)]∑
x̂∈X exp [pi (x̂, s,β) + δEV (x̂, s)]
(1.13)
where the function EV (x, s) is the solution to the fixed point problem:
EV (x, s) =
∫
s′
log
{∑
x′∈X
exp [pi (x′, s′,β) + δEV (x′, s′)]
}
f (s′|s, x) (1.14)
Proof See Appendix 1.C.
1.3.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The parameters β can then be found via maximum likelihood estimation. Let
xmt−1, p
m
x,t−1 be the actual choices of exporter and price paid at time t− 1 for importer
m from data. Then the likelihood of observing importer m choosing exporter xmt is:
L
(
xmt |pmx,t−1, xmt−1,β
)
= P
(
xmt |xmt−1, pmx,t−1,β
) · f (pmx,t|pmx,t−1, xmt−1, xmt )
And thus the total likelihood function for the set of importer choices at time t is:
L (β) =
M∏
m=1
P
(
xmt |xmt−1, pmt−1,β
) · f (pmx,t|pmx,t−1, xmt−1, xmt )
The constraints for the maximization problem are the system of fixed point equations
defined by Equation (1.14). To solve this problem, I follow the MPEC approach as
described in Su and Judd (2012) and Dube´, Fox, and Su (2012), namely an inner loop
for solving the fixed point problem in (1.14) for the constraint vector EV and β, and
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testing each candidate β within the likelihood function to see where the function is
maximized. Thus the problem to solve is:
max
β
L (β) =
max
β
M∑
m=1
exp [pimt (x
m
t , s
m
t ,β) + δEV (x
m
t , s
m
t )]∑
x̂mt ∈X exp [pi
m
t (x̂
m
t , s
m
t ,β) + δEV (x̂
m
t , s
m
t )]
+
M∑
m=1
f
(
pmx,t|smt , xmt
)
(1.15)
s.t.
EV (xt, st) =
∫
st+1
log
 ∑
xt+1∈X
exp [pit+1 (xt+1, st+1,β) + δEV (xt+1, st+1)]
 f (st+1|st, xt)
(1.16)
Solving this problem produces maximum likelihood estimates for the vector of
parameters β. The next section describes the particulars of how this model is taken
to the data.
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1.4 Estimation
This section has three objectives: first, I describe the specific assumptions involved
in discretizing the state space for the constrained maximization problem in Equations
(1.15)-(1.16) and model performance on generated data with pre-set parameter values.
Second, I specify the process used to calculate quality. Third, I present analysis of the
raw structural parameters obtained from the solution of the constrained maximization
problem using U.S.-China trade data.
1.4.1 Implementation
In order to estimate the above model, I need to solve the system of equations
defined by (1.16) for the unknown elements EV and β. To do this, I discretize the
price state space into N intervals, allowing me to rewrite the fixed point equation
(16) as:
EV (xt, ŝt) =
N∑
ŝt+1=1
log
 ∑
xt+1∈X
exp [pit+1 (xt+1, ŝt+1,β) + δEV (xt+1, ŝt+1)]
Pr (ŝt+1|ŝt, xt)
(1.17)
where p̂ is the midpoint of each price interval, chosen such that 1
N
of all firms are
in each interval. My use of MPEC in solving the maximum likelihood model follows
the description from Su and Judd (2012) and Dube´, Fox, and Su (2012). The MPEC
maximization protocol uses values of the vector β that satisfy the fixed point equa-
tion (1.15), given expected prices and price transition probabilities for each potential
choice, and selects the vector that delivers the highest likelihood. As a simple example
to fix ideas, suppose there are 30 exporters in an industry and N discrete price states.
Then there are 30N possible state values and 30 possible choices, meaning that the
vector EV contains 900N elements, one for each value of EV (xt, ŝt). Thus the con-
straint set in (17) is a fixed point problem of 900N equations and 900N+4 unknowns,
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where the additional 4 unknowns are β = {βp, βx, βc, ξ}. Each of the possible values
of β and EV that satisfy these constraints are tested in the objective function (1.15)
to see which give the closest match between the estimated probabilities and the true
data.
Before computing the model on U.S.-China trade data, I first set the parameters
at fixed values and create 250 Monte Carlo replications of data based on these val-
ues. Every importer m is assigned an exporter xt−1 and price px,t−1 from a previous
period, and predicts the expected price received from every potential exporter xt, i.e.
E [px,t|px,t−1, xt−1, xt]. The importer matches with an exporter, given both these ex-
pected prices and the pre-set values of the parameters βp, βx, and βc.
19 I then utilize
the observed outcomes and prices from each dataset to run the maximum likelihood
problem found in (1.15) and (1.17), extracting the cost parameters consistent with
those choices. I set δ = 0.975 and use N = 5 price states.
Since the total number of importers (M), exporters (X), and exporter cities (C)
are free to choose, I set the number of importers at 30 and create three different
samples: one small (M = 30, X = 4, C = 3), one with the average number of exporters
in the data but few cities (X = 33, C = 3), and one matching both the average number
of exporters and the average number of cities in the data (X = 33, C = 9).20 I then
run the estimation routine on each set of data, and report summary statistics for
how well the procedure matches the pre-set values. The results of this procedure are
presented in Table 3.
It is clear that the estimation routine matches the pre-set parameters poorly on
the very small sample. Furthermore, mean estimates of the exporter switching effect
19For this estimation, I do not include quality estimation terms, given the extra assumptions I
would have to make to run the quality estimation protocol described below. The profit equation is
the same as (3), only without the λ term.
20The average number of Chinese exporters in an HS6 industry is 33.58. The median number of
exporters is eight. The industry at the 90th percentile of exporters contains 81 exporters. 15.3% of
the 3000 or so HS6 codes found in the trade data contain only one exporter. These figures are based
on computation of the “main” exporters, i.e. exporters who are found after assigning a “plurality
exporter” to each importer.
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βx are extremely high. These results occur because with such a small sample space
(four exporters and three cities), a number of Monte Carlo runs likely have very few
cases of within-city switching, providing very high estimates for the base exporter
switching cost. Yet even in this scenario, the median results preserve the ordering
of the originally set parameters. In addition, the elasticity of the switching decision
with respect to prices, βp is of reasonable sign and size.
Once the sample size is extended to 33 exporters (the average number of exporters
in an HS6 industry), some of the results improve. For Sample B, which contains fewer
cities, we see a vast improvement in the measurement of the price coefficient βp, and
the exporter switching cost βx. A greater number of exporter possibilities permits
more partner switching observations, allowing for better estimation of this parameter.
Notably, the mean and median of the outside-city switching cost βc is much higher
than the pre-set value of the parameter, as the number of cities is small enough to
make the estimation procedure assign higher costs of switching cities.
Finally, results for Sample C demonstrate that the procedure improves further
when the number of cities is increased to the average number of exporting cities
found in the LFTTD, C = 9. Not only do estimates of the city switching cost
decrease in mean and median to levels much closer to the preassigned values, but
the exporter switching cost and price elasticity similarly approach their values. My
estimation procedure thus is expected to perform better in industries that have enough
observations of within-city, out-of-city, and non-switching observations to estimate the
parameters of interest, and in those industries, will deliver reasonable results.
1.4.2 Data Preparation
In this section, I describe how I bring the LFTTD data to the model, in order to
run the MLE problem of Equation (1.15) with the constraints in Equation (1.17). To
do so, I must calculate the one-period log expected profits from an importer choosing
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each potential exporter xt as given in Equation (1.6). There are four elements to this
profit equation:
• Whether xt is different from an importer’s previous partner.
• Whether xt is located in a different city from an importer’s previous partner.
• The expected price of xt.
• The quality of xt.
The first two are easily identified using the MID variable discussed in Section 1.2. I
described the process for calculating expected prices in Section 1.3.2. It remains to
specify the process through which I estimate the quality of an exporter, λ. I consider
exporter quality as an estimate of exporter heterogeneity given data in the LFTTD.
The intuition follows from Kim and Petrin (2010) and Khandewal (2011): if exporters
are very similar in terms of observables but one charges a higher price, then that one
has a higher quality.
Specifically, I use the control function methodology of Kim and Petrin (2010) to
account for unobserved supplier heterogeneity that is likely to be positively correlated
with the price, via the following regression:
ln px,t = lnµ− log zx,t + lnλx,t (1.18)
This equation follows directly from the specification of exporter prices described in
Section 1.3.2.1, although the price is now the average price of exporter xt charged to all
importers and is not specific to an importer-exporter match.21 From the trade data,
I cannot observe the productivity of individual Chinese exporters. However, there
are a number of variables in the data that I use to proxy for productivity, including
total U.S. exports, number of HS products exported, number of years exporting to
21I also assume the exponent on quality β is 1.
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the U.S., number of import partners, and number of transactions. For each industry,
I group these terms into a firm-specific vector of covariates Zx, and together with
time fixed effects, regress the exporter’s average offered price (firm-level unit value)
on these variables. I then take the residual from this regression and call it quality.
The approach is similar to the “quality ladder” estimation procedure described in
Khandewal (2010).22
Finally, I describe the final pieces of the puzzle necessary to run the MLE prob-
lem above. Firstly, with some industry variation, some U.S. importers use multiple
exporters each year. As before, rather than counting every possible permutation of
exporters as a discrete choice, I restrict attention to that exporter from which a U.S.
importer obtained the plurality (highest percentage) of its imports from each year.
Thus the “choice” in the discrete choice model is which exporter the firm imports the
most from, rather than which exporter the firm uses.23
A second simplification is to use HS6 categories: even though the trade data
is measured at the most disaggregated level possible - HS10 - many measures of
industrial characteristics that I use to compare my results with are only at the HS6
level. This is because the HS6 level is the most disaggregated level of product that is
consistent for all countries. The simplification also gives more observations and more
potential for wider geographic effects. At the same time, any switching behavior
that goes on at a more disaggregated level is swamped by this aggregation, and the
degree of product heterogeneity across firms is likely much larger than at the more
disaggregated level.
Additionally, given the fact that not every exporter is found in both periods, I
have to take a stand on the set of potential exporters X. I define the set of possible
22As a check, I estimate the model on goods that are considered highly homogeneous across sellers.
The results from including quality and leaving out quality in these industries are qualitatively similar.
23Analysis of the LFTTD indicates that U.S. importers typically import a very large share of their
total imports from only one partner. The average share of imports that come from a U.S. importer’s
main Chinese partner is 83.9%, with a standard deviation of 22%.
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exporter choices broadly, consisting of a) any exporter used in time t and b) any
new exporter in time t + 1, as long as I know what price they charged in time t. As
described above, I am making the exporter choice one of “where do I get my majority
of imports from”, meaning it is possible that we have some “new” exporters found in
time t+ 1 that have price information from time t, even though they did not actually
appear as any importer’s majority supplier in time t.
The last step is to clean the LFTTD by eliminating unreasonable prices. Unit
values in the LFTTD are particularly prone to wildly unreasonable outliers, sometimes
caused by firms writing down a quantity of 1 instead of the standard quantity that
should be used for a product, for example. Before averaging prices across transactions,
I eliminate any transactions with prices greater than the 90th percentile for an HS6
industry that are also greater than 10 times the median price in that industry. I then
repeat the process, again eliminating prices that are greater than 10 times the new
median price.
I use the above procedure to estimate the model for a large number of industries,
using data on U.S.-China trade from 2005-2006. I use TOMLAB / KNITRO to
compute the Jacobian and the gradient for Equations (1.15) and (1.17) analytically,
and then solve the above MLE problem.
1.4.3 Estimation Results
A key result from the estimation procedure is that the cost of switching is large. I
run the model on 50 industries, chosen to represent industries across the spectrum of
imported products from China that are also large enough to have both partner and
city switching.24 The value-weighted average of switching costs across the sample
of industries is βx = 2.99 and βc = 1.61. The numeric results are interpreted in
units of the Type I Extreme Value shock, which has mean 0 and standard deviation
24The list of industries and their trade shares are listed in Table 1.A.2.
32
√
pi2
6
≈ 1.29, which gives the following implication: for an importer to be indifferent
between its current partner and some other potential partner in the same city charging
the same price, the new partner must provide a positive shock to profits that is
approximately 2.99/1.29 = 2.3 standard deviations from the mean. If that new
partner is located in a separate city, then that new partner must provide a positive
shock to profits that is (2.99 + 1.61)/1.29 = 3.6 standard deviations from the mean.
Thus the estimated parameters confirm the reduced form results that frictions from
switching are large.
Furthermore, the costs are highly heterogeneous across industries. Rather than
presenting the full battery of results (available upon request), in this subsection I
present estimates of the parameters in illustrative industries.25 These estimates are
presented in Table 1.4.
I begin by presenting results for industries that have noteworthy spatial charac-
teristics related to the location of exporters. The HS6 industries “Hand Pumps for
Liquids” (HS6 841320) and “Files, rasps, and similar tools” (HS 820310) are both
characterized by fairly low degrees of out-city switching. Of all switching importers
in HS6 841320 from 2005 to 2006, only 30% switched cities. For HS6 820310, the
respective figure is 15%. Thus the estimates should reflect the fact that switching
cities is more costly through higher city-switching costs relative to partner-switching
costs. On the other hand, the HS6 industries “Portable Digital ADP Machines”
(HS6 847130) and “Motorcycles, Side-cars, Reciprocating Engine of a cylinder capac-
ity greater than 50 cc but not exceeding 250 cc ” (HS 871120) are characterized by
very high levels of inter-city switching among switching firms: 72% find a partner in
another city in HS 847130, while 86% switch cities in HS 871120. Thus the size of βc
relative to βx should be much smaller than in the previous two industries, given that
calculations of these parameters take into account how much switching is actually
25Not all industries discussed below are included in the sample of 50 industries above.
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occurring. The first panel of Table 1.4 demonstrates this to be true: those industries
with relative low levels of city switching have higher relative levels of city-switching
costs, and the opposite for industries with greater city switching.
Another illustrative comparison is to examine the “slackness” of the market for
imports- how many available exporters there are compared to the number of im-
porters. Though most industries tend to have similar numbers of importers and
exporters, the industry “Floor Coverings, Wall or Ceiling Coverings, of Polymers of
Vinyl Chloride” (HS6 391810) has many more importers than available exporters:
58 to 42. Thus this is a market where importers are truly competing for exporters,
a trend that should be reflected in low switching and high partner-switching costs.
The middle panel of Table 1.4 demonstrates this to be true: the cost of switching
exporters is a high proportion of the total exporter costs borne by switching both
partner and city.
Next, I present selected results for textile imports from China, for the purpose of
illustrating differences in elasticities of substitution. According to estimates for HS10
categories provided in Broda and Weinstein (2005), the industries “Gloves, Impreg-
nable Plastic 4Chtt less than 50% Cotton, Man-Made Fibers, kt” (HS10 6116106500)
and “Footwear, soles of rubber/plastic/leather, upper leather other protective toe-
cap” (HS10 6403406000) have particularly high elasticities of substitution (between 9
and 15, where 20 is the generally accepted upper bound on feasibility of the estimate).
The estimates are based on import data from the United States in the 1990s. High
elasticities of substitution mean importers buying these products are very sensitive
to changes in price, and are more likely to change their behavior in response to price
changes. Although different elasticities of substitution are not included explicitly in
the model, the characteristics of highly elastic industries should imply a high sensi-
tivity to price changes, and indeed a strong response of switching, measured through
βp. On the other hand, industries such as “Men’s Underpants and Briefs of Manmade
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Fibers, Knit” (HS10 6107110010) and “Ski/Snowmobile Gloves of Synthetic Fibers”
(HS10 6116930800) are industries with particularly low elasticities of substition (be-
tween 1 and 2, where the non-inclusive lower bound from the estimation procedure
is 1). In contrast to the industries described above, we would expect very weak re-
sponses of switching to price changes: these firms will not adjust their partners in
response to price changes. The lower panel of Table 1.4 confirms these conclusions
about switching and the elasticity of substitution: we see negative values for βp in
the industries earmarked as having very high substitution elasticities, whereby an in-
crease in price of one log point implies lower profits and thus, according to the model,
a switch more likely. On the other hand, the high values of βp imply that importers
in those industries are not sensitive to price changes. This unresponsiveness shows
that these firms are simply not likely to switch, as higher prices do not alter their
choices.
I further make use of concordances developed by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang,
and Zhang (2012) between HS codes and the China Industry Code (CIC) system to
analyze different types of industries based on their domestic characteristics. Using
China National Bureau of Statistics firm-level data for 2005, I isolate CIC industries
where exporters have particular characteristics relevant to the importer-exporter part-
nership decision. For example, I compare industries with highly skilled workers to
unskilled workers, and industries composed of large firms to industries composed of
small firms. I then use the HS6-CIC concordances to estimate the switching behavior
parameters among all firms importing in that CIC code. I summarize the estimates
according to their underlying traits in Table 1.5.
The first set of results relates to the labor productivity of workers in different ex-
porting industries. Chinese exporters in the industry “Arms and Ammunition” (CIC
3663) are in the lower tail of value added per worker relative to other industries. On
the other hand, exporters in the industries “Rolling and Processing of Rare Earths”
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and “Tungsten and Molybdenum Smelting” have very high levels of value added per
worker. As can be seen from the top panel of Table 5, industries with lower worker
productivity tend to be characterized by lower exporter switching costs, while those
industries with high levels of worker productivity have much higher exporter switch-
ing costs. This result is intuitive, as it implies importing firms who are importing
products with highly productive workers receive greater relationship-specific benefits,
and breaking up is more costly. On the other hand, firms with unproductive workers
have little to distinguish themselves from competing firms, and thus have lower costs
of switching from one to another.
I also compare results for firms of different employment sizes. Exporters in the
industry “Other Ward Care and Medical Equipment” (CIC 3689) are of very small
size, compared to exporters in the industry “Arms and Ammunition” (CIC 3663). The
bottom panel shows importers importing in a product category that is dominated by
small firms tend to value their relationship more, while an industry dominated by
large firms is characterized by smaller exporter switching costs and more relationship
breakups. This evidence suggests that smaller firms generally seem to be better
tailored to specific needs of importing firms, which is in line with earlier findings in
the literature, such as Blum et al (2010).
In summary, the results are broadly what we would expect of the estimates ex ante:
higher exporter switching costs relative to city switching costs appear in industries
with low levels of inter-city switching, many importers, and highly skilled workers.
Lower exporter switching costs are found in industries with high levels of inter-city
switching, and a high proportion of large firms. The next section uses the whole set of
quantitative estimates to perform counterfactual experiments about the role of these
frictions in import prices and trade flows.
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1.5 Counterfactual Experiments
1.5.1 Changes in switching costs
Switching costs in this model can be interpreted as import market frictions, by
which firms would like to import from particular other firms, but for some reason
(lack of information, poor logistics, etc) do not actually import from these partners.
There are potential efficiency gains to be realized if these costs were reduced, and
importers could enjoy lower-priced alternatives rather than remaining ”stuck” with
their previous exporting partner. The structural model I estimated above allows me
to assess how matching U.S. import prices from China, would change in response to
falling switching costs. Conversely, I also examine how prices would be affected by
increases in switching costs, such that switching occurred far less frequently than is
seen in the data.
I follow the procedure outlined by the BLS Handbook of Methods to calculate the
Import Price Index for my sample (U.S. Department of Labor, 2013).26 Using the
same sample of 50 industries as above, I then generate data according to a new set
of parameters for each industry that reflect differences in switching costs. Keeping
the state variables the same for each firm (supplier and price in the previous period),
I generate outcomes given randomly drawn extreme-value shocks and the estimated
parameters.
Specifically, for each industry j in the set of industries I use J , the industry price
index Pj sums together firm-level prices, weighted by the share of one firm’s imports
26I make one deviation from the BLS methodology, as I compute the index for each counterfactual
and then compare, while the BLS measure compares individual prices first before aggregating to a
comparative index. This is because I am comparing model simulations to other simulations. Results
are qualitatively similar, but more subject to simulation outliers, if I compare each price first and
make one index, rather than making two indices and then comparing.
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in total industry imports:
Pj =
∑
i∈Ij
ωipi (1.19)
In the above, pi is a summary measure-the mean or median- of firm i’s received
price across 1000 replications.27 I weight each firm i by the value of its imports
relative to total imports in that industry, ωi. Given these industry level price ratios, I
aggregate up using the share of industry imports in total trade wj across the industries
in my sample:
P =
∑
j∈J
wjPj (1.20)
The result is an price index that accounts for firm size and industry size. I create
the same index for each different simulation and compare it to the generated data
according to the original parameters.28The results are in Table 1.6.
The first thought experiment is to reduce both βx (the partner-switching cost)
and βc (the city-switching cost) by half for all industries, and determine the size of
the efficiency gain when more importers can separate and/or find better matches. I
find that the U.S.-China Import Price Index decreases by 12.5% in response to such
a change, as seen in Table 1.6 Column 2. Since the fixed switching cost is measured
in units of the Type I Extreme Value  shock, and the average βx is approximately 3
(about 2.5 standard deviations of the shock), this can be thought of as a reduction in
the size of the shock necessary to switch partners by about one standard deviation.
Another way to think about this reduction is at the original parameter values (and
27Above, I used log prices to estimate the model. Since log price is potentially negative in certain
industries, I exponentiate the price in each run of the generated data.
28In Appendix 1.D, I assess Model Fit by the same procedure, but comparing generated data from
the originally estimated parameters to the true data
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in the sample of industries I examine) approximately 57% of firms stayed with their
partner. This reduction results in only about 18% of all total importers now staying
with their partners. I calculate the price index for each of 1000 Monte Carlo simula-
tions under both the original and the adjusted parameter set, and present the kernel
densities in Figure 1.5.
One can see the same pattern in individual industries as well. Figure 1.6 shows the
distribution of industry price indices (Equation 1.19) in separate HS codes with higher
and lower switching costs. In many cases, the distribution is more skewed to the left,
meaning prices are typically lower after allowing for more switching. However, there
are also more cases of higher prices, such as in industry HS 610432, as a reduction in
switching costs can also lead to worse matches. Importers in this industry tend to be
insensitive to price in their final exporter decision, and thus an increase in switching
often leads to higher prices than in the case with higher switching costs.
How to interpret such a decrease in switching costs? The Chinese government
is well known for its investment in capital projects, especially infrastructure and its
national development strategy focusing on inland provinces. One plausible scenario
is that distribution networks to inland cities will improve greatly as China’s economy
further develops, exactly the type of advance that would lower the cost of adjusting
import supply chains. A second is to think of these costs as information frictions,
where importers are simply not aware of the alternative exporting options available
to them. In this case, reduction in switching costs would be interpreted as the es-
tablishment of a registry where all exporters of a particular HS product would list
their prices jointly, thus eliminating information frictions. A “gold standard” system
where national governments ensure that producers are known and marketed together
is another way to reduce switching costs. A third example would be better contract-
ing institutions in China, allowing importers to adapt short-term contracts while still
remaining confident in the ability to find quality inputs at acceptable prices over the
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long-term.
A second thought experiment is to weigh the relative effects of βx vs. βc. These
parameters are broadly interpretable as the overall difficulty in leaving one’s trading
partner, for reasons of information frictions, long-term contracts, etc. versus city-
specific effects, such as geographic agglomeration, better distribution networks, or how
rapidly developing cities compare to well-known exporting hubs. Table 1.6 Column
3 shows then when the partner-switching cost βx is reduced to zero, the amount
of importers staying reduces even further, such that the total number of staying
importers drops to 8%. Importers are also far more likely to switch city under this
scenario, as the total cost of switching cities βx + βc reduces substantially (βx is
typically 2 times higher than βc in the average industry). The effects on prices are
even stronger than the original case: if almost all importers can break up from their
partners, then the new matches have a 15% lower Import Price Index, as compared
to the original frictions. On the other hand, reducing the city friction to zero means
that, as expected, importers do switch city more often, as can be seen in Table 1.6
Column 4. However, the partner friction is important enough to still leave 30% of all
importers staying with their original partner, smaller than either of the previous two
counterfactuals. The effects on prices is also smaller, with the Import Price Index
reducing by 7.37%.
Finally, I consider the case where both the frictions are tripled, thus shutting
down many of the original switches under the original parameters. Table 1.6 Column
5 demonstrates that such a change increases the number of importers staying with
their partner to 90%, meaning the vast majority of firms are now unwilling to leave
their partner. Indeed, the effect of importers being unable to move increases the prices
received by 7.62%. Such a finding confirms the importance of supplier switching in
overall price changes.
The results of these counterfactual experiments point more broadly to the impor-
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tance of importer-exporter dynamics in considering the gains from trade over time.
If, as is typically assumed in trade models, importers equally pay the lowest price
available in a market, this presents the best scenario for welfare. Any buyer’s diver-
gence from the lowest price will necessarily lower estimates of the gains from trade.
On the other hand, there are clear policy implications for importer efficiency from
improving the general knowledge of the exporter base and helping importers have a
better understanding of all possible options. Reducing information and contract fric-
tions in practice can have a major impact on prices of goods, as the size of efficiency
gains through lower prices are a robust prediction of the model I estimate, and are
large in scope.
1.5.2 Potential for Re-Shoring
Many companies such as Apple have recently announced policies to move pro-
duction of intermediate inputs back to the U.S. I use my model to estimate how
low prices would have to be in order for importers from China to switch to another
potential supplier to which different frictions apply. Specifically, I increase the size
of the exporter choice set X by one firm, and assign it a different price to create
separate scenarios. I eliminate the geographic switching cost that must be paid to
switching this new firm, though it remains costly to switch from one’s previous firm).
I also assume this firm has the median “quality” (residual of the regression of price
on observable exporter characteristics). I then re-solve the fixed point equation in
(1.17) for each scenario, and see how many importers would choose to switch to this
new firm over 1000 simulations. By using each firm’s total share of imports in that
industry, I can then determine what fraction of trade accrues to this new firm, i.e.
how much trade would be “re-shored” given the existence of a firm with those prices
and favorable switching costs. The experiment is one way of thinking about the exis-
tence of a highly favorable supplier located in the U.S., about which U.S. firms would
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tend to have much better information. The results are found in Table 1.7.
The results demonstrate the clear inertia involved in rousting importers from
their Chinese partners, even with the elimination of geographic switching costs. If
the hypothetical firm in each industry offered a price in the 75th percentile of the
price distribution, only about 2% of trade value would come to this new U.S. firm.
However, this price is already far lower than the average U.S. exporter price for firms
in the same HS6 product. Furthermore, while it is possible to retrieve 3-4% of Chinese
imports back to the U.S. by a hypothetical firm offering the mean or median price in
each industry, this price is even farther away from the prevailing prices charged by U.S.
exporters: a decrease of approximately 57% compared to U.S. exporters producing
the same product. Thus efforts to return imports from the U.S. are significantly more
difficult than simply offering a competitive price- the considerable benefits involved
in maintaining existing relationships means that only a small share of imports would
be able to move back to this hypothetical supplier.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have documented empirically and analytically that frictions from
switching suppliers are large, and have important effects for import prices. U.S.-
China importer-exporter relationships are characterized by a lack of turnover: 45%
of importers remain with their supplier from one year to the next, and one-third of
switchers switch within the same city. I estimate a model of dynamic discrete exporter
choice, which uses partner switching costs and geographic switching costs in the con-
text of U.S. decisions to import from Chinese exporters. I derive an exporter-specific
profit function for importers from a heterogeneous firm model of international trade,
and use the techniques of industrial organization to estimate the parameters of inter-
est. Switching costs are large, and heterogeneous across industries. I then present a
number of counterfactuals, including the effects on import prices from improved dis-
tribution channels and better information. Specifically, reducing switching costs such
that U.S. importers can have better matches leads to 12.5% lower prices. Such a find-
ing can be used to assess the effects of more complete partner information and lower
distribution costs in an exporting country on welfare and aggregate productivity for
the importing country. Indeed, this paper has shown that better partner options are
often available for U.S. importers, but they are not always used. Increasing efficiency
of matches will lead to higher gains from trade than are generally considered in mod-
els where price decisions occur at the country level, and presents a clear avenue for
improving the productivity of U.S. firms through importing. The regional dimension
of exporter choice decisions is also much stronger than has generally been known.
This project is merely the first step in a robust area for growth in the study of in-
ternational trade transactions. The geographic link between importers and exporters
gives us a new way to understand how shocks in a specific area move through inter-
national trade, a field of study that has thus far been limited to industry-to-industry
linkages. Further research can augment this study that uses U.S.-China data and un-
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derstand when importers change their country of importing, and where they go when
they change. Switching costs across countries could play a role in explaining the slow
response of exports to exchange rate shocks importers may be unable to quickly
switch to more favorable import sources. In addition, future work will asses the im-
pact of specific regional policies on importer behavior, such as the formation of special
export zones in cities such as Shenzhen. Being able track exporter dropouts from the
U.S. import data presents a reasonable degree of exogenous variation that can be used
to determine U.S. final good producer behavior in response to an unexpected loss of
members of its supply chain. Finally, the increasing availability of firm-level datasets
puts the possibility of firm-to-firm linkages through trade transactions between the
production data of separate countries closer to being realized, providing the most
complete analysis of the micro-underpinnings of international trade.
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Figure 1.1: Year-to-Year “Staying” Percentages of U.S. Importers from China, 2003-8
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Notes: To determine if a U.S. importer (firm + HS10 product) kept the same ex-
porting partner from one year to the next, I calculate the majority partner for each
importer in each year, using the value imported from each manufacturing ID in the
Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD). If this majority partner
remained the same from year-to-year, then the importer “stayed” with its partner. If
the city of the majority partner remained the same, then the importer stayed in its
city, and if the majority partner province remained the same, then the importer stayed
in the same province. I apply the panel concordance for HS10 products developed by
Pierce and Schott (2012).
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Figure 1.2: U.S. Total and “Same Partner” Imports from China, 2003-2008
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Notes: Total U.S. imports from China comes is the sum of all arm’s length import
value from the Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD). To de-
termine if a U.S. importer (firm + HS10 product) kept the same exporting partner
from one year to the next, I calculate the majority partner for each importer in each
year. If this majority partner remained the same from year-to-year, then the im-
porter “stayed” with its partner. Total imports among “Stayers” is the sum of all
arm’s length import value from these importers. I apply the panel concordance for
HS10 products developed by Pierce and Schott (2012). Note that “total imports” also
includes importers who began importing the year in question (the “extensive margin”)
while total imports from “stayers”, by definition, cannot. Imports from non-entrants
(the “intensive margin”) are typically 85-90% of total imports from China over this
time period.
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Figure 1.3: Percent of U.S. Importers from China “Staying”, Additional Tests
Panel A: Year-to-Year “Staying” Percentages, Surviving Exporters, 2003-2008
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Notes: For this figure, an importer is considered to have switched (not stayed with) its
exporter only if two conditions are met: (a) the majority partner changed from one year
to the next, and (b) the majority partner in the original year is still found exporting to
someone else. The same procedure as above is followed to determine whether an importer
stayed with its partner, city, or province.
Panel B: Year-to-Year “Staying” Percentages of U.S. Firms, 2003
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Notes: For this figure, an importer is considered to have switched from its exporter if it
kept any one of its partners in any one of its HS10 imported products. The same procedure
as above is followed to determine whether an importer stayed with its partner, city, or
province.
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Table 1.1: Determinants of Supplier Stay/Switch Decision
Dependent Variable: Stayed with Chinese Exporter Year-to-Year, 2002-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Price
1st Decile -0.0085∗∗ 0.0171∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
2nd Decile -0.0052 0.0026 0.0020 0.0018
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
3rd Decile -0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
4th Decile 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
6th Decile -0.0038 -0.0043 -0.0046 -0.0047
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
7th Decile -0.0064∗∗ -0.0069∗∗ -0.0073∗∗ -0.0076∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
8th Decile -0.0109∗∗∗ -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
9th Decile -0.0138∗∗∗ -0.0091∗∗∗ -0.0112∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
10th Decile -0.0357∗∗∗ -0.0189∗∗∗ -0.0225∗∗∗ -0.0234∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log Supplier Size 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0643∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Supplier Age -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0029∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Importer Size -0.0322∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.4438∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.1047∗∗∗ 0.0863∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Entry Year FE No No No Yes
N 510,485 510,485 510,485 510,485
R2 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the HS10 level in brackets. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant
at the 5% level. HS10 and year fixed effects are included. The sample is the universe of U.S. importers (HS10 product
code and fim combination) from China who are found two years in a row. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if
the U.S. importer had the largest (plurality) share of its total import value from the same Chinese supplier in both
years, and equal to 0 if not. Log price is the log average unit value across transactions with its majority partner in the
previous year, standardized across products by subtracting the HS10 mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
Supplier size is the total estimated exports of a Chinese supplier in the HS10 product code in the prior year, based
on cross-section summation of total exports to the U.S. Supplier Age is calculated using the first year the Chinese
supplier appears in the U.S. customs data, and subtracting it from the prior year. Importer size is the total size
of imports in that HS10 product code in the prior year for any U.S. firm. Importer Entry Year is the first year a
U.S. importers is found importing from China. Any importer that has the same share of imports from two separate
Chinese suppliers is dropped.
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Figure 1.4: Role of Price in Supplier Stay/Switch Decision
Student Version of MATLAB
Notes: Log price is the log average unit value across transactions with its majority
partner in the previous year, standardized across products by subtracting the HS10
mean and dividing by the standard deviation. This variable is split into deciles,
and used as an independent variable in a linear probability model of importer
staying status. The outer lines are a 99% confidence interval, calculated with robust
standard errors clustered at the HS10 level. The sample is the universe of U.S.
importers (HS10 product code and fim combination) from China who are found two
years in a row over the years 2002-2008. Any importer that has the same share of
imports from two separate Chinese suppliers is dropped. HS10 and year fixed effects
are included. The fifth decile of price is excluded.
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Table 1.2: Determinants of Supplier Stay/Switch Decision, Linear Price
Dependent Variable: Stayed with Chinese Exporter Year-to-Year, 2002-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Price -0.0084∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Supplier Size 0.0399∗∗∗ 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0643∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Supplier Age -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0029∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Importer Size -0.0322∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.4353∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.1011∗∗∗ 0.0823∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Entry Year FE No No No Yes
N 510,485 510,485 510,485 510,485
R2 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the HS10 level in brackets. *** significant at the 1% level,
** significant at the 5% level. HS10 and year fixed effects are included. The sample is the universe
of U.S. importers (HS10 product code and fim combination) from China who are found two years
in a row. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the U.S. importer had the largest (plurality) share
of its total import value from the same Chinese supplier in both years, and equal to 0 if not. Log
price is the log average unit value across transactions with its majority partner in the previous year,
standardized across products by subtracting the HS10 mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
Supplier size is the total estimated exports of a Chinese supplier in the HS10 product code in the
prior year, based on cross-section summation of total exports to the U.S. Supplier Age is calculated
using the first year the Chinese supplier appears in the U.S. customs data, and subtracting it from
the prior year. Importer size is the total size of imports in that HS10 product code in the prior year
for any U.S. firm. Importer Entry Year is the first year a U.S. importers is found importing from
China. Any importer that has the same share of imports from two separate Chinese suppliers is
dropped.
Table 1.3: Monte Carlo Replication Results, based on 250 Replications
βp βx βc
Pre-Set Values −0.5 −1 −3
Sample A: M = 30, X = 4, C = 3
Mean −0.626 1.269 4.728
Median −0.564 0.954 3.690
Sample B: M = 30, X = 33, C = 3
Mean −0.543 0.843 8.209
Median −0.540 0.837 5.017
Sample C: M = 30, X = 33, C = 9
Mean −0.538 0.985 3.427
Median −0.512 1.055 3.081
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Table 1.4: Selected Quantitative Estimates, HS Industrial Classification
HS6 Industry βp βx βc βc/βx
Geographic Characteristics
Low City Switching
Hand Pumps for Liquids 0.08 1.67 3.95 2.36
Files, rasps, and similar tools −0.06 2.74 2.95 1.08
High City Switching
Portable Digital ADP Machines (Laptops) −0.22 3.00 0.43 0.14
Motorcycles, Side-Cars, Engine ≥ 50 cc, < 250 cc −0.13 3.91 0.19 0.05
Market Size Characteristics
Many more Importers than Exporters
Floor Coverings, Wall or Ceiling Coverings, of Polymers of Vinyl Chloride 0.08 3.69 1.38 0.37
Pencils and Crayons −0.04 3.47 1.21 0.35
Substitutability of Product
High Elasticity of Substitution
Men’s Underpants and Briefs of Manmnade Fibers, Knit −0.06 3.56 0.97 0.27
Ski/Snowmobile Gloves of Synthetic Fibers, Knit −0.05 2.82 0.69 0.24
Low Elasticity of Substitution
Gloves, Impregnable Plastic, 4 chtt, less than 50% cotton, manmade fiber, kt 0.51 1.45 1.64 1.13
Footwear, sole Rubber/Plastic/Leather, Upper Leather Protective Toe-Cap 0.25 2.76 1.75 0.63
Table 1.5: Selected Quantitative Estimates, China Industry Code (CIC) Industrial
Classification
CIC Industry βp βx βc βc/βx
Worker Characteristics
Low Skilled Workers
Arms and Ammunition −0.03 1.67 2.66 1.58
High Skilled Workers
Rolling and Processing of Rare Earths −0.01 2.63 1.86 0.70
Tungsten and Molybdenum Smelting 0.04 2.64 1.73 0.71
Firm Size Characteristics
Large Firms
Arms and Ammunition −0.03 1.67 2.66 1.58
Small Firms
Other Medical and Ward Care Equipment −0.00 2.98 1.30 0.44
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Table 1.6: Counterfactual Results (I)
Original
Sample
βx ↓ 50%
βc ↓ 50%
βx ↓ 100%
βc =
βx =
βc ↓ 100%
βx ↑ 200%
βc ↑ 200%
Price Index - -12.50% -15.20% -7.37% +7.62%
Staying 57% 18% 8% 31% 90%
City Staying 75% 43% 47% 46% 93%
Notes: Objects computed by the model simulated with the originally estimated pa-
rameters are compared to the same objects in each of four counterfactual experiments:
partner cost and city cost each reduced by half; partner cost reduced to zero, city cost
unchanged; partner cost unchanged, city cost reduced to zero; and partner cost and
city cost increased by three times. To compute the Price Index, I take the median
received price across 1000 simulations for each importer, then weight each importer
by its size within the industry. I then apply industry weights based on total trade
among along simulated industries. The staying and city staying percentages are also
estimated under the new parameter estimates.
Table 1.7: Counterfactual Results (II)
Price Mean Sim. Trade Share Median Sim. Trade Share Reduction from U.S. Exp. Price
Median 3.86% 1.75% 56.27%
Mean 3.76% 1.53% 47.47%
75th Pct. 3.18% 0.77% 34.04%
Notes: This table describes the flow of trade that would go to a hypothetical supplier not subject
to geographic switching costs. The first column describes the size of the price charged by this
hypothetical supplier compared to alternative Chinese suppliers. The second and third columns
describe the percent of imports that would flow to this supplier, while the fourth column compares
the price charged to the prevailing price charged by U.S. exporters for the same product.
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Figure 1.5: Kernel Density Plots, Original β vs. Divided by Half
Notes: This figure presents kernel densities for the weighted average Import Price
Index for importer-exporter matches predicted under the original parameters (solid
line) and reducing switching costs by half (dashed line). I run 1000 replications of
the model under each parameter set, and calculate the price index for the matches
predicted in each replication.
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Figure 1.6: Kernel Density Plots, Original β vs. Divided by Half, Selected Industries
Panel A: HS 401120, Rubber Tires
Panel B: HS 847130, Laptop Computers
Panel C: HS 852520, Cell Phones
Panel D: HS 610432, W/G Cotton Jkts.
Panel E: HS 640340, Metal Toe Footwear
Panel F: HS 850940, Mixers/Blenders
Notes: This figure is kernel densities for the Industry Import Price Index for importer-exporter
matches predicted under the original parameters (solid line) and reducing switching costs by half
(dashed line), for individual industries. I run 1000 replications of the model under each parameter
set, and calculate the price index for the matches predicted in each replication.
58
CHAPTER II
Gains from Offshoring? Evidence from U.S.
Microdata
(Joint Work with Jooyoun Park and Jagadeesh Sivadasan)
2.1 Introduction
The impact of trade on the U.S. labor markets, particularly its contribution to
the steep decline in manufacturing employment and increase in income inequality,
has been a topic of intense academic and policy interest (Feenstra 2010, Krugman
2008, Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2012, Pierce and Schott 2013).1 A major pathway
through which trade can impact employment and wages is through the offshoring of
production (Feenstra 2010, Blinder 2009).
However, empirical work has been significantly hampered by the lack of good qual-
ity data on offshoring (Kirkegaard, 2007). In this paper, we assemble a new dataset
of offshoring events and firm performance, by linking offshoring-induced employment
layoff events available from the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program to U.S.
Census Bureau panel microdata. We use this linked dataset to evaluate the effects of
1Absolute employment levels in manufacturing have sharply declined over the last decade. Per
BLS figures (data.bls.gov), manufacturing employment stayed relatively stable around 17 million
from 1990 until about 2000, and then declined sharply to about 14 million by 2004, and then further
to about 12 million in 2012.
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offshoring on the remaining domestic activities of offshoring firms.
While media discourse about offshoring focuses largely on immediate job destruc-
tion at affected plants, theoretical predictions of the effects of offshoring vary across
models. When the offshored activity has vertical linkages to the remaining domestic
activities, there is potential for complementarities between offshoring and domes-
tic activity (Harrison and McMillan 2011, Desai, Foley and Hines 2009, Sethupathy
2011). For example, in an extension of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg’s (2008) model
of offshoring, Sethupathy (2011) finds that remaining domestic units benefit from
lower input costs of the offshored input/task. While the net effect on employment
is ambiguous, total output and profits at an offshoring firm go up; if workers share
in the profits through bargaining, worker wages can be expected to rise at offshoring
firms (and fall at non-offshoring firms who lose market share). Measured productivity
at the domestic firm level is expected to go up as a result of lower costs for offshored
tasks. Further, restructuring through offshoring may help firms avoid failure relative
to non-offshorers (Park 2012a).2
However, if offshoring consists of unrelated “horizontal” activity (H-FDI), foreign
employment may be a substitute for domestic employment, even in remaining domes-
tic units, as support activities in other parts of the firm may be eliminated following
offshoring (Harrison and McMillan 2011, Markusen and Maskus 2001). Further, with
H-FDI, there is no linkage to other parts of the firm via lower input costs, so mea-
sured productivity at the (domestic) firm level may be unaffected. Thus the extent to
which offshoring affects firm-level employment and other outcomes is an interesting
empirical question.
The TAA program administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) is
2Park (2012a) analyzes the theoretical employment effect of offshoring in a heterogeneous firm
framework and finds the majority of industry-level negative effects stem from the “cleansing effect” -
job destruction from the downsizing or death of non-offshoring firms that lose price competitiveness
against their offshoring rivals. Our focus in this paper is not on the aggregate effects of offshoring,
but rather on firm level outcomes for offshorers (which we assess by comparing offshorers to industry
peers).
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intended to help find reemployment for workers who lose jobs specifically because
of trade related reasons. When layoffs occur at a plant, different concerned parties
can file a petition with the USDOL; in our data 50% of petitions were filed by the
company, 42% by the union, and the remaining 8% by state workforce offices. These
petitions are then investigated by the USDOL to verify that layoffs were indeed trade-
related. The rejection rate is non-trivial – in our sample about 45% of the petitions
were rejected. Starting in 1999, approved petitions were classified into four categories
based the reason for layoff, two of which (certified due to production relocation, or
company’s choice to replace the domestic tasks with imports) relate specifically to
offshoring (the other two categories relate to import competition). More details about
the TAA program and the petition data are provided in Appendix 2.A.
We use name-matching algorithms supplemented by extensive manual checks and
modifications to link the names (and state) of establishments in the TAA petition
data to the U.S. Census Bureau’s business register (more details are provided in
the Data Appendix). We achieve a match rate of about 70 percent; after cleaning
and linking to the underlying Census micro data sets, and focusing only on initial
offshoring events within firms our analysis covers about 1,400 unique offshoring firms
with a limited set of variables (from the Longitudinal Business Database) and about
1,000 unique offshoring firms with greater information (from the Census and Annual
Survey of Manufactures). We use these data to understand offshorers and examine
the effects of offshoring on a range of outcomes at the (domestic) aggregate firm level.
First, we examine the basic characteristics of offshoring firms relative to the overall
population of firms. Consistent with models where offshoring involves a fixed cost
(e.g. Sethupathy 2011), we find that prior to initiation of offshoring, offshorers are
larger, more capital intensive, and more productive than non-offshorers. Interestingly,
offshoring firms were not more skill intensive than others in the industry.3
3Because large firms are typically more skill-intensive than smaller firms, relative to similar sized
peers, offshorers appear to have lower skill-intensity. This consistent with economic theory, as we
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Next, we examine the effects of offshoring. A key concern for this analysis in
our setting is the potential endogeneity of the offshoring decision. We attempt to
address this concern in a number of ways. Because the key drivers of the offshoring
decision are likely to be industry shocks (e.g., reduction of transport costs, or increased
competition from imports), in our baseline analysis, for each offshoring firm, we select
two “controls” closest in size to an offshorer firm from within the same 3-digit industry,
and form cells consisting of the offshorer and matched peers. The matching on size
addresses potential concern that the effect of industry shocks varies by firm size. We
then estimate difference-in-differences effects of offshoring, by comparing offshorers
to the matched controls. In our most conservative specification, we include cell-year
controls, that allow for differential shocks affecting each of the matched groups, so
that the estimated effects are net of industry-size cell-year shocks.
We find that firms experience a significant decline in employment coincident with
the initiation of offshoring, with the decline continuing for 3 to 4 years after. We find
no evidence of firm employment recovery: over a six-year window of time from the
initiation of offshoring, firm-level employment remains well below the pre-offshoring
levels, with an average drop of 32% employment. Importantly, this pattern of em-
ployment reduction is very similar if we restrict the sample to multi-unit firms only,
or to only non-offshoring plants within a offshoring firm. The magnitudes of declines
in employment are similar for the aggregate of non-offshoring plants, suggesting sig-
nificant declines in supporting activities at other parts of the firm. Consistent with
the decline in employment, we find stark declines in output (28%) and capital (22%)
at the firm level; again similar patterns also hold for the aggregate of non-affected
plants within offshoring firms.
We find no discernible change in wages for either production workers or non-
may expect low skill activities to be precisely the ones to be offshored (e.g., Krugman 2008). But
it provides a noteworthy contrast to the stylized facts for exporters, who are both larger as well as
more skill-intensive than non-exporters (e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1999).
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production workers. We find small gains in labor productivity (measured as real
output per worker or real value added per worker). However, these gains appear
to be achieved through more intense use of capital (as capital declines less than
employment); firm level total factor productivity (TFP) measures that account for
capital show no significant change relative to controls. We also examine firm survival
rates, and find that the survival rate of firms who offshore is very similar to control
group firms.
One potential source of bias for DID analysis is the presence of pre-existing trends.
We specifically test for this in two ways. First, we plot the trends for both the
treatment and control groups for a 13-year window around the offshoring event (see
e.g. Figure ??) as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009, who cite Autor 2003).
These figures show that: (a) the offshoring firms do not show a significant declining
trend in any of the key outcome variables prior to offshoring; (b) the trends for the
control group of industry-employment matched firms are very similar prior to the
offshoring event; and (c) there is a stark break in trend for offshorers relative to
non-offshorers, consistent with changes being triggered by offshoring. Second, in the
regression analysis, we include a test for pre-existing trends, and we confirm that the
post-offshoring decline for employment, output and capital very significantly exceed
the magnitude of preexisting trend effects (if any).
While our baseline DID analysis controls for endogeneity from omitted industry-
size variables, there could be concerns about differential trends based on other (non-
size) initial characteristics. To condition on a richer set of variables, we adopt a
propensity score matching approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). In addition to
employment, we include capital intensity as well as production and non-production
wages in the propensity model. We then redo our analysis using controls matched on
the propensity score, and we find our baseline results very robust to this alternative
DID approach.
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We undertake a number of additional checks of our results. First, one possibility
not captured in our baseline analysis using manufacturing sector data is that potential
benefits from offshoring are transmitted mainly to non-manufacturing activities of
the firm. For example, if the offshored product is distributed by domestic retail
or wholesale establishments, employment gains may be observed mainly in these
marketing units or at the headquarters. To examine this possibility, we use data from
the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which includes employment and payroll
information on all establishments in all sectors. We find results consistent with the
baseline analysis; in particular, we find significant declines in firm-level employment,
and no change in average wage.
Second, we check the robustness of the sharp decline in employment, output, and
capital to using an alternative instrumental variables (IV) approach to address en-
dogeneity. Our IV approach draws on Pierce and Schott (2013), who find evidence
that the decline in employment in manufacturing was sharper in those industries
for which the threat of tariff hikes with China declined the most, following confer-
ral of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) on China. Specifically, they find
“circumstantial evidence that these changes in employment are driven in part by off-
shoring.” The idea behind our IV approach is that the PNTR status reduces expected
costs of offshoring, as expected future tariffs form part of expected transport costs.
Because other industry level shocks need to be controlled for, this variation alone
does not provide a usable instrument (as reduction of tariff hike threats would get
absorbed by industry fixed or industry-year effects). However, any model with a fixed
cost of offshoring (e.g., Sethupathy 2011) generates the prediction that reductions in
offshoring costs are more likely to affect larger firms, as the smallest firms are not
close to the margin for making the switch to offshoring (see Figure ??). Thus, for
our primary IV specification, we use lagged (prior to offshoring) employment levels
interacted with the reduction in potential tariffs as an instrument for the offshoring
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decision. Our first stage results suggest instruments are sufficiently strong, and they
also pass the Hansen’s overidentification test. The IV results confirm the conclusions
from the baseline analysis (the IV results have greater magnitude for the employ-
ment and capital reductions, and smaller magnitudes for the sales output and value
added).4
We also confirmed robustness of our findings to a number of additional concerns,
discussed in detail in Section ??. Thus, in our sample, offshoring was a strong
substitute for domestic activity, with output, employment, and capital showing sig-
nificant declines. Our results appear consistent with shifting of entire product lines
abroad, where offshored activity lacked strong vertical linkages with remaining home
activities. 5
Our paper contributes to the literature that has studied whether offshoring is a
complement or substitute for domestic employment. Our finding of a stark negative
impact on domestic firm output, employment and capital stand in contrast to a
number of studies in this literature (which are reviewed in more detail in Section ??
below). Two prominent recent studies are Harrison and McMillan (2011) and Desai,
Hines and Foley (2009). In a careful study using MNC survey data from the BEA
(which allows them to examine effects separately by destination of outward investment
flows), Harrison and McMillan find that in general, offshoring to low-income countries
substitutes for domestic employment. Using foreign GDP growth as an instrument,
Desai, Hines and Foley (2009) find that foreign investment is generally a complement
4The results are also robust to adding lagged capital intensity, white collar and blue collar
wage rates and their interactions with the reduction in threat of tariff hikes as additional instru-
ments(though these set of instruments fail the overidentification test).
5To check for complementarity, we examined a sub-sample where the activity at the offshored
plant was a significant supplier to activities in the remaining plants, per the Input-Output tables
(following the approach in Atalay, Hortascu and Syverson 2014). However, we find no significant
difference in results for this sub-sample. We interpret this as suggesting that, as documented by
Atalay et al (using Commodity flow survey data for the US) and by Ramondo, Rappaport and Ruhl
(2014) (using MNC survey data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)), actual input flows
may not be occurring within firms even when plants appear vertically related per the Input-Output
tables.
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for domestic investment. The major novelty in our paper is the new linked data that
allows us to examine events that are verified (by the U.S. Department of Labor) to
be related to offshoring.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section ?? describes the
related literature and the alternative approaches to measuring offshoring. Section
?? presents a model of offshoring drawn from Sethupathy (2011)’s extension of the
Grossman–Rossi-Hansberg’s (2008) work, and briefly discusses the case of horizontal
FDI. Section ?? describes the data in more detail. Section ?? briefly describes the
empirical methodology used to evaluate the effects of offshoring. Section ?? presents
our baseline results. Section ?? describes our robustness checks; Section 8 discusses
results and concludes.
2.2 Related Literature and Measurement of Offshoring
The most common approach to measure offshoring in the existing literature is to
use the share of imported inputs. At the industry level, this entails using input-output
tables to identify offshoring industries. The general consensus in this literature is that
employment effects of offshoring are weak. Amiti and Wei (2006) find that the impact
is insignificant at the disaggregated level, but positive at a more aggregated level in
the U.S. manufacturing sector between 1992 and 2000. In a similar study, Amiti
and Wei (2005) find an insignificant employment effect in the U.K. manufacturing
industry between 1995 and 2001. For the Canadian manufacturing sector, Morissette
and Johnson (2007) find that the industries with intense offshoring did not show
significantly different employment growth rates compared to other industries. Koller
and Stehrer (2010) use Austrian data and find that offshoring had a negative effect
during 1995-2000, but a positive effect during 2000-2003.
Such a measure can also be constructed for firm-level data. For the U.S., the 1987
and 1992 Census of Manufactures conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau collects data
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on plant-level imported input usage. All manufacturing plants were asked whether
they used any inputs of foreign origin. The answer ’yes’ is used as a flag for an
offshoring activity in many early studies (Berman, Bound and Griliches 1994; Feenstra
and Hanson 1996 & 1999; Kurz, 2006). Unfortunately, the Census stopped asking
this question after 1992.6 Similar attempts have been made with micro data of other
countries. E.g., Hummels et al.(2011) use Danish employer-employee matched data
to explore a similar question with more focus on the impacts on wage rates. They
find that offshoring increases high-skilled wages and decreases low-skilled wages, and
that workers displaced by offshoring suffer from a larger wage loss than from other
layoffs.
An important limitation of using imported input usage as a measure of offshoring is
that the imported inputs could be related to newly introduced products rather than
replacement of in-house inputs (Feenstra and Markusen 1994). These new inputs
would not involve shifting of in-house production, and hence may not capture true
offshoring. Further, if an entire production line is offshored, no measured increase
in imported inputs will be recorded even though offshoring is taking place; in fact
if the offshored activity used some imported inputs, the fraction of inputs imported
may even decline. Our data allow us to identify offshoring events certified by an
independent investigator, and this avoids these two sources of measurement error
that could impact the use of imported intermediate inputs as a proxy for offshoring.
A second source used to identify offshoring is survey data on foreign operations of
the U.S. multinationals, collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
This dataset has detailed operational information at the establishment level, including
location, employment and wages. Brainard and Riker (2001) find little substitution
between U.S. facilities and foreign affiliates, and larger substitution among foreign
affiliates in low wage countries. Stronger substitution between home and foreign affil-
6A subsample of establishments were asked this question in the 2007 Census, and used in work
by Fort (2011) who investigates the determinants of importing.
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iate employment is found by Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005). On the other
hand, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009) find complementarity between home and foreign
affiliates of U.S. multinationals; they find that when foreign investment (employment
compensation) rises by 10%, U.S. domestic investment (employment) rises by 2.6%
(3.7%). In contrast, Borga (2005) finds an insignificant effect. Harrison and McMillan
(2011) find that while overall offshoring substitutes for domestic employment, the ef-
fects of offshoring are nuanced. For firms that do significantly different tasks at home
and abroad, foreign and domestic employment are complements, whereas for firms
that do similar tasks, foreign and domestic employment are substitutes. Sethupathy
(2011) examines offshoring activities to Mexico using the same BEA data. He finds
an increase in wages and no evidence of greater job losses in domestic locations at
offshoring firms. Similar analysis was performed using the data on European firms.
Muendler and Becker (2010) investigate German multinationals and find strong sub-
stitution. Braconier and Ekholm (2000) find substitution between Swedish facilities
and affiliates in high-income countries, but neither substitution nor complementarity
for affiliates in low-income countries.
One drawback of this type of data is that it does not capture the impact of off-
shoring through arm’s length contracts, which according to Bernard et al. (2005),
account for about half of offshoring activities of U.S. multinationals. Further, some of
the outward investment observed in these data sets, even when they are in vertically-
related industries may not be related to offshoring, as they could be related to ex-
pansions of activity abroad (rather than shifting of production from home).7
7E.g., Desai et al (2009) describe their work as investigating the effect of foreign investments
broadly (rather than offshoring specifically). While they find that FDI outflows and domestic in-
vestments are complementary, earlier work on the effects of foreign investment found mixed effects
of foreign operations on domestic activity. A negative link was found for seven selected U.S. multi-
nationals (Stevens and Lipsey, 1992) and for aggregate data in OECD economies (Feldstein, 1995).
A positive link was found for cross-section of U.S. multinationals (Lipsey, 1995), aggregate data
for Australia (Faeth, 2005), German firm-level data (Kleinert and Toubal, 2010), German industry-
level data (Arndt, Buch, and Schnitzer, 2007), and industry-level data for Canada (Hejazi and Pauly,
2001).
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The strength of our data is that, because of the nature of the TAA program and
classification scheme used by the Department of Labor, we are able to include events
of production shifting abroad irrespective of whether it was within the firm or to
outside parties. Also, any outbound investments not related to production shifting
are not included in our data.
2.3 Theoretical motivation
The theoretical predictions about the effect of offshoring on domestic activity de-
pends crucially on whether the activity is vertically related to the remaining domestic
activities of the firm (Harrison and McMillan 2011). We discuss the theoretical back-
ground for both vertical and horizontal FDI offshoring, with some more details for
a horizontal FDI model with heterogenous firms. Because the nature of fixed costs
and marginal cost savings are likely to be similar for both types offshoring, the re-
sults about which type of firms benefits from lower offshoring costs is likely to be the
similar as well.
2.3.1 A model of vertical FDI offshoring
In this section, we present a brief version of Sethupathy’s (2011) extension of
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg’s (2008) seminal model of offshoring, where tasks
within a vertically linked chain are offshored. While the model in Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008) allows two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, it limits firms
to be homogeneous. Sethupathy (2011) allows firm heterogeneity while limiting work-
ers to be homogeneous.
2.3.1.1 Set-up
There are two sectors, X and Y , and one factor, labor. Sector X has homogeneous
goods produced using CRS technology. Offshoring is not possible in sector X and the
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product market is perfectly competitive. Workers are paid their marginal product,
wX . Sector Y has differentiated products with a monopolistically competitive market.
Workers first look for a job in sector Y and all residual workers are absorbed by sector
X.
First, firms in sector Y incur a sunk entry cost fe and get a productivity draw φ
from the Pareto distribution G(φ). After learning their productivity, firms enter the
labor market to hire their workforce and start producing. The production function
is q = φN(φ) where N(φ) denotes the total employment by this firm. Production
is composed of a continuum of tasks z with a mass 1 (z ∈ [0, 1]). The employment
share of each task is fixed as s. The cost of offshoring task z has two multiplicative
components: heterogeneous offshoring cost t(z) and policy cost β. Tasks are indexed
according to the size of their offshoring cost so that t′(z) > 0. The domestic wage is
wd and the foreign wage rate is wf . Therefore, the cost of performing task z is sNwd
at home and βt(z)sNwf in the foreign country.
Workers begin their job search in sector Y keeping the job in sector X as an
outside option. Firms with productivity φ pay a search cost b(φ) (b′(φ) > 0) and
receive a random match. The domestic wage rate in sector Y , wd, is determined
through Nash bargaining between an employer and a worker as the following:
Max
wd
θln(wd − wx) + (1− θ)ln(piop)
where piop is the marginal profit of an additional worker and θ denotes the Nash
bargaining parameter. This maximization problem yields the rent sharing wage spec-
ification as the following:
wd = ηpiop+wx where η =
θ
1− θ : rent sharing parameter
Consumer demand is characterized by the quasi-linear utility function as in Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008). Utility maximization yields the following expression for the
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demand for product i in sector Y :
pi = ρ− γqi − λQy ,
where ρ summarizes the degree of substitution among differentiated products in Y ,
γ indicates the degree of product differentiation, and λ is the degree of substitution
between production in X and Y . Qy denotes the total consumption of sector Y
products.
2.3.1.2 Impact of a Fall in Offshoring Cost
As in Melitz (2003), the equilibrium is characterized by cut-off productivities
of firms with different operational strategies. In this set-up, we have two cut-off
productivities: one for survival and the other for offshoring. This is depicted in panel
(a) of Figure ??. Each offshoring firm then has a marginal task that separates the
offshored tasks and domestic activities.
If the policy cost of offshoring, β, decreases, firms with different productivity
levels respond differently. These responses are summarized in panel (b) of Figure ??.
First, the cut-off productivity for offshoring falls, since offshoring brings larger cost
reduction for all tasks offshored. This implies that offshoring becomes profitable
for more firms, including the firms with lower-productivity. Second, the extent of
offshoring within an offshoring firm increases. Recall that costs of carrying out task
z at home and in the foreign country are sNwd and βt(z)sNwf , respectively. As β
falls, the marginal task z∗ such that wd = βt(z∗)wf falls. Therefore, offshoring firms
enjoy cost reduction for a larger fraction of their production process. Third, the cut-
off productivity for survival increases. Park (2012a) terms this the cleansing effect
of offshoring. The cost reduction from offshoring reduces the prices of the products
by offshoring firms, raising the relative price of the non-offshoring firms. This hurts
their profitability, and it becomes harder for non-offshorers to survive.
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The employment effect within offshoring firms is ambiguous because there is job
creation as well as job destruction. As they initiate offshoring of some tasks, their
employment in those tasks at home decreases. However, their prices fall from cost
reduction which leads to larger sales. This could lead to job creation, potentially
large enough to offset the initial job destruction. The sign of the net effect cannot be
determined analytically and depends on parameters of the model (Park, 2012a). The
fall in offshoring cost unambiguously improves profitability of offshorers and causes
their wage rates to rise through rent-sharing.
Thus this model predicts: (i) an ambiguous net effect on firm-level employment;
(ii) positive effect on output; iii) positive effect on wage rates; (iv) positive effect
on the survival rate of offshorers relative to non-offshorers. Further, if total factor
productivity (TFP) measurement uses common input deflators for all firms within an
industry (as we use in this study), measured TFP would increase for offshorers (as
they actually face lower input prices, and hence would have relatively lower measured
real inputs when a common deflator is used).
In the model above, the positive spillover to domestic output arises due to vertical
linkages between the offshored activity and the remaining domestic activity, with the
offshored input now being lower cost than before. In general, as discussed in Desai
et al (2009), there could be complementarities also if the remaining domestic activity
is upstream (e.g., when the more skill or capital intensive activity is retained in the
U.S. and labor intensive assembly of final product is offshored abroad). Even in this
case, the lower overall cost of production would allow the firm to lower prices and
gain market share, leading to an expansion in its domestic activity.
2.3.2 Alternative model: Shifting entire product line (Horizontal FDI)
However, if offshoring consists of a shift of an entire product line (unrelated to
remaining domestic activity), foreign employment may simply involve a shift of em-
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ployment, with no spillover effects. In fact, this type of “horizontal FDI” (H-FDI)
could lead to job losses in remaining domestic units, if support activities in other
parts of the firm are eliminated following offshoring (Harrison and McMillan 2011,
Markusen and Maskus 2001). Further, with H-FDI, measured productivity at the (do-
mestic) firm level would be unaffected, as there is no distinct effect on the marginal
costs of other activities.
There would also be no output gain at all if the shift involved movement of ex-
port production to another country (termed “export-platform FDI” by Harrison and
McMillan, 2011). If part of the shifted production was sold through domestic estab-
lishments, there would be gains recorded in output of other domestic units (possibly
in marketing units). We investigate this possibility by including non-manufacturing
establishments in part of the analysis (see discussion in Section ??). But if the
foreign plant sold directly to other firms directly, the sales would be recorded by
the foreign plant, and this would not affect measured output of remaining domestic
establishments.
Because the nature of the optimization problem faced by the firm is similar to that
discussed above for vertical offshoring, the effect of reduction in offshoring costs can
be expected to be similar as well. In particular, if offshoring involves a fixed cost, then
offshoring may not be preferred by firms below a cutoff productivity level for whom
lowered marginal costs are not sufficient (because of their small scale) to cover the
fixed cost. Thus, even for horizontal FDI offshoring, under plausible assumptions,
we expect the effect of lowering of the costs of offshoring to be similar to that in
Figure ??.
2.4 Data & TAA Background
We use three main sets of data in our analysis: Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA) petition data to provide information on layoff events related to offshoring; the
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U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), with basic operational
information on the universe of establishments in the U.S.; and the U.S. Census Bu-
reau’s Annual Surveys of Manufactures/Censuses of Manufactures (ASM/CMF) with
more detailed information for manufacturing establishments.
2.4.1 Trade Adjustment Assistance Program Background and Data
The information on trade-induced layoffs in U.S. manufacturing plants is obtained
from administrative dataof the U.S Department of Labor’s (USDOL) TAA program.
The bulk of the petition data we use was procured through a Freedom of Information
Act request; this was then complemented with manual data collection from TAA
websites.8
The TAA is a dislocated worker program that originated with the Trade Act of
1974. When layoffs occur, workers or any entity that represents them (company,
union, or state) may file a petition with USDOL. The petitions are filed at the plant
level. The minimum requirement for petitioning is that three or more workers were
laid off or get their work hours reduced. Historically, the majority of petitions were
filed by labor unions, but an increasing fraction is being filed by companies. For our
sample period - between 1999 and 2006 - 50% of petitions were filed by companies,
42% by unions and workers, and the remaining 8% by State Workforce Office.
The petition filing process is straightforward. The petitioner(s) needs to fill out
two-page petition form with basic information about the employer or layoff event such
as name and address of the employer, articles produced by the establishment, and
the separation dates of the three workers listed on the form. The petition form is
available on USDOL website (and can be easily found easily through search engines).
The petitioner can fax/mail the form, or file it online at no cost. The petition can be
8Some petitions are filed under the North American Free Trade Agreement-Transitional Adjust-
ment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA) program for years between 1994 and 2003. The NAFTA-TAA
program was merged into the regular TAA by the Trade Act of 2002.
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filed within a year from the separation date.
Once filed, each petition is assigned an investigator from USDOL who conducts
interviews at the petitioned plant, upstream/downstream plants, and with customers
to identify the reason for layoffs and determine when they began (impact date).
Certification is issued if the reason for layoffs is determined to be one of the following:
(i) company imports (the company itself replaced in-house tasks with imported tasks);
(ii) customer imports (buyers now purchase from foreign firms instead of this plant);
(iii) production shift (the company replaced tasks with activities at own subsidiaries
abroad); and (iv) increase in aggregate imports (an increase in imports of the plant’s
product at the aggregate level).9 45% of petitions in our sample period are denied,
as they were deemed not to be trade related. Decisions made on TAA petitions are
published in the Federal Register and on the DOL website.
Once certified, the workers displaced from this plant between the impact date
and two years from the certification date (or impact date whichever comes later)
are eligible for various benefits provided under the TAA program. The benefits,
summarized in Appendix Table A.1 (taken from Park 2011), include job training up
to 2 years, remedial training, extended unemployment insurance during training, and
other financial support such as relocation allowance and job search allowance. It
should be noted that the dollar spending on the TAA program is very small relative
to other transfer programs (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013). Per Autor, et al., per
capita in 2007 , in-kind medical transfer programs spent about $2,500, social security
retirement insurance about $1,400, disability insurance about $300, federal income
assistance about $300, whereas TAA payments amounted to just $2 per capita. Also,
a substantial portion of TAA spending was spent on re-employment services, mainly
training (see Table B-1 in Collins 2012).
9This category (instead of category (ii) customer imports) usually applies when an establishment
has many small buyers rather than a few large customers. Many petitions filed in the paper industry
were certified for this reason.
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Based on the reason for layoffs, we classify the petitions into three groups: off-
shoring events, import-competition events, and denied petitions. Offshoring events
are the petitions certified due to company imports or production shifts (criteria (i)
and (iii) above). The layoffs in these events reflect a voluntary decision of the com-
pany, indicating a strategic move to relocate activity abroad. Import-competition
events, instead, are those driven by external forces (categories (ii) and (iv) above).
The petition data report company name, address (state, city, zip code, street
address), impact date (the day layoffs began), and 4-digit SIC code. The reason
for displacement is reported only after 2002 in the collated data provided by the
USDOL in response to our FOIA request (after the Trade Reform Act of 2002 revised
the coding guidelines). Though unreported, USDOL had began this classification
process prior to 2002; for petitions between 1999 to 2001, we manually examined the
investigation report of each certified petition (available on the USDOL website) to
identify the reason for certification. We classify a total of 19,603 petitions over our
sample’s impact years range of 1999 to 2006.10
2.4.2 Micro data from the U.S. Census Bureau
We link the information on layoff events from the TAA petition data to confidential
micro data from the U.S. Census Bureau. There are two sets of U.S. Census micro data
we use to explore firm-level impacts of offshoring. Our primary source is the Annual
Surveys and Censuses of Manufactures (ASM/CMF); we conduct some supplementary
analysis using the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD).
In order to analyze the impact of offshoring on difefrent aspects of firm-level
10Between 1999 and 2006, a total of 23,327 petitions were filed and 12,831 were certified. Of those
certified, we were able to identify the reason for layoff for 9,107 petitions. In order to construct the
sample of offshoring events and import competition events, we dropped the certified petitions for
which the detailed classification was not documented. Thus our final sample includes 9,107 petitions
certified with a reason identified and 10,496 denied, totalling 19,603. Table A1 shows the number
of certified petitions and offshoring events for each impact year (before cleaning of data to focus on
initial offshoring episode for affected firms).
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operations, we use ASM/CMF data as our main database. The ASM/CMF contains
a rich set of variables such as employment and payroll separately for production and
non-production workers, total value of shipments (output), value added, material
costs, fixed assets, and investment.
Coverage includes all manufacturing establishments in the Census (CMF) years,
and a sub-sample in the ASM years. More specifically, the CMF is a quinquennial
survey on the universe of U.S. manufacturing establishments, undertaken in years
ending in 2 or 7. For between-Census years, a similar set of information is collected
in the ASM for a representative sample of manufacturing establishments. The sam-
pling weight is based on the employment size in the most recent CMF with larger
establishments receiving a larger weight. Establishments with 1,000 or more employ-
ees, as well as all establishments of multi-unit firms, are included with certainty. The
ASM sample changes every five years.
The LBD consists of data on all private, non-farm U.S. establishments in existence
that have at least one paid employee, including non-manufacturing establishments,
but it collects limited operational information for each plant. The LBD contains
annual information on total employment, total payroll, industry, location, and also
the birth and exit year for each establishment.11
A concern when undertaking analysis with ASM/CMF variables relates to the
potential loss of data in the ASM years, and the lack of non-manufacturing establish-
ments in the ASM/CMF. We retain approximately 65% in the ASM/CMF sample
compared to our LBD sample. The explanation for why we retain a significant frac-
tion of the LBD sample in the ASM-CMF is twofold: (i) offshoring firms are predom-
inantly engaged in manufacturing activity; and (ii) as we document in Section ??
below, firms (and establishments) that offshore are significantly bigger than average
and hence they are disproportionately included in the ASM/CMF. In any case, we
11The birth year is left-censored at the start of the data (1976) and the exit year is right censored
at the end of our LBD data period (2009).
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check robustness of the results to concerns about potential bias from loss of data for
ASM years in three ways: (i) in Section ??, we check robustness of our employment
and wage analysis using the LBD sample; (ii) in Section ??, we examine robust-
ness in a sub-sample of multi-unit firms (all units of multi-unit firms are sampled
with certainty in the ASM); and (iii) we examine robustness in a balanced panel of
establishments in Section ??.12
2.4.3 Merging of TAA to Census Microdata and Construction of Firm-
level Variables
Since TAA petitions are filed at the plant level, the merging of the TAA petition
data and the micro data from the Census Bureau is performed at the plant-level.
The matching of the names and state information in the petition data to the U.S.
Census business register is done using name matching algorithms, supplemented with
extensive manual checks and modifications; we provide details on the merging process
in the Data Appendix.
Using the firm identification codes available in the Census microdata, we aggregate
establishments to one firm. Some firms experienced multiple offshoring events during
the observation period, either at different plants at the same time (cross-section)
and/or at different times in the observation period (time-series).13 In such cases, we
use the impact date of the first offshoring event as the firm’s initiation of offshoring.
We undertake analysis at the firm aggregate level, and use industry or industry-
year effects in most specifications. For multi-unit firms, within each firm we aggregate
establishment-level employment by 3-digit 1987 SIC codes, and pick the SIC code
with the largest employment as the firm’s industry. Other firm-level variables (e.g.,
12Tests (ii) and (iii) are motivated by other reasons as well, as discussed in the respective sections.
13A certified petition covers all workers laid off between the impact date and two years after
the certification of the petition. So if the firm continues to layoff workers as part of a staggered
offshoring process beyond two years after certification of an initial petition, it would need to file a
second petition for the laid off workers to get TAA support.
78
employment or value added) are aggregates from establishments in the data. Firm
level factor intensity measures are obtained using firm-level aggregates of underlying
variables (e.g., firm capital intensity is firm level real capital stock divided by firm
level real output).
For productivity measurement, we use a number of different approaches: in addi-
tion to labor productivity measures (real output per worker and real value added per
worker), we also estimate total factor productivity as residuals from a value added
production function, estimated alternatively using OLS (with plant-fixed effects) and
using the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to control for endogeneity of inputs.
These estimation methods measure TFP at the plant level; in the baseline results
reported below, we aggregate productivity measures up to the firm level using the
(unweighted) average across all plants at a firm. We check and confirm robustness
(unreported) to using an employment-weighted average across all plants, as well as a
relative (within-industry) ranking of each of these measures across firms.
2.5 Empirical Methodology
Our main interest is in the firm-level impact of offshoring. While it is expected that
the subunit with the offshored activity will see reduction in employment and output,
the model sketched out in Section ?? suggests that other domestic units of the
offshoring firm would realize benefits from offshoring, so that firm-level employment
and output could show improvements in medium- and long-run.
We carry out the impact analysis by exploiting the timing of layoff events identi-
fied by our data. In order to separate the operational changes caused by offshoring
events from other industry- or even economy-wide factors surrounding the timing of
offshoring, we use a difference-in-differences estimation approach, using a matched
control group of peer firms. In our baseline analysis we use a ‘nearest neighbor’
matching, choosing two controls for each offshored firm based on employment within
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the same industry (as discussed in Section ??); to undertake the analysis below,
the two matched controls are assigned the same event year as the offshored firm.
As an alternative robustness check, we use a propensity-score matching approach(as
discussed in Section ?? below).
We build a longitudinal link for each treated and control firm for a 13-year window,
six years before and after the impact year. We investigate the impacts of offshoring
on a range of outcomes including size (sales, value added, employment, and capi-
tal), wage rates (overall, production and non-production), factor intensity (capital
per employee, non-production share of employment and wage bill), and productivity
(labor productivity and TFP measures). An outcome variable, yijt, of firm i belong-
ing to group j (where one group consists of one treated firm and one to two controls)
observed at time t is estimated using the following specification:
yijt = γ0 +
6∑
k=−6
(βkδi + αk)Dj,t+k + fi + eijt (2.1)
where t + k is the impact year (the offshoring event occurs k years away from the
current time t, with k ∈ [−6, 6]), fi stands for firm fixed effects, δi is an indicator
for an offshoring firm, and Dj,t+k is the indicator that the treated firm in group j
underwent offshoring k periods from year t. In this case, αk provides the trend for
the matched controls, and (βk+αk) provides the trend for the treated firm. Therefore,
βk captures the impact of offshoring k years from the impact year. We plot the trends
(and confidence intervals) for the treatment and control group; these figures provide
a straightforward basis to assess: (a) whether there was a clear break in trend around
the initiation of offshoring, and (b) to assess whether the offshoring firms and the
control group had similar trends before the offshoring event (Angrist and Pischke,
2009 Chapter 5). Note that since the equation is estimated with firm level fixed
effects, these estimated coefficients are averages. Standard-errors are clustered by
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treatment group throughout. We use the year prior to the impact year (k = −1) as
the omitted year.
To report summary DID effects in regression tables, we collapse the thirteen pe-
riods into four groups, two three-year periods prior and two three-year periods after
the offshoring event (explained in more detail in section ?? below).14
Equation (1) is our preferred specification, as we account for both time-invariant
firm-specific characteristics and specific differential effects in the treated firm com-
pared to its controls. In the omitted year, estimates of the variable of interest yijt
will be the same for offshorers and their controls by construction (γ̂0), as the firm
fixed effects subsume mean differences. Thus in the results that follow, the compar-
ative differences between the two groups, rather than the absolute magnitude, is the
relevant statistic.
2.6 Baseline Results
2.6.1 Cross-Sectional Comparison of Offshorers and Non-offshorers
We first present a basic comparison in firm characteristics between offshorers and
non-offshorers prior to offshoring, adopting the approach in Bernard and Jensen’s
(1999) study of exporters. To restrict attention to the cross-section for which we have
maximum data availability, we use 2002 CMF data, and examine differences between
(i) firms that have offshoring events in 2003 or later and (ii) the universe of firms that
are not linked to any identifiable offshoring event. We do this by regressing dependent
variables on an indicator for offshorers, both with and without 3-Digit SIC industry
fixed effects.
The results are shown in Table ??. Our sample of offshorers exhibit premia
14As a robustness check, in section ??, we run regressions with group-period effects (fjk), which
allows for industry-size-period specific shocks (but provides only the relative DID estimates, as the
control group effects are absorbed by the cell-year effects).
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consistent with what is expected in the model presented in Section ??. Offshorers
tend to be significantly larger - in terms of sales, value added, employment and capital,
both overall (OLS column) and relative to industry peers (Industry FE column). On
average they pay higher wages (for both production and non-production workers)
and are more capital intensive. They are also more productive, according to most
productivity measures.
Interestingly, the non-production wage and employment share measure shows that
the offshoring firms are not more skill-intensive than non-offshorers. This is notewor-
thy given that larger firms are typically both more capital and skill intensive on
average; thus future offshorers appear to be significantly less skill-intensive relative to
similar-sized firms. This finding is intuitive and consistent with economic theory – we
may expect low skill activities to be precisely the ones to be offshored by firms in a
developed country, as these activities would be the ones for which there are the largest
gains in offshoring to a low-skill abundant developing country (Krugman 2008).
2.6.2 Baseline Analysis: DID using Industry-Size Matched Controls
In order to estimate Equation (1), we construct a control group of “similar” firms.
The first approach we take is based on industry and employment size, using the LBD.
For each offshoring firm, we use total employment in the year prior to the listed impact
year, and select two firms with the closest employment directly above and below the
offshoring firm in the same 3-digit SIC industry.15 Firms that have one or more
identified offshoring events are excluded from the control group selection pool. Using
the LBD sample for control group selection allows us to take advantage of the fact
that the LBD covers the entire universe of firms operating in the U.S.; we thus select
control firms from a larger pool of firms to improve the similarity to the treated firms.
15We impose a restriction that log employment at one of these ‘nearest neighbors’ cannot be more
than 4 points different from the comparison offshorer, meaning that not every offshorer is paired
with exactly two controls.
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We then merge this sample of treated and control firms to the detailed data in the
ASM/CMF. Table ?? presents results of the difference-in-differences estimation for
all firms in our sample with employment-matched controls.
2.6.2.1 Size and Wage Variables
The top rows of Table ?? show the estimation results for size and wage measures.
The column headings refer to the time periods. LR-PRE refers to a long run pre-
offshoring period; in this context, we take this to be four to six years prior to the
offshoring impact year. SR-PRE refers to the short-run pre-offshoring period (one to
three years prior to the impact year), SR-POST the short-run post-offshoring period
(one to three years after the impact year) and LR-POST the long-run post-offshoring
period (four to six years after the impact year). In this specification, the impact year
itself is omitted. All size measures - output, value-added, employment and capital -
show a large decline in the short-run. We do not find any evidence of improvement
in these size measures even in the long run; in fact, all size measures show continuous
decline relative to their controls in the long run. We perform a t-test to explore the
short-run and long-run impacts compared to the period leading up to the impact year
(SR-PRE) rather than the impact year, with results presented in the columns headed
with “Relative to SR-PRE”. We again find significantly negative impacts in all size
measures for offshorers in both the short-run and long-run; the long-run DID decline
in output is 0.326 log points or 27.8%, in employment is 0.38 log points or 31.6%,
and in capital is 0.253 log points or 22.4%.
Finally, in the last column, we test for evidence of a pre-existing trend in these
offshorer-control comparisons that might be accounting for our results. We find no
significant differences between the treatment and control group that would indicate
trends in these variables prior to the offshoring event. As for firm wage variables, the
differential trend between offshorers and non-offshorers are very small and statistically
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insignificant. This is the case also for the average wage rate, and production and non-
production worker wage rates separately.
These results can be seen graphically in Figure ??. Here we compute coefficients
for each event-year (where the omitted event-year is year -1, i.e., one year prior to the
offshoring impact year) rather than broader time periods used above. The trend lines
for offshorers and the controls with firm fixed effects are shown with 95% confidence
bands with standard errors clustered by treatment group. Figure ?? shows that both
employment and the total value of shipments for offshoring firms display a drastic
decline in the impact year. The event associated with an impact date in the TAA
petition data clearly matches a significant layoff event for the firm. More specifically,
sub-figure (a) shows that the drastically negative adjustment occurs in the short-run
up to four years from the event, then settles at a level that is permanently lower than
that of the control group. There is little evidence that employment recovers relative
to the control group after the initial adjustment. This implies that if there is any job
creation from offshoring, it is out-weighed by continuous downsizing within the firm.
Sub-figure (b) shows the same trend for output (sales). The lack of wage impact from
offshoring is shown more vividly in sub-figures (c) and (d).
2.6.2.2 Productivity and Factor Intensity
Table ?? also presents results of the difference-in-differences procedure for fac-
tor intensity and firm productivity variables. Offshorers do appear to become more
capital-intensive than their controls after the offshoring event, which is a result of a
smaller decline in capital compared to the larger fall in employment. The share of
non-production workers in total employment also rises at offshoring firms, suggest-
ing that layoffs disproportionately affect production workers, consistent with low-skill
activities being targeted for offshoring.
For productivity measurements, we use a number of different variables: in addition
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to labor productivity measures (output per worker and value added per worker), we
also estimate total factor productivity as residuals from a value added production
function, estimated alternatively using OLS (with plant-fixed effects) and using the
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to controlling for endogeneity of inputs. While
the value-added per worker variable shows improvement in both short- and long-run
periods after offshoring, no TFP measures show significant improvement. Sub-figures
(e) and (f) of Figure ?? present the labor productivity and Levinsohn-Petrin (LP)
TFP measures. The TFP measure has a wide confidence band, and appears to show
no systematic (DID) change in relative TFP levels, consistent with the results in
Table ??.
2.6.2.3 Firm Survival
If offshoring is beneficial to the firm, one potential consequence is that offshoring
firms will be more likely to survive in the highly competitive environment that man-
ufacturing firms face. Figure ?? shows the survival rate of offshoring firms compared
to control group firms. This simply depicts the percentage of plants (sub-figure (a))
or firms (sub-figure (b)) in our LBD sample still in existence for the indicated period.
The benchmark year is the year prior to the impact year.16 Within the six years
of post-impact observation period, almost 70% of firms disappear from the data.17
However, the survival rates for offshoring firms and the controls are nearly identical.
We find no evidence that offshoring improves the firm’s chance of survival.
2.6.3 Potential Selection Bias with TAA Petition Data
Because TAA petitions are triggered by layoffs, our sample of offshoring events
captures only events where laid-off workers were not absorbed back into the same
16Numbers less than 100% before the impact year indicates that some plants/firms were born
between 6 and 1 years prior to their offshoring impact year.
17This six year period differs across firms due to the fact that they are aligned around the impact
years. They range from 1999 to 2007.
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establishment. This raises two potential issues: One, whether this is a valid sample
to test the model presented in Section ??, and two, whether the sample we look at
consists of weaker-than-average firms, so that overarching negative trends unrelated
to offshoring may be biasing our DID estimates. We believe neither of these concerns
apply in our context.
First, we believe our sample is valid for testing the model, because the analytical
predictions are not based on any particular assumptions about the fate of laid-off
workers. In particular, positive spillovers to the rest of the firm do not assume or
imply that workers in the offshored activity will be reabsorbed in the same estab-
lishment. In fact, it is likely that the offshored tasks systematically differ from the
non-offshored tasks, so that workers with skills suitable for the offshored tasks may
not be a good fit for the tasks that expand due to gains from offshoring. For example,
jobs destroyed due to offshoring could be low-skilled (as the wage advantage for the
foreign country is likely to be higher for these tasks) while the newly created jobs may
be in relatively high-skilled occupations. Thus workers who used to perform offshored
activities are not necessarily likely to be absorbed by the same establishment, under
the assumptions of the model. Accordingly, the sample of offshoring events identified
using the TAA petition data is a valid one to look for positive spillovers to other parts
of the firm.
Second, for every variable of interest, we perform two tests for pre-existing trends.
First, following the suggestion in Angrist and Pischke (2009), we examine an event
study graph that plots the trend for each of the key outcome variables, both before
and after the offshoring event, for both the treatment and control group. As is
evident from Figure ??, all the dependent variables show similar trends for the
offshorers and the control group prior to the offshoring event; for employment and
output there is a stark break in trend coincident for offshorers coincident with the
initiation of offshoring. In particular, there is no evidence of a strong decline in output
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or sales prior to the offshoring event, in absolute terms or relative to the peer group.
Second, we explicitly test for pre-existing trends in our regression analysis (column 7
in Table ??). None of the dependent variables shows any significant prior trend.
While we believe these tests provide considerable evidence that pre-existing dif-
ferences in offshoring firm characteristics are not driving the baseline results, we
check robustness of our results using an alternative method of constructing a control
group – by matching on the propensity score (generated from a model predicting the
propensity to offshore). This approach is discussed in detail below.
2.6.3.1 Propensity-matched Controls
We re-select control firms by matching on the propensity score. Specifically, we
estimate the probability of offshoring for all firms based on a variety of firm charac-
teristics, and find firms that did not offshore despite having a predicted probability
very close to actual offshorers. The potential advantage of this alternative approach
is that any post-offshoring effects driven by interaction of pre-existing characteris-
tics with changes in the environment are controlled for by matching on this scalar
propensity measure (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985), assuming certain conditions hold.
Specifically, this approach lets us incorporate a number of covariates other than size in
forming the control group. First, we estimate the following linear propensity model:
Offshoreikt = βXikt + δt + δk + εikt (2.2)
We couple the observed offshoring decision (zero or one) for firm i in industry k at
time t, Offshoreikt with a vector of firm-level covariates, Xikt, found in the ASM and
CMF, including capital intensity, skill intensity, output, and three-year employment
and wage growth rates, in order to predict the probability of offshoring given those
characteristics. If baseline results are driven by pre-existing differences for offshoring
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firms on these characteristics, then matching on the propensity score will help control
for that bias.
The results from estimation of the propensity model are presented in Table ??.
We find employment growth has no significant predictive power; however wage growth
enters negatively, suggesting some prior cost pressure on offshorers. Consistent with
the cross-sectional differences documented in Table ??, we find that higher labor pro-
ductivity, lower skill-intensity and higher capital intensity predict higher propensity
to offshore. Next, we use the predicted propensity to form control groups. and then
undertake analysis using Equation ??.
2.6.3.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimation using Propensity-matched Con-
trols
Table ?? presents results from DID estimation using propensity score matched
controls. The results are qualitatively identical to the estimation with employment-
matched controls shown in Table ??. As in the estimation with employment-matched
control, all size measures - output, value added, employment, and capital - decline
significantly immediately after the impact year and the downward trend continues
into the long-run. We perform a t-test to capture the differences between the short-
run pre-offshoring period and both the short-run and long-run post-offshoring periods,
again finding significant negative differences for offshorers. Finally, in the last column,
we test for evidence of any significant pre-offshoring differential trends between the
treatment and control groups, and we find none.
The impacts on wage rates are also qualitatively identical to what we found using
employment-matched controls. Neither production nor non-production worker wage
rates are significantly influenced by offshoring in both short- and long-run.
The bottom panel of Table ?? presents results for factor intensity and produc-
tivity measures. Again, the results are qualitatively identical to what we find using
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employment-matched controls. Offshorers do appear to become more capital-intensive
than their controls after the offshoring event, which is again the result of lower de-
cline in capital relative to employment. The share of non-production workers in total
employment also rises at offshoring firms. Measures of labor productivity improve -
weakly for shipments per worker, more strongly for value added per worker - consis-
tent with a lower decline in output relative to employment. However, again there is
little evidence of comparative TFP gains at these offshoring firms compared to their
controls in both the short- or long-run.
These results are graphically presented in Figure ??. All sub-figures display a
striking resemblance to Figure ??. This demonstrates that our results, particularly
the lack of evidence for firm-level benefits from offshoring, are not driven by the
nature of the control group we selected using employment matching for the baseline
analysis.
2.7 Robustness Checks
In order to check the robustness of our results, we perform the same difference-
in-differences estimation using various alternative specifications and sub-samples.
2.7.1 Estimation using Treatment Group-Year Fixed Effects
Our baseline regression specifications use firm fixed effects and period effects;
while this controls for all possible fixed firm specific effects, the time-varying effects
are assumed to effect all controls and offshored firms similarly. In order to allow for
group-specific shocks, which effectively allows period effects to vary by industry-size
groups, we estimate a variant of Equation (1) that includes group-year fixed effects.
The coefficients in these regressions then report variations in offshored firms relative
to their matched controls for every period. This set of results on firm performance
measures are included in Table ??, using both employment- and propensity-score-
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matched controls.
Overall, these results are qualitatively similar to the baseline findings described
above, except that changes in skill intensity and labor productivity measures are no
longer statistically significant. All size measures decline rapidly compared to the
control firms in the short-run. Wage measures show no significant changes. Capital
intensity increases, but this is significant only in the propensity-matching analysis;
skill intensity measures show no statistically significant changes. Here none of the
productivity measures show a significant change following offshoring.
2.7.2 Longitudinal Business Database Results
In this subsection, we use employment and payroll (and hence average wage) data
available on all establishments in the LBD, to check robustness of the baseline results
to two concerns.
First, it could be the case that employment gains from offshoring are experienced
in non-manufacturing establishments of the firm; in particular at the headquarters, or
in wholesale or retail establishments of the firm. The latter would be the case if the
product offshored was sold in the U.S. through the firm’s marketing arm. This would
be missed in the baseline analysis that uses manufacturing ASM/CMF data. Because
the LBD data includes these data on headquarters as well as marketing (wholesale
and retail trade) establishments, using this data would allow us to examine domestic
firm-level aggregates that include potential gains in these units.
Second, examining the LBD allows us to check robustness to potential bias from
sampling in the ASM, discussed in Section ??. Because ASM sampling puts more
weight on the larger establishments, small establishments in our TAA petition are
less likely to be selected into our ASM/CMF sample of offshoring events. Using the
LBD sample allows us to check robustness of our findings to potential bias from this
sampling procedure.
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Table ?? reports results from estimation of Equation (1) using the LBD sample.
This raises the sample size from 7,000-9000 offshorer-year observations (depending on
the matching technique) to over 12,000. Note that since we drop offshoring firms that
cannot be matched to any control, we have different observation counts, even for un-
derlying offshorer-year observations. Such an approach has many fewer observations
in the propensity score matching results, as any firm without one of the covariates
used to compute the probability of offshoring is excluded. The total number of off-
shoring events increases from approximately 1,000 (in the ASM/CMF analysis to
1,400 here.
Due to the fact that there is a limited number of operational variables in LBD, we
can only perform the analysis on total employment, total payroll, and average wage
rate. For propensity score matching analysis with the LBD, we have fewer variables
to “match” on, and thus use only employment, wage rate, 3-year employment growth
rate, and 3-year wage growth rate as our covariates for Equation (2).
We find results similar to those using the ASM/CMF sample. Employment and
total payroll drop greatly compared to the control groups in the short-run and remain
low in the long-run. While the magnitude of the long-run effect for employment in the
employment-matching approach (-0.138 log points) is lower than the long-run decline
in the baseline approach (-0.38 log points in Table ??), the magnitude of decline in
the propensity matched approach (-0.366) is very similar to that in the baseline (-0.37
log points in Table ??). The DID effect on average wage rates for offshoring firms is
a statistically significant decline of 0.029 log points in the short run, and a gain of
0.061 log points in the long run when we use employment-matched sample; however
in the propensity-matched sample we find no statistically significant changes (though
magnitudes are similar to that with the employment matched sample). Payroll shows
a significant decline, both in the short and long-term, with long-term decline being
considerably larger in the propensity-matching analysis.
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These results suggest: (i) no significant net employment gains in domestic activ-
ities, even including headquarters and marketing units, and no significant increases
in wage rates; and (ii) baseline findings for size (employment) and wages are not
impacted by loss of data from sampling in the ASM. As discussed in Section 2.4.2,
the robustness of the baseline results is not very surprising, given the large degree of
overlap between the ASM/CMF and LBD samples.
2.7.3 Multi-Unit Firms
In the model in Section ??, as some tasks of a firm are offshored, the other tasks
that remain at home benefit through the vertical supply links. At the offshored plant
itself, the destructive nature of offshoring might dominate any potential job creation
making it difficult to capture the positive effects. For single-unit firms, this offshored
plant constitutes the offshoring firm.
In this section, we analyze the impact of offshoring using only the multi-unit
firms to allow the potential positive effects to be better captured. Close to 80%
of our ASM/CMF sample is multi-unit. Table ?? presents the estimation results.
The results are qualitatively identical to our baseline analysis of all firms including
single-unit firms. Figure ?? shows the trend for total employment and total value of
shipments for the estimation using employment-matched controls. One can see that
both employment and shipment figures are very similar to subfigures (a) and (b) of
Figure ??.
2.7.4 Pseudo-Firm: Non-offshored Plants in Multi-unit Firms
We take one step deeper into separating the potential positive effects of offshoring
from the destructive effects at the offshored plants by looking only at non-offshored
plants within the offshoring firms. Specifically, we construct a “pseudo-firm” by
aggregating all plants at an offshoring firm that are not matched with any offshoring
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events from the TAA petition data. We then construct the firm-level variables using
only these plants.18 By construction, only multi-unit firms are candidates to be
pseudo-firms. Our sample of offshorer-year observations drops to 2,161, out of over
7,000 offshorer-years in the original sample.
The results are shown in Table ??. It is clear that even those plants of offshoring
firms that are not hit directly by offshoring do not display any sign of gains in size,
wages, or productivity compared to their controls. In fact, we find that size variables
(output, value added, employment and capital) decline significantly both in the short
and long-term for these pseudo-firm aggregates of non-TAA plants within offshoring
firms. Wage rates and productivity generally show no significant changes; capital and
skill intensity show some increase consistent with the baseline effects.
These results strongly confirm that remaining domestic activity of the offshoring
firms in our sample do not experience positive spillovers in output, employment,
wages or productivity; in fact, the results suggest significant decline in output and
employment in unaffected units as well. This is suggestive of elimination of supporting
activities in remaining units following offshoring.
2.7.5 Vertical Linkages
As discussed in Section ??, the vertical supply links between offshored plant and
remaining domestic plants is crucial for positive spillovers from offshoring. If there
are no vertical linkages, we cannot expect to see improvement in firm-level operation.
Thus we could expect to see more gains for firms where the offshored plant is vertically
linked to the remaining domestic plants. We check if this is the case in this section.
In order to build the vertical supply links, we use the Input-Output (IO) table of
industries for 2007 published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The Input-Output
18Total employment and firm industry are reconstructed using these non-offshored plants only,
then are used to construct the employment-matched controls. The controls selected using propensity-
score matching also utilized the variables of the pseudo-firms.
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table distinguishes between Final Products and Intermediate Products, listing the
purchase value of each intermediate product used to create a final product. Similar
to the procedure outlined in Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012), we classify two
industries as vertically linked if one industry makes up more than 1% of the total
purchase value of all inputs used to produce the final goods. Using the industry
code for each establishment, we determine an offshoring firm as vertically linked if
the offshored plant is vertically linked to at least one other plant within the firm.
About 30% of the original sample fits this definition of vertically-linked offshoring
firms. Table ?? summarizes the estimation results. The results for employment
and shipments are shown in Figure ?? for employment-matched controls. While the
reduction in sample size increases the standard errors of the estimations, the overall
pattern of the short-run and long-run impacts is very similar to the ones we find in
other specifications.
The lack of significant difference between vertically-linked firms and the others in
the wake of offshoring can potentially be explained by the fact that linkages measured
using Input-Output tables do not necessarily translate into actual vertical linkages
in the form of intra-firm shipments in the data, as carefully documented by Atalay,
Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012) using U.S. Commodity Flow Survey data. They find
that firms that are identified as vertically-linked rarely use inputs made by other
establishments within the firm. Their analysis is for domestic intra-firm shipments
in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Ramondo, Rappaport, and Ruhl (2014) look at
the cross-border intra-firm shipments of U.S. multinationals using the BEA data.
They find that while most multinationals display vertical linkages per the I/O tables,
there is very little actual intra-firm shipment. They find that the majority of output
from the foreign subsidiaries is sold locally and that the median subsidiary reports
no shipment to the U.S. parent. Both studies attribute the identifiable vertical links
among establishments without actual shipment to knowledge capital.
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This analysis, and the studies cited above, suggest a plausible explanation of our
baseline results: vertical linkages across establishments within firms are weak, even
if the plant is vertically linked per the IO table. This suggests that the effects of
offshoring are likely to be similar to that envisaged in H-FDI models, rather than as
in the model sketched in Section ??.
2.7.6 Balanced Panel Results
Finally, we investigate whether our results are affected by firm entry and exit. In
particular, differential patterns of exit by offshoring firms relative to controls could
affect the baseline results. For example, short-term exit by the largest offshoring firms
could lead to smaller relative sizes for offshorers in the long-term after offshoring.19
In order to address this concern, we re-estimate our results using only firms who
were present for all 13 years of the 13 year event window (the true balanced panel).20.
The balanced panel consists of approximately 30% of our baseline sample and contains
2,330 offshorer-years. We find baseline results are robust in this sub-sample – results
are available upon request.
2.7.7 Other Robustness Checks
We also undertook a number of additional robustness checks, which we summarize
without reporting tables for brevity. First we tried alternative methods for aggregat-
ing TFP, as described in Section 4.3. Second, we checked robustness of key results
to using only a sample of firms that filed a single offshoring petition in the sample
period. Third, we repeated the analysis for only single-unit firms. Fourth, we altered
the composition of covariates in the propensity score estimation to exclude 3-year
19We note that this bias is controlled for in the analysis with treatment group-year fixed effects
in Section ??, as exiting firms do not contribute to estimated effects (their groups get absorbed by
the group-year effects).
20ASM/CMF data go up to 2009. In order to retain all six years after offshoring, we need to
drop offshoring events that occurred after 2003. Again, our offshoring events in the baseline sample
ranges from 1999 to 2006.
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growth rates or overall employment. Fifth, we repeated the analysis at the plant level
only. Sixth, we checked robustness to examining a subsample of pre-2002 offshorers;
results suggest no changes in the pattern of findings over different years. Finally,
we performed a number of concurrent checks: multi-unit firms in a balanced panel,
pseudo-firms that were vertically linked, pseudo-firms using LBD data. Our baseline
results are robust to using these alternative specifications and definitions.
2.8 Discussion and Conclusion
We use specific information on the source of trade-related layoffs available in the
assessments of petitions filed under the U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance program
to identify offshoring events. We link these data on initiation of offshoring activity to
rich U.S. Census micro datasets, namely the Longitudinal Business Dataset (LBD),
Census of Manufactures (CMF), and Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). We
examine changes in key outcome variables for offshorers relative to controls (matched
alternatively on size and propensity score within the same industry) using a standard
difference-in-differences methodology.
We find that employment declines significantly at the firm level following off-
shoring. The DID decline in employment relative to controls is statistically and
economically significant – about 19% in the short run and 32% in the longer run.
These findings are robust to using alternative control groups. We verify that this is
not simply the result of decline at the affected plant; we find that employment falls
significantly (only slightly lower in percentage terms than at the affected plants) at
aggregated non-affected establishments. This shows that for our sample of offshoring
events, offshoring results in net negative employment effects, as well as negative ef-
fects at remaining domestic units. While our baseline analysis uses only manufactur-
ing sector data, we obtained similar results using data from the LBD, which covers
non-manufacturing establishments as well; there was no employment increase, even
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including non-manufacturing establishments.
We also examine a number of other outcomes including output, value added,
capital, wage rates, labor and total factor productivity, as well as capital and skill
intensity using the ASM/CMF data. We find offshoring firms drastically reducing
their size (output, value added and capital) compared to controls, with little evidence
of increases (or decreases) in productivity or wages. Firms reduce workers more than
capital, so capital intensity goes up; this is also reflected in higher labor productivity,
but we find no change in more detailed TFP measures relative to the control group.
In the TAA data we observe only those offshoring firms who did not re-absorb
their workers (‘non-absorbers’); as we argue in Section ??, even so, we believe that
this is a valid sample to check for potential complementarities in other parts of the
firm. Further, our figures plotting prior trends for the offshored sample and controls,
as well as explicit tests for prior-trends, suggest no strong prior downward trend for
offshored firms relative to controls. Nevertheless, our results should be considered as
average effects for non-absorbers, rather than for offshorers as a whole.
Our findings suggest that the pathway of vertical linkages crucial in the Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg class of models is not operational in our data. Thus the offshoring
activity in our sample may be the shifting of whole product lines abroad, more closely
resembling horizontal FDI (H-FDI) in the Markusen and Maskus (2001) model. This
type of H-FDI would not result in any positive spillovers, and may generate negative
employment and output spillovers, if some supporting activities in other domestic
units are closed down following the production shift. In this sense, our results are
in line with the findings of Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012) and Ramondo,
Rappoport and Ruhl (2014) who find very little evidence of intra-firm shipments
(even within firms who have establishments in that are vertically linked per the IO
tables). Our tentative conclusion that most of our offshoring events may be related
to horizontal shifts echoes Ramondo, Rappoport and Ruhl’s (2014) conclusion that
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most foreign affiliate activity is “horizontal” in nature rather than truly vertically
linked to domestic activities of MNCs.
One point to keep in mind while interpreting our results are that we focus on
the first offshoring event in the sample, while other studies that use imported inputs
or MNC data may be looking at changes within existing offshorers. The employ-
ment effect of offshoring, even in the case of vertically linked firms, is arguably more
negative for new offshorers than for incumbent ones because they go through the
initial large-scale job destruction when tasks are first sent abroad. As discussed in
Sethupathy (2011), a fall in offshoring cost makes the already-offshored tasks even
cheaper, which generates new jobs in domestic operation without necessarily causing
any additional displacement in incumbent offshorers. New offshorers do not enjoy
this purely positive employment impact. Thus one interpretation of the steep decline
we find in employment in the short run could be that this captures the new offshorer’s
employment adjustment. However, in such models with positive spillovers via vertical
linkages, it would be very puzzling to see strong decline in output and employment
in the non-affected plants as well.
It should be strongly emphasized that our results do not imply negative welfare
effects from offshoring. In fact, given data limitations, two of the key channels of
gains – reduced output prices and increased global firm profits – are not measured in
this paper. Welfare losses from under-utilization of labor resources would depend on
the how long the displaced workers take to find new jobs, which we cannot address
with this data. We hope to undertake follow-up work to address these issues using
different data sources: Comtrade for publicly listed companies to assess impact of
offshoring on global profits, and U.S. Census shipment level trade data to measure
unit values which can be used for estimating price effects for products exported by
offshoring firms. Using the link between TAA and the business register that we have
developed, it is also possible to use the U.S. Census’ employee-employer linked dataset
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(LEHD) to examine unemployment durations and wage effects on workers at affected
plants.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Offshoring Firms to Non-offshorers Prior to Offshoring
Variable Definition OLS Industry FE
Size Measures
Output Log(Total Sales) 3.044 2.607
(0.000) (0.000)
Value Added Log(Value Added) 2.919 2.521
(0.000) (0.000)
Employment Log(Employment) 2.679 2.313
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital Log(Capital) 3.336 2.949
(0.000) (0.000)
Wage Measures
Wage Rate Log(Total Wage Bill/ total employment) 0.045 0.044
(0.001) (0.000)
NPW Wage Rate Log(Non-production wage bill/ employment) 0.082 0.040
(0.000) (0.016)
PW Wage Rate Log(Production wage bill/ production employment) 0.011 0.049
(0.447) (0.000)
Factor Intensity
Capital Intensity Log(Capital/ total employment) 0.656 0.636
(0.000) (0.000)
NPW Emp Share Non-production share of employment −0.009 −0.009
(0.131) (0.112)
NPW Wage Share Non-production share of wage bill 0.003 −0.012
(0.660) (0.018)
Productivity
Output per Worker Log(Total sales/employment) 0.364 0.294
(0.000) (0.000)
VA per Worker Log(Value added/employment) 0.240 0.208
(0.000) (0.000)
TFP-Levpet TFP- Levpet, Value Added 0.088 0.054
(0.026) (0.028)
TFP-OLS TFP- OLS (fixed effects), Value Added 0.618 0.559
(0.000) (0.000)
Notes: The number of observations for all of the statistics is 131,377. The p-values are reported in parenthesis.
Industry-level fixed effects are at the 3-Digit SIC level. The data source is the Census of Manufactures for 2002.
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Table 2.2: Difference-in-Differences Estimation - All Firms, Employment-Matched
Relative to Pre-Trend
SR PRE Test
LR PRE SR PRE SR POST LR POST SR POST - LR POST- SR PRE-
SR PRE SR PRE LR PRE
Size Measures
Output 0.069 0.048 -0.179 -0.278 -0.227 -0.326 -0.021
(0.055) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.416)
Value Added 0.097 0.075 -0.228 -0.316 -0.303 -0.391 -0.022
(0.016) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.452)
Employment 0.07 0.041 -0.211 -0.339 -0.252 -0.38 -0.029
(0.039) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.247)
Capital 0.004 0.005 -0.116 -0.248 -0.121 -0.253 0.001
(0.920) (0.841) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.770)
Wage Measures
Wage Rate -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.001
(0.834) (0.711) (0.719) (0.904) (0.980) (0.701) (0.892)
NPW Wage Rate -0.019 -0.003 -0.036 -0.027 -0.033 -0.024 0.016
(0.373) (0.865) (0.046) (0.254) (0.051) (0.272) (0.337)
PW Wage Rate 0.007 0.008 -0.004 0.006 -0.012 -0.002 0.001
(0.596) (0.430) (0.757) (0.682) (0.659) (0.291) (0.122)
Factor Intensity
Capital Intensity -0.066 -0.046 0.096 0.091 0.142 0.137 0.02
(0.038) (0.029) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.406)
NPW Emp Share -0.001 -0.003 0.021 0.022 0.024 0.025 -0.002
(0.904) (0.589) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.690)
NPW Wage Share -0.007 -0.003 0.015 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.004
(0.313) (0.603) (0.005) (0.099) (0.003) (0.055) (0.444)
Productivity
Output per Worker 0.027 0.034 -0.015 0.024 -0.049 -0.01 0.007
(0.313) (0.139) (0.555) (0.503) (0.045) (0.775) (0.720)
VA per Worker -0.002 0.006 0.035 0.062 0.029 0.056 0.008
(0.936) (0.689) (0.043) (0.017) (0.117) (0.033) (0.585)
TFP- Levpet 0.017 0.049 -0.057 -0.03 -0.106 -0.079 0.032
(0.589) (0.055) (0.040) (0.453) (0.000) (0.052) (0.156)
TFP- OLS 0.034 0.048 0.016 0.022 -0.032 -0.026 0.014
(0.267) (0.060) (0.549) (0.603) (0.023) (0.519) (0.506)
Notes: The number of observations for each regression (row) is 22,556. Refer to Table ?? for variable definitions. The
column headings refer to time periods. LR-PRE refers to a long run pre-offshoring period (four to six years prior to
the offshoring impact year). SR-PRE refers to the short-run pre-offshoring period (one to three years prior to the
impact year), SR-POST the short-run post-offshoring period (one to three years after the impact year) and LR-POST
the long-run post-offshoring period (four to six years after the impact year). The variables correspond to those in
Table 1. All specifications include event-year and firm fixed effects. The figures in parenthesis are p-values.
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Table 2.3: Propensity Model Estimates
Variable Coeff
3-year Employment Growth 0.01
3-year Wage Growth −0.007∗∗
Output per Worker 0.012∗∗
NPW Emp Share −0.009∗∗
Capital Intensity 0.012∗∗
Constant −0.077∗∗
R-sq 0.06
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if the firm offshored in any year in the sample period. Refer to Table ??
for variable definitions. Number of observations is 16,296. ** denotes significance at 1% level and * at 5% level.
Table 2.4: Difference-in-Differences Estimation - All Firms, Propensity Score Match-
ing
Relative to PE Trend
SR PRE Test
LR PRE SR PRE SR POST LR POST SR POST - LR POST- SR PRE-
SR PRE SR PRE LR PRE
Size Measures
Output -0.019 0.016 -0.128 -0.239 -0.144 -0.255 0.035
(0.624) (0.529) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.228)
Value Added 0.035 0.061 -0.159 -0.295 -0.22 -0.356 0.026
(0.424) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.412)
Employment -0.011 0.011 -0.193 -0.359 -0.204 -0.37 0.022
(0.741) (0.624) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.392)
Capital 0.019 -0.019 -0.052 -0.171 -0.033 -0.152 -0.038
(0.660) (0.484) (0.073) (0.003) (0.288) (0.009) (0.239)
Wage Measures
Wage Rate -0.011 -0.008 0.007 0.037 0.015 0.045 0.003
(0.384) (0.412) (0.503) (0.015) (0.145) (0.002) (0.731)
NPW Wage Rate 0.011 -0.006 -0.009 0.053 -0.003 0.059 -0.017
(0.674) (0.757) (0.674) (0.072) (0.870) (0.030) (0.374)
PW Wage Rate -0.028 -0.015 0.001 0.009 0.016 0.024 0.013
(0.048) (0.187) (0.992) (0.603) (0.185) (0.131) (0.238)
Factor Intensity
Capital Intensity 0.031 -0.03 0.141 0.188 0.171 0.218 -0.061
(0.379) (0.190) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017)
NPW Emp Share -0.006 -0.003 0.016 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.003
(0.379) (0.610) (0.003) (0.016) (0.001) (0.008) (0.510)
NPW Wage Share 0.001 -0.002 0.016 0.03 0.018 0.032 -0.003
(0.992) (0.734) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.761)
Productivity
Output per Worker 0.047 0.05 0.034 0.063 -0.016 0.013 0.003
(0.114) (0.059) (0.219) (0.129) (0.562) (0.735) (0.876)
VA per Worker -0.007 0.004 0.065 0.119 0.061 0.115 0.011
(0.741) (0.803) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.462)
TFP- Levpet -0.012 0.025 -0.043 0.009 -0.068 -0.016 0.037
(0.734) (0.384) (0.177) (0.841) (0.025) (0.712) (0.130)
TFP- OLS -0.031 0.023 0.017 0.064 -0.006 0.041 0.054
(0.384) (0.424) (0.589) (0.177) (0.856) (0.348) (0.029)
Notes: The number of observations for each regression (row) is 18,949. Refer to Table ?? for variable definitions. See
notes to Table ?? for explanation of column titles. All specifications include firm fixed effects and event-year effects;
the figures in parenthesis are p-values.
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(a) Initial Benchmark Equilibrium (b) A Fall in Offshoring Cost
Figure 2.1: Cut-off Productivities in Equilibria
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Figure 2.2: Employment-Matched Difference-in-differences Estimation Results
(a) Employment (b) Output
(c) Production-Worker Wage (d) Non-production Worker Wage
(e) Output per Worker (f) TFP Levpet
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Figure 2.3: Survival Analysis
(a) Plants (b) Firms
115
Figure 2.4: Propensity Score Matched Difference-in-differences Estimation Results
(a) Employment (b) Output
(c) Labor Productivity (d) TFP Levpet
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Figure 2.5: Employment-Matched DID Estimation Results: Multi-Unit Firms Only
(a) Employment Results (b) Output Results
Figure 2.6: Employment-Matched DID Estimation Results: Vertically Linked Firms
(a) Employment Results (b) Output Results
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CHAPTER III
Learning and the Value of Relationships in
International Trade
(Joint Work with Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr)
3.1 Introduction
The manner in which relationships evolve between firms in different countries can
have major implications for international trade flows. Successful relationships may
lead to expansion for firms on both sides, while failed relationships involve disrupted
production possibilities in addition to wasted money and effort. In fact, breaking
relationships might be so costly for an importing firm that it might choose to remain
with an exporting partner even if the particulars of the transaction are not ideal.
Recent work (Monarch (2014), Eaton, Eslava, Jinkins, Krizan, Kugler, and Tybout
(2014)) has shown that importer-exporter relationships are fairly persistent. But it
is not obvious whether this persistence is driven by the acquisition of of positive
exporter information, high fixed costs of finding another partner, or simply small cost
differences between different potential export partners.
In this paper, we disentangle the different explanations for relationship persis-
tence found among U.S. importers and their foreign export partners. We first utilize
118
confidential U.S. import data and unpack supplier decisions across different imported
products to study the effect of learning on relationships. In the empirical section,
we document the importance of relationship links between importers and exporters:
48.8% of relationships continue from year-to-year. Additionally, even when switching
does occur, 52% of all supplier switching decisions are to “familiar” export partners,
meaning importers use partners that were used in small amounts for the same HS10
product previously, or that were used for other HS10 products. Underscoring the
importance of familiarity even further is the finding that 43% of such new product
purchases also come from export partners used to buy other HS10 products in the
past. A key insight of our work is to use variation in the behavior of multi-product
importers along these lines to separately identify the process of dynamic learning
about a supplier (which occurs across multiple periods and products) from the static
search cost explanation.
These stylized facts lead us to put forth a model that incorporates dynamic learn-
ing about suppliers, fixed costs of searching for a new supplier, and price differences
across suppliers. The framework borrows from the model of exporter learning by
Araujo, Mion, and Ornelas (2014), but adds a number of additional features to make
it compatible with the empirical findings discussed above. Our setup leads to predic-
tions about how importer decisions to stay or switch, and which supplier to use for
both new and existing products. We tabulate these at different levels of aggregation:
country level aggregates of switching behavior, firm level decisions, and firm-product
level decisions. Switching arises endogenously in the model, due to learning occurring
over multiple periods. This implies the lowest cost producer is not always used, even
with perfect information about the price of the traded product. In the final section,
we present evidence for the additional predictions implied by the model regarding the
relationship between institutional quality and switching, as well as the link between
the total number of suppliers used and the probability of switching.
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Previous work on the topic of dynamic buyer-supplier relationship formation in
international trade centers on the study of networks: Rauch (2001) surveys the po-
tential for transnational cultural networks to help smooth international trade and
reduce barriers to entry, while Rauch and Watson (2004) present a general equi-
librium model through which economic agents can use their supply of networks to
either produce/export more efficiently or to become an intermediary. Recent work
has made use of the U.S. Customs database used in this paper, which provides in-
formation about U.S. importers and their foreign exporting partners. Eaton et. al.
(2014) study the relationship between Colombian exporters and the number of U.S.
importers they partner with over time and calibrate a search and matching model to
match exporter decisions, including sales, number of clients, and transition probabil-
ities. Kamal and Krizan (2012) use U.S. Census trade transaction data to document
trends in the formation of importer-exporter relationships. Kamal and Sundaram
(2013) use the same U.S. import data to determine how likely textile producers in
Bangladeshi cities are to follow other exporters in their same city to export to a
particular partner. Other work takes advantage of two-sided trade data to study the
effects of heterogeneity on trade: Bernard, Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe (2013) develop a
model of relationhip-specific fixed costs for exporting using Norwegian buyer-supplier
trade data. Our work also fits into the literature on multi-product firms in inter-
national trade, including Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2010) and Bernard, Jensen,
and Schott (2011). In this project, we combine a theory of trade network forma-
tion, multi-product importers and dynamic learning behavior by importers about the
quality of buyers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the
main features of the importer-exporter database we use. Section 3.3 presents the five
broad empirical findings about U.S. importer relationships with foreign partner firms
that form the backbone of our project. Section 3.4 describes the model we use that
120
is inspired by the empirical work discussed above, and presents separate predictions
that can be tested. Section 3.5 describes the reduced form tests we run to examine
these predictions. Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Importer-Exporter Data
The data come from the Longitudinal Foreign Trade and Transaction Database
(LFTTD), collected by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and maintained by the
U.S. Census Bureau. Every transaction of a U.S. company importing or exporting a
product requires the filing of a form with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and
the LFTTD contains the information from each of these forms.1 There are typically
close to 50 million transactions per year. In this paper, we utilize the import data,
which includes quantity and value exchanged for each transaction, HS 10 product
classification, date of import and export, port information, country of origin, and a
code identifying the foreign exporting partner. Known as the manufacturing ID, or
MID, the foreign partner identifier contains limited information on the name, address,
and city of the foreign supplier.2 Monarch (2014) found substantial support for the use
of the MID as a reliable, unique identifier, both over time and in cross-section. Kamal
and Krizan (2012), Dragusanu (2013), Kamal and Sundaram (2013) and Eaton et. al.
(2014) have all used this variable in the context of studying U.S. firm relationships
in international trade. This variable allows us to present stylized facts for the role
of information in dynamic formation of trade relationships. We present results for
relationships between U.S. importers and foreign firms over the years 2002-2008.
We also follow the related literature in our methods for cleaning the LFTTD,
using methods outlined in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) and Pierce and Schott
(2009). As in Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2009), we drop all transactions with
imputed quantities or values (which are typically very low-value transactions) or
converted quantities or values. We also eliminate all related-party transactions, as
exporters who are importing from separate branches of the same firm will likely have
1Approximately 80-85% of these customs forms are filled out electronically (Krizan 2012).
2Specifically, the MID contains the first three letters of the producer’s city, six characters taken
from the producer’s name, up to four numeric characters taken from its address, and the ISO2 code
for the country of origin.
122
very different relationship dynamics than arm’s-length exporters. We also concord
HS codes over time according to the methodology in Pierce and Schott (2009), which
accounts for the changes in HS10 product definitions over this time period.3
3.3 Empirical Findings
Our knowledge of relationships between sellers and buyers in international trade
is still limited. In this section we illustrate several new empirical findings that shed
light on relationship trends between importers and exporters. We start by illustrating
the importance of multi-product importers.
Basic facts about multi-product importers 66.1 % of U.S. importing firms
import more than one product, accounting for 98.3% of U.S. imports. Figure 3.1 plots
the kernel density of the number of products imported, underscoring the significant
variation in the number of products imported. The graph underscores that there
is significant variation among firms along this domension. The mean number of
imported products is 7.67 and the median is 3. 10% of firms in the data import more
than sixteen HS10 products.
At the same time, many U.S. importers rely on multiple sources for their imports.
For U.S. importing firms, the average number of partners is 23.3, and the median is
4. 72.4% of firms have more than one partner. There is also variation in the number
of countries a firm is buying from: the median number of countries is 3, and the
average is 11.4. It is possible to disaggregate the data to an even finer level by using
a firm-HS10 product combination as the unit of observation. With this measure, the
average number of suppliers for a firm-product purchase is 3 (with a median of 1), and
36.5% of firm-product combinations use more than one supplier. Thus even within a
product category, a sizable share of U.S. importers use more than one trading partner.
3None of the results in this paper are significantly different if we track HS codes simply using the
present-period code, rather than concording over time.
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Facts about trade relationships over time How stable are trade relationships
over time? How is this related to the number of products, suppliers and source
countries a firm has? In the following we show statistics related to these questions
that reveal that year-to-year supplier decisions are far from random. Instead, we find
high persistence in trade relationships, a trend that is consistent both with substantial
fixed costs of searching for a trading partner and with information asymmetries about
the reliability of new suppliers.
We begin by looking at the probability that an importing firm keeps buying a
product from the same main supplier year to year. Define a U.S. firm as “staying”
with a supplier if it obtains the largest share of its purchases of a product from the
same firm for two consecutive years.4 It is critical to note that this definition of
staying is firm-HS10 product specific- i.e. one firm with many export products could
have multiple stay/switch decisions within one period. Additionally, a firm could buy
a product only in one year and that firm-product observation would not enter into
this data of relationship dynamics.5
According to this definition, 48.8% of U.S. importers stay with the same partner
from one year to the next. This is a much higher share than what we should find if
trading partners were basically indifferent between different product suppliers after
having purchased from one: the median number of exporters in an HS code in one
year is 40, meaning that if each year’s decision was made randomly, there would a
1 in 40 chance of using the same partner. The size of the exporter choice set plays
a role: the share of importers staying is negatively correlated with the number of
available exporters selling the same HS10 product. The more partners there are to
choose from, the less firms stay with a trading partner.
We now look at the same statistic, taking into account the heterogeneity of firms
4The average share of trade from this “major partner” used by a U.S. firm-product combination
is 85%, with a median of 100%.
5We study new product purchasing decisions later in this section.
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with respect to the number of products they are importing. We have shown above
that U.S. importers typically import more than one product- in this dimension, U.S.
importers remain with their partner on 55.5% of the total number of products they
import. Figure 3.2 plots the share of products on which U.S. importers remained with
their partner, demonstrating the significant variation among firms. For example, U.S.
firms importing two products remain with their partner on 56% of their products.
Firms importing 30 products stay with the same partner on 49.2% of their products,
and the largest firms remain with exporting partners on 39.9% of their products. In
sum, the more products a firm imports, the more the products it switches sellers.
Familiarity with a Partner and Switching Behavior As described above,
slightly over half of U.S. import relationships involve new exporter partners from
one year to the next. Who are the new partners that U.S. importers buy from? Is
the new source completely unknown to the buyer or is there some experience from
previous interactions? It turns out that the latter is more common. That is, even
when switching, importers tend to buy from firms they are familiar with.
There are two ways in which an importing firm can be “familiar” with a supplier of
a given HS10 product in our data, other than it being her current main source. First,
the importer can know about another supplier through her purchase of a different
HS10 product from that firm in a previous year. Second, the importer can know
about a supplier because she previously bought a minority share of the same HS10
product from that source. We examine each of these different avenues below.
Both types of familiarity turn out to be important. We find that 26.6% of all
partner switches (again defined as a U.S. firm-HS10 product combination buying
from a new partner) are to a supplier that a U.S. importer has bought a different
HS10 product from. An additional 25.9% of switching is to partners that were used
in the minority for the same HS 10 product. Thus over half of all partner switching is
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to what can broadly be called “familiar” partners. Furthermore, if we eliminate those
cases where each type of familiar switch is impossible, i.e. excluding one-product
importing firms from the first definition, and excluding firms that only used a single
partner for an HS 10 product from the second definition, the share of switching to
familiar partners rises to 69.9%. This constitutes robust evidence that familiarity
with a supplier is central to the buying decisions of an importer.
New Product Purchases Familiarity could also matter for the purchase of “new”
HS10 products. Define a new purchase of an HS10 product as a U.S. importer buying
an HS10 product that it had not purchased in the previous year. 72.2% of importing
firms buy at least one new product each year. Again, we find familiarity to be a key
explanatory factor in these purchases: 43.9% of new products come from partners
used one year previously for a different HS10 product.
We also observe in the data that newly formed relationships- i.e. new importer-
exporter observations in any year- start slower, and expand faster if they survive.
The top panel of Table 3.1 illustrates that brand new relationships in 2003 tended
to have 1.6 products, compared to an average of 2.7 products for relationships that
were preexisting. The number of products ramps up quickly for those surviving
relationships over time. The same trend is observed in terms of total trade volume
from new relationships, with new relationships involving less imports than existing
relationships, and growing quickly over time.
To summarize, there are a number of key results from the data that the dynamic
model of import sourcing we work with should match:
1. Importing firms have multiple export partners, even for the same HS10 product.
2. Importers have strong links to their chosen export partners over time.
3. Exporter choice is heavily influenced by prior experience with that partner, both
within and across products.
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4. New relationships start small, and grow faster upon survival.
5. New product purchases are governed in part by exporter usage in other products.
Potential Explanations and Mechanisms for our Findings Why do firms stay
with the same trading partner over time? Why is persistence of relationships smaller
for firms buying a larger number of products?
There are several explanations for why U.S. importers may choose to stay with
the same partner over time. These include avoiding the cost of searching for a new
partner, favorable pricing terms, the gains from experience of a long-standing sup-
plier with respect to the customization of the product to the specific needs of the
importer and importantly, learning. The last includes learning by the importer about
the quality and reliability of the supplier, as well as learning by the supplier about the
trustworthiness of the importer. While none of these mechanisms besides the price
are directly observable, we can use our rich data to differentiate between them based
on their differential predictions for the dynamics and patterns of trade flows over
time and across products. A key dimension that we exploit in this paper to disen-
tangle information effects from other factor is the fact that many firms buy multiple
products.
3.4 Model Framework
In the following we outline a model that helps explain the empirical patterns we
uncovered so far. The goal is to quantify the value of a trade relationship and to
think about the welfare consequences of the destruction of trade relationships.
The model builds heavily on work by Araujo, Mion, and Ornelas (2014). While
their analysis focused on the problem of an exporter, we use their framework to
study the related decisions of an importer. We follow their basic setup closely before
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extending it to allow for multi-product firms as well as for differences in production
costs.
Basic Setup We begin by describing the problem of a single buyer matched to
a single supplier. Assume that a fraction θ̂ of suppliers are patient whereas the
remainder of them are myopic. As in Araujo, Mion, and Ornelas (2014), we assume
that the difference in the discount rates is so large that patient suppliers always
want to keep a trade relationship alive whereas myopic firms try to deviate from the
contract whenever they get an opportunity to do so. Such an opportunity arises when
the source country fails to enforce the contract. This happens with probability 1−λ,
where λ is a measure of the quality of legal institutions in the source country.
While in reality, firms choose from a set of different payment contracts, for now,
we assume that all transactions are settled cash-in-advance. That is, before goods
are delivered, the importer needs to send the agreed amount to the supplier. Only
then, the exporter may send the goods.
Buyer Behavior As there are two types of suppliers in the economy, learning plays
a central role. Initially, buyers believe correctly that the probability that a seller of
a product is patient and will fulfill the contract is equal to the population mean θ̂.
Every period that a relationship survives, they update their beliefs according to Bayes
Rule. Remember that a myopic supplier defaults whenever there is an opportunity
(probability (1 − λ)). If a buyer has successfully purchased from the same seller for
k periods, the posterior probability that the seller is patient can be derived as:
θk =
θ̂
θ̂ +
(
1− θ̂
)
λk
(3.1)
Importantly, the probability only depends on the length of time that a buyer has been
buying from the same seller. It is easy to see that for large k, θk converges to 1, that
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is the buyer is almost certain that the seller is of the good type.
3.4.1 Single Product Importers
The Static Case In the following, we introduce a fixed cost of keeping a trade
relationship from one period to the next. Denoted by f , this cost is paid at the
beginning of the period, before the optimal import bundle is chosen. Then, expected
importer profit in the current period when buying from a supplier that she traded
with for k periods are:
pik = max {(θk + (1− θk)λ)R (q)− cq − f, 0} (3.2)
The buyer can sell the goods for revenue R if if they are successfully delivered
by the supplier. This happens with probability θk + (1− θk)λ (that is, if the seller
is non-myopic, or if the seller is myopic, but no opportunity to default occurs). We
assume that the buyer has all bargaining power, so she pays the seller the marginal
cost of production c for each unit purchased q. Finally, the importer has to pay the
per period cost of sustaining the trade relationship f . The firm can always decide to
cancel the trade relationship and receive profits of zero.
The net present value of future profits Assume that with probability δ a re-
lationship is separated for exogenous reasons, such as supplier exit. Further, assume
that this shock takes place between trading periods, so that the Bayesian updating
is not affected by this variable. We can then derive the net present value of a given
trade relationship as:
Π = pi0 +
∞∑
i=1
{(
i∏
j=1
(1− δ)[λ(1− θj) + θj]
)
pii
}
(3.3)
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(1 − δ)[λ(1 − θj) + θj] is the probability that a relationship active in period j − 1
survives to period j.
∏i
j=1(1 − δ)[λ(1 − θj) + θj] is therefore the probability that a
relationship that is formed in period 1 is still active in period i.
The case of two suppliers Suppose now that there are two suppliers of the same
product, each of whom has been used by the importer. To distinguish between them
we add a superscript s ∈ {1, 2} to the relevant variables. Suppliers can differ in
their production cost cs. Furthermore, the buyer may have different posterior beliefs
about their reliability {θ1k1 , θ2k2}. For now, assume that both suppliers come from the
same base population and that they face the same enforcement probabilities. That
is θ̂1 = θ̂2 and λ1 = λ2. This implies that differential beliefs about the supplier types
can only arise if the importer has been buying from the two firms for a different
number of periods, i.e. k1 6= k2.
Suppose that the importer has a longer relationship with firm 1, meaning k1 > k2.
It follows directly that θ1 > θ2, i.e. the buyer has a better opinion about seller 1’s
reliability. Suppose also, that seller 2 has a better technology that allows her to pro-
duce the product at a lower production cost c2 < c1. In this simple case we can make
the following prediction:
Prediction III.1. For sufficiently large δ and fixed q, an importer may buy from
a higher cost exporter if she has a longer relationship with that firm than with an
alternative lower cost supplier.
This prediction is quite straightforward. First, denote the likelihood of delivery by
θ˜s = θs + (1− θs)λ. Now, consider the limiting case of δ → 1. Then, the net present
value of future profits collapses to the static one-period profits pis0. In that case, based
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on equation (??) an importer buys from the higher cost supplier 1 if:
∆c q = (c1 − c2) q < R(q)
[
θ˜1 − θ˜2
]
(3.4)
If production cost differences ∆c q are not too large, the familiarity effect (θ˜1 > θ˜2)
dominates and the importer buys from the better known firm.
Searching for Suppliers We now turn to the dynamic aspects of searching for
suppliers. As we saw in Prediction ??, a firm may decide to buy from a higher cost
supplier in the short run. However, the importer may decide to try out a new supplier
and keep ordering from it for a while to see whether she is reliable.
A challenge in analyzing this question is how much an importer has to order to
make the supplier reveal its type. Given the dynamic nature of the relationship, we
should expect such a constraint to be related to the maximum growth rate in the
ordered quantities over time. More precisely, the discounted present value of future
gains from trade has to be dominated by the one period deviation payoff for the
myopic suppliers. It is straightforward to see that for sufficiently high discount rates
of the myopic firms, this constraint can be arbitrarily weakened. Instead of analyzing
this aspect explicitly, in the following, we assume that it is sufficient to order a very
small amount of  from the supplier to test its reliability. However, finding a new
trading partner is costly. Whenever a firm wants to test a new supplier, it has to
pay a fixed cost fN . This could be a pure search cost. An alternative interpretation
would be that this cost captures the fact that firms actually have to order more than
 in order to trigger defaults from myopic firms.
The updated single-period profit equation from purchasing from a supplier s is
thus:
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pis = max
q≥
θ˜sR (q)− csq − fN1 [s = new] (3.5)
There are three key aspects to determining which supplier an importer prefers:
• The dynamic reputation of seller s, θ˜s, compared to other sellers s′.
• The cost paid to seller s, cs, compared to other sellers s′.
• The fixed cost of buying from a seller s if they have not been used before, fN .
Which suppliers will a firm drop over time and which will it keep? Note that
an importer does not automatically drop a new supplier with a higher marginal cost
than the current one. If the exogenous shock δ is sufficiently high and the baseline
share of patient suppliers sufficiently low, it may well be worth it to have a reserve
supplier even if that firm is less efficient. This observation is consistent with Finding
1 from Section 3.3 above that many firms use multiple exporters for their products.
It also speaks to the level of persistence in relationships over time from the data:
Prediction III.2. Relationship persistence between buyers and suppliers can be high,
even with price dispersion among export choices.
While we still need to quantify this prediction and see how much persistence can be
generated, to some extent, this is a corollary to Prediction ??. Trade with low-cost
unknown parties may not be profitable. If learning is slow, the exogenous death rate
δ is high and there is a substantial cost of trying out a new supplier, it may not
be worthwhile to change from a familiar source to a new one. This prediction is
consistent with Finding 2 discussed in Section 3.3.
The model can also speak to another fact about switching behavior observed in
the data and summarized in Finding 3: when switching suppliers, importers tend to
buy from already familiar firms. Consider two suppliers, one with whom the importer
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had at positive experiences in the past and one who is new and therefore completely
unfamiliar. Then, ceteris paribus, given the Bayesian updating, the importer should
buy from the familiar exporter rather than the new one. This is captured in the next
prediction:
Prediction III.3. Switching is likely to occur to partners that are already known
through prior purchases.
Finally, we can match the empirical result in Finding 4, concerning the growth
patterns of new relationships.
Prediction III.4. New relationships are likely to start small, then grow faster, com-
pared to preexisting relationships.
This prediction is the same as in Araujo, Mion, and Ornelas (2014), in their case
for exporters learning about importers. There are two potential explanations. First,
following the logic in Araujo, Mion, and Ornelas (2014), the importer may choose
optimal quantities based on her belief about a specific exporter. This leads to an
increasing path of purchases over time. Alternatively, the importer may keep buying
from a familiar source while buying small amounts from a new firm until enough
information has been gathered. A theoretical challenge in the second approach is
how to pin down how much an importer needs to order from a supplier to generate
learning. Above, we simply assume some  quantity is necessary in order to start or
maintain the learning process. That is, we abstract away from optimal import share
calculations on behalf of the buyer.
Separately from our findings discussed above, the simple model discussed here
lends itself to two additional tests. It is informative to consider a case where the
quality of legal institutions λ can vary by country. As can be seen from equation
(??), the speed of learning decreases in the strength of contract enforcement. This
is quite intuitive. Myopic suppliers can only deviate when contract enforcement
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fails, which happens more often in countries with bad legal institutions. We should
therefore expect firms importing from exporting countries with better institutions to
have more persistent relationships and to switch less.
Prediction III.5. The share of firms switching should be lower in countries with
better institutions.
This prediction is also a byproduct of the model designed in Araujo, Mion, and
Ornelas (2014), though they do not have dual-sided firm data in order to calculate
the share of switching.
Secondly, the model implies that the more partners an importer uses overall, the
more likely a switch becomes. We have shown this to be the case in the simple
case with two suppliers, whereby switching is more likely if the importer has ongoing
relationships with each supplier.
Prediction III.6. The more partners used by an importer, the more likely they are
to switch to a different partner for that product. Additionally, they are more likely to
switch to one of those partners that were used before.
There are two potential explanations for this result: increasing returns to scale of
searching may allow larger firms to build up relationships more cheaply. Alternatively,
the larger number of current suppliers may give an importer more firms to switch to
that she is already familiar with.
We go on to test these predictions formally in Section 3.5.
3.4.2 Multi-Product Importers
We next consider multi-product importers. Let us go back to the case of buying
from a single supplier. When would an importer buy multiple products from the
same firm? To study this problem, we follow the multi-product firm literature by
assuming that every producer has a core product. Adding additional products moves
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the firm away from its core competency and therefore increases production costs.
Assume therefore that additional products have higher marginal costs by factor γ > 1.
Further, assume that learning about a supplier’s type happens at the firm and not at
the product level. Therefore, buying multiple products does not increase the speed
of learning. Assume also that now there is an additional fixed cost fp that has to be
paid per product bought. Under these assumptions, it is straightforward to calculate
profits from buying product n of a supplier as: Profits from product n are thus:
pis(n) = (θk + λ(1− θk))R(q)− cγnq − fp (3.6)
Product n > 1 is bought whenever the current profit term is greater than 0. This can
be solved for.
θk >
1
1− λ
[
cγnq + fp
R(q)
− λ
]
(3.7)
We can also solve equation (??) for the number of products sold. This delivers:
n =
ln
[
θ˜kR(q)− fp/cq
]
ln γ
(3.8)
Prediction III.7. The more familiar an importer is with a supplier, the more prod-
ucts she buys from that firm (∂n/∂θ > 0).
This is consistent with Finding 5 discussed in Section 3.3 above: namely, new
product decisions are highly correlated with whether an importer has experience with
that exporter. We also present two additional conjectures from the theory that we
go on to test in Section 5:
Conjecture 1: The better the institutions of the exporting country, the higher
the share of switching to exporters of of that country familiar from other products.
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Conjecture 2: The more partners used by an importer across all products, the more
likely that importer is to switch partners. They are also more likely to switch to an
exporter used by one of their multiple products.
3.4.3 Simulations
In this subsection, we demonstrate some of the features of the model with a
numerical example. Specifically, we solve the model under CES demand for the final
good, and simulate trajectories for profits, prices, and other key variables in the
model.
As above, expected importer profits from using any seller s at time t are:
pist = (θ
s
k + (1− θsk)λ)R (q)− csq − f
where k is the number of periods that the buyer has been buying from supplier s by
time t.
We again use θ˜s = (θsk + (1− θsk)λ) to save notation. Analysis of the problem
while allowing for CES demand (q = A (ps)−σ) for the final good of the producer is
straightforward. Assume there are two potential sellers to choose from, with costs to
the buyer c1 and c2. The optimal price depends on which supplier s is used:
pst =
σ
σ − 1
1
θ˜s
cs
This means that revenue from supplier s at time t is Rst = A (pst)
1−σ, and profits
are:
pist =
1
σ
A
[
σ
σ − 1
1
θ˜s
cs
]1−σ
− f (3.9)
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The buyer is comparing profits from using either seller. Note that without infor-
mation θ˜ in the model, profits are maximized by simply using the buyer with least
cost. However, by allowing for dynamic adjustment of partners, we can endogenize
the decision to switch partners, whereby an importer might first prefer to use a buyer
of higher cost that it has better information about, switching only once it learns
enough about the other buyer to be sure they will not default.
Setting λ = 0.6, the share of good sellers θ̂=0.6, costs {c1, c2} = {1, 1.2}, and
k2 = k1 + 3, we can obtain the graphs found in Figure 3.3.
In Panel A, the solid line represents the supplier with high cost that possesses a
better reputation, by virtue of the fact that θ˜ is higher. This is because the high-
cost supplier has been used for longer. Panels B and C show that eventually, as
information improves about the low cost seller, the buyer can charge lower prices for
the final good, increasing revenue at a faster pace. Indeed, panel D demonstrates that
by period 7, the reputation of the low cost seller improves enough such that there are
higher profits from utilizing that seller, thereby inducing dynamic switching behavior.
Furthermore, we can justify the purchases of more products from a seller using
our framework of multi-product importers. Again as before, we have the profits from
individual product n from seller s as
pis(n) = (θk + λ(1− θk))R(q)− cγnq − fp
with products only being bought that satisfy the condition in Equation (3.7). We
set the marginal cost of an extra product at γ = 1.02. Figure 3.4 demonstrates
the evolution of the number of products purchased over time, again with the more
expensive seller initially selling more products to the buyer, up until the reputation
of the cheaper seller improves enough.
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3.5 Results
In this section, we describe the tests we undertake for Predictions III.5 and III.6
and Conjectures 1 and 2 from above, using the LFTTD data described in Section 3.2.
First, we test whether source countries with better institutions tend to have a
higher share of maintained relationships over time. Guided by Prediction III.5, our
estimating equation is:
ShareStayc = α + β1λc + β2PCGDPc + νc (3.10)
Based on Prediction III.5, we would expect a greater fraction of U.S. import rela-
tionships to persist in countries with better legal institutions λ, due to better enforce-
ment of contracts and the low rate of learning that takes place in sources with better
institutional quality. The variable ShareStay is the fraction of importer-exporter
relationships that are maintained between the U.S. and from country c averaged over
all the years of our sampling frame, while PCGDP is log per capita GDP in country
c. We also include private credit coverage as an additional regressor. To measure the
quality of institutions λ, we use a collection of institutional quality variables taken
from the World Bank World Development Indicators. First is the Strength of Legal
Rights index, which measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws
protect the rights of borrowers and lenders in a country. Since this variable is not
directly a measure of contracting rights,we also include both the number of proce-
dures required to enforce a contract, and the ordinal ranking of countries by such a
procedure. Neither of these two institutional quality variables has significant changes
over our sample period from 2002-2008, so we simply use 2004 values for each, as well
as for per-capita GDP, while averaging the ratio of staying partners for each country
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over time.6 As can be seen in the top part of Table 3.2, the results are consistent with
the predictions of the model: higher legal rights and fewer procedures in exporting
are both indicative of a larger share of firms remaining with their partner over time.
In line with Conjecture 1, we run the same specification replacing the dependent
variable with the share of firms that obtain new products from familiar exporters at
country level. This variable is the fraction of all new products coming from a certain
country that arrive from familiar partners. From the bottom panel of Table 3.2,
we see again that better institutions lead to a greater share of new products being
sourced from familiar partners.
It is also possible to test the extent to which switching is linked to the number
of partners used, as in Prediction III.6 and Conjecture 2. There are two avenues
through which familiarity might be an important determinant of the decision. First,
an exporter could be familiar as a minority partner for the same product. To explore
this channel, we test whether having more partners within a firm-HS10 product code
combination is correlated with whether a minority-to-majority switch occurs. We also
include total size of imports in each firm-product combination as a regressor. The
results in Table 3.3 confirms Prediction III.6- having more partners for a product
indeed means importers are more likely to switch. The second avenue for familiarity
is buying a product from an export partner previously used for some other product.
Here, we test whether a switch came from a familiar firm against the total number
of partners used by a firm (rather than a firm-HS10 product combination). Table 3.4
confirms that these types of switches are indeed more likely to occur among firms that
have more overall firm partners. As above, firms with more overall partners are more
likely to switch. However, including either by including total firm imports directly
or splitting firms into size deciles, we see that given the same number of partners,
larger-volume importers are actually more likely to remain with their partner over
6The results are the same if we use yearly measures of ShareStay for each country c with individual
year observations of PCGDP and lambda.
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time.
3.6 Conclusion
We have presented evidence demonstrating that familiarity is critically important
to U.S. importers in making supplier decisions. When deciding from whom to buy,
not only are importers likely to continue buying from the same partner over time,
but even when switching, they use information from their individual experience with
exporters. We demonstrate that both buying a small amount from an exporter,
and buying different products from an exporter are strongly related to the decision
of whom to buy from. New products are also extremely likely to be bought from
exporters that were used previously. Guided by these regularities and recent work
on institutions, we have implemented a model of learning in international trade that
delivers predictions about how importers match with exporters in international trade
that are consistent with patterns in the data. Future work can take the simple model
we have developed here, and estimate the key components of the model directly, with
the goal of calculating the effect of trade volumes and welfare as a result of preexisting
relationships between importers and exporters.
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Figure 3.1: Kernel Density, Number of Imported Products
Notes: The graph shows the density of U.S. firms for each number of total HS 10
products imported. Product codes are taken from customs declarations by U.S. im-
porters, and adjusted using the methodology described in Pierce and Schott (2009).
The density is cut off for readability above 78 products, accounting for 99% of the
total sample. The kernel density is computed using 1000 grid points within this range.
10% of U.S. importing firms import more than 16 HS 10 products.
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Figure 3.2: Share of Products “Staying” with Same Partner, by Number of Products
Notes: The graph shows the share of products in which a U.S. importing firm has
kept the same partner over a two year period, over the total number of products
imported continously over those two years. For example, the first point demonstrates
that among U.S. firms importing two products, the average share of those two prod-
ucts in which the same partner is used is about 57%. The highest-scale importers
tend to remain with their partner on a smaller share of products, bottoming out at
approximately 40%. For disclosure reasons, the sample is cut off at 78 products.
144
Table 3.1: New Relationships in 2003, versus Existing Relationships from 2003
Average Number of Products
2003 2004 2005 2006
New Relationships 1.6 2.4 2.8 3
Existing Relationships 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.6
Average Value of Imports (Log)
2003 2004 2005 2006
New Relationships 9.72 10.71 11.05 11.2
Existing Relationships 10.92 11.31 11.5 11.57
Notes: This is a comparison of the size of trade for new importer-exporter relation-
ships formed in 2003 to trade occurring in existing relationships in 2003. The top
panel is the number of products imported by relationships between U.S. importing
firms and foreign exporters, while the bottom panel is the total value of trade. For
the year 2003, 61.3% of total firm-firm relationships are new.
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Figure 3.3: Model Simulations- Single Product Importers
Panel A: Reputation Information
Panel B: Final Good Prices
Panel C: Revenue
Panel D: Profits
Notes: These simulations are for single product importers facing CES demand and
having profits according to Equation (3.9) in Section 4.3. The choice is which supplier
to use, a high-cost seller with a better starting reputation (solid line) or a low-cost
seller with a less reputation (dotted line).
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Figure 3.4: Model Simulations- Multiple Product Importers
Panel A: Number of Products Panel B: Total Profits, All Products
Notes: These simulations are for multiple product importers facing CES demand and
having profits according to Equation (3.9) in Section 4.3. The choice is which supplier
to use, a high-cost seller with a better starting reputation (solid line) or a low-cost
seller with a lesser reputation (dotted line), as well as how many products to buy
from each.
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Table 3.2: Relationship between Institutions and Staying/ Switching Decisions
Dep. Variable: Share of Importers Staying with Exporter Year-to-Year, 2002-2008
(1) (2) (3)
Log Strength of Legal Rights 0.0489∗∗
(0.02253)
Procedures to Enforce a Contract -0.00673∗∗∗
(0.00195)
Rank (Procedures) -0.00106∗∗∗
(0.00027)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.02403∗∗∗ 0.01893∗∗∗ 0.01677∗∗
(0.00740) (0.00743) (0.00747)
Constant 0.16496∗∗ 0.52975∗∗ 0.37517∗∗∗
(0.05531) (0.11278) (0.07171)
N 151 152 152
R2 0.14 0.18 0.20
Dep. Variable: Share of Switches To Exporters Used for other Products, 2002-2008
(4) (5) (6)
Log Strength of Legal Rights 0.06471∗∗
(0.02438)
Procedures to Enforce a Contract -0.00539∗∗
(0.00217)
Rank (Procedures) -0.00078∗∗
(0.00031)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.02458∗∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗
(0.00808) (0.00836) (0.00846)
Constant -0.01302 0.32657∗∗ 0.19129∗∗
(0.06102) (0.12559) (0.08084)
N 149 150 150
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16
Notes: The independent variables come from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators. Strength of Legal Rights is an index from 0 to 10, and measures
the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers
and lenders in a country. Number of procedures to enforce a contract are the number
of independent actions, mandated by law or courts, that demand interaction between
the parties of a contract or between them and the judge or court officer. Per Capita
GDP and Private Credit Coverage variables are also from the World Bank. Three
asterisks implies significance at 1%, two asterisks implies significance at 5%.
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Table 3.3: Staying/Switching Decisions, using Firm-Product Characteristics
Stay Stay Switch to Minority Switch to Minority
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Partners -0.00388∗∗∗ 0.00163∗∗∗
(0.00014) (0.00001)
Log Total Partners -0.19332∗∗∗ 0.15586∗∗∗
(0.00132) (0.00169)
Log Importer Size 0.02119∗∗∗ 0.06504∗∗∗ 0.08044∗∗∗ 0.03624∗∗∗
(0.00044) (0.00055) (0.00081) (0.00054)
Constant 0.26771∗∗∗ -0.7735∗∗∗ -0.60280∗∗∗ -0.26456∗∗∗
(0.00467) (0.00568) (0.00857) (0.00621)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,108,201 3,108,201 1,592,852 1,592,852
R2 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.23
Notes: Three asterisks implies significance at 1%, two asterisks implies significance
at 5%.
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Table 3.4: Staying/Switching Decisions, using Firm Characteristics
Stay Stay Switch to Exporter from Other Product
(1) (2) (3)
Log Firm Total Partners -0.07676∗∗∗ -0.05576∗∗∗ 0.01910∗∗∗
(0.00074) (0.00045) (0.00057)
Log Importer Firm Size 0.02870∗∗∗ 0.00017
(0.00062) (0.00055)
Firm Size Deciles
2 0.02097∗∗∗
(0.00513)
3 0.03723∗∗∗
(0.00558)
4 0.04520∗∗∗
(0.00518)
5 0.05996∗∗∗
(0.00550)
6 0.07523∗∗∗
(0.00556)
7 0.08581∗∗∗
(0.00601)
8 0.10629∗∗∗
(0.00628)
9 0.12123∗∗∗
(0.00665)
10 0.15504∗∗∗
(0.00691)
Constant 0.37481∗∗∗ 0.17077∗∗∗ 0.59676∗∗∗
(0.00709) (0.00615) (0.00665)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 3,108,201 3,108,201 1,592,852
R2 0.06 0.11 0.17
Notes: Three asterisks implies significance at 1%, two asterisks implies significance
at 5%.
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APPENDIX 1.A
Robustness and External Validity of the MID
At this point, I describe the foreign exporter identifier in more detail. As shown in
Figure 1.A, two characters on the country of the manufacturer, six characters related
to the name of the manufacturer, four characters (in certain circumstances) related
to the address of the manufacturer, and three characters related to the city of the
manufacturer make up the exporter identification variable. The MID is assembled
by the U.S. importing firm (or more likely, by a specialty customs broker utilized
by the importing firm) according to an exhaustive list of regulations found in the
instructions to the baseline U.S. Customs Document CBP Form 7501, along with the
other particulars of the import transaction1. I use this identifier to study the behavior
of U.S. importers over time, namely what exporter they choose, where the exporting
firm is located, and what guides the decision for what partner U.S. importers will
choose in the future.
Clearly, the reliability of this variable is important for the stylized facts laid out
above. I therefore first present some background on how the U.S. government en-
courages honest construction of this variable. According to the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, over 99% of entry summary transactions are filed electronically,
reducing the risk of misread or misspelled codes. As mentioned above, these forms
are also overwhelmingly filed by professional customs brokers well aware of the rules
for constructing these codes. Another concern is that the code does not capture the
actual producer of a good, but rather some “middle-man”, the use of which are very
common among firms importing from China (Tang and Zhang 2012). Importantly,
even if a U.S. importer makes use of an intermediary to help them find an exporting
firm, information about the actual source of the product is carried through on the
final invoice through the entire process2. It should also be noted that importers are
explicitly warned by the U.S. CBP to make sure that the MID they assemble is re-
flective of the true producer of the good, not any type of intermediary or processing
firm:
1See CBP Form 7501 Instructions, p. 30-32 for the exact details.
2Krizan (2012), p.10-11, makes clear that this information is available at all stages of the trade
transaction.
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“Trading companies, sellers other than manufacturers, etc. cannot be used to cre-
ate MIDs. Entries and entry summaries in which the first two characters of the MID
do not meet the country of origin ISO code, or are created from a company that is
known to be a trading house or agent and not a manufacturer, will be rejected for fail-
ure to properly construct a MID...Repetitive errors in the construction of MIDs for
entries of textile or apparel products will result in the assessment of broker and im-
porter penalties for failure to exercise reasonable care.” — U.S. Customs and Border
Protection
I augment these facts with a number of checks on this variable by utilizing a rich
panel dataset on Chinese firms. This comprehensive dataset from China’s National
Bureau of Statistics covers all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs whose
annual sales are more than five million renminbi, and includes more than 100 financial
variables listed in the main accounting sheets of firms.3. Industries are classified
according to the China Industry Code (CIC). Sadly, due to confidentiality and security
concerns, the datasets cannot be merged at the firm-to-firm level at this time, despite
the availability of plausibly consistent identifiers in both datasets related to name
and address. However, this dataset has many other uses in the context of studying
importer-exporter behavior.
One application where the NBS industrial database is useful is I can follow the
rules laid out for how to construct Manufacturer IDs and assess how commonly mul-
tiple firms in an industry possess the same MID- a type of outside check on the
uniqueness of the foreign exporter identifier. I do this for five industries in 2005, with
uniqueness statistics illustrated in Table 1.A Panel A. Although this analysis is sub-
ject to some qualification- namely, the NBS data is not the entire universe of Chinese
firms, nor is there any gurantee that the name of the firm in Chinese characters (as
in the NBS data) is the same as the romanized version of the name of the firm- it
appears that the MID does a good job of uniquely identifying foreign firms at the
industry level.
An additional complication for studying geographic switching behavior is that
only three letters of the city are given in the MID. For example, a city code of “SHE”
would be assigned to both Shenyang and Shenzhen, both major cities of more than
8 million people. Again, I use the China Industrial Database in 2005 to check how
widespread the problem would be in particular industries. Table 1.A Panel B shows
that such cases do indeed occur, but not with fatal frequency. It should be noted
too that the figures on city-switching from Table 1 will only be misspecified if a U.S.
importer switches from a city to another city that happens to start with the same
first three letters.
A final concern raised by the construction of the MID is that an importing firm
may in fact choose to stay with a supplier, but if the supplier changes its name or
address, a new MID means that I will classify that importer as a switching firm.
The China Industrial Database tracks firms over time with a unique firm identifier,
so I can collapse the data into a panel and see how many firms would fall into this
3For more information on this database, see Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2011).
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hypothetical scenario by having a change in name or address from 2005 to 2006 that
changes their MID. The results of this test are in Table 1.A Panel C. Again, though
such situations do happen, the vast majority of Chinese exporting firms in the NBS
data do not have undergo such a change.
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APPENDIX 1.B
Robustness Checks for the Stylized Facts
In Section 1.2, I demonstrated that among U.S. continuing importers from China,
partner switching is pervasive, there is a strong geographic component to the switching
decision, and that these two trends become more pronounced over time. My baseline
specification is to define a “switch” as a U.S. importing having a completely different
set of partners for a product from one year to the next. Below I lay out a number of
other specifications.
Figure 1.B.1 shows that the same stylized facts carry through even when using
an alternate of switching: defining an importer as “staying” if it stayed with at least
one or more of its partners: importer-exporter relationships are highly volatile, and
geography matters a great deal in the switching decision. The same results come
through if I analyze only U.S. manufacturing firms (as identified in the 2002 Census
of Manufacturers) as in Figure 1.B.2, or if I use firm-HS6 product as the unit of
analysis, as shown in Figure 1.B.3. Figure 1.B.4 presents the individual years that
make up the switching data in Figure 1.1. Ultimately, it is clear that the stylized
facts described above are consistent across a variety of different specifications.
I also check the estimation of Equation (1.1) using data from 2005-2006. As can
be seen in Tables 1.B.1 and 1.B.2, there is still a strong correlation between high
prices and the decision to switch, with those importers paying the highest price close
to 4% more likely to switch than the omitted decile of prices.
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APPENDIX 1.C
Proof of Proposition 1
Assumption 1. (Conditional Indepdendence) The joint transition density of pt
and t can be decomposed as:
h (pt+1, t+1|pt, xt, xt+1, t) = g (t+1) f (pt+1|pt, xt, xt+1)
I also assume that the profit shock  is distributed according to a multivariate
extreme value distribution, with known parameters:
Assumption 2. The distribution of the profit shock is
Pr (t < y) = G (y) = exp {− exp{−y − γ}}
for γ = 0.577... (Euler’s constant).
These two assumptions permit the computation of choice probabilities for any
particular outcome :
Proposition 1. Let any present time variable a at one period prior be written as
a−1, and one period in the future be written as a′. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, and
grouping together the state variables as s = {p−1, x−1}, the probability of observing a
particular exporter choice xC conditional on state variables s and cost parameters β,
P
(
xC |s, β), is:
P
(
xC |s, β) = exp [pi (xC , s, β)+ δEV (xC , s)]∑
x̂∈X exp [pi (x̂, s, β) + δEV (x̂, s)]
(1.C..1)
where the function EV (x, s) is the solution to the fixed point problem:
EV (x, s) =
∞∫
s′=0
log
{∑
x′∈X
exp [pi (x′, s′, β) + δEV (x′, s′)]
}
f (s′|s, x) (1.C..2)
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Proof. Let any present time variable a at one period in the past be represented as
a−1, and one period in the future be written as a′. Group the state variables together
as s = {p−1, x−1}.
Theorem 1 in Rust (1987) states that, using Assumption 1, for the social surplus
function defined as
S ([pi (s, β) + δEV (s)])
≡
∫

max
x
[pi (x, s, β) + δEV (x, s)] g () (1.C..3)
the choice probability of any particular exporter choice x occurring can be written
P (x|s, β) = Sx ([pi (s, β) + δEV (s)])
where Gx is the derivative of S with respect to pi (x, s, β). Furthermore, the function
EV (x, s) can be written as the contraction mapping:
EV (x, s) =
∫
s′
S ([pi (s′, β) + δEV (s′)]) f (s′|s, x)
Therefore, we need to compute the social surplus function S given the specific func-
tional form of the density of .
The location parameter µ for a random variable  with multivariate extreme value
distibution is defined such that µ satisfies:
Pr ( < y) = exp{− exp{− (y − µ)}}
Additionally, the expectation of  is µ + γ, where γ is Euler’s Constant. Following
a procedure similar to the one in McFadden (1981), Assumption 2 means that the
location parameter for the multivariate extreme value distibution of the profit shock
 is equal to −γ. This means that the expectation of  is equal to 0, and we can
rewrite the integral in (1.C.3) as:∫

max
x
[pi (x, s, β) + δEV (x, s) +  (x)] g () = E
{
max
x
µx +  (x)
}
(1.C..4)
So the social surplus function will be the expectation of the expression inside the
brackets.
For any n indepdent random variables, {1, ...n}:
Pr (max {1, ..., n} < y) = Pr (1 < y, . . . , n < y)
= Pr (1 < y) · · ·Pr (n < y) .
157
Thus for any n independent random variables distributed according to the multivari-
ate extreme value distubtion with location parameters µ1, . . . , µn, with cumulative
distribution function in Assumption 2:
Pr (max {1, ..., n} < y) = Pr (1 < y) · · ·Pr (n < y) =
n∏
i=1
exp {− exp {− (y − µi)}}
= exp
{
−
n∑
i=1
exp {−y} exp {µi}
}
= exp
{
−
(
exp {−y} exp
[
log
n∑
i=1
exp {µi}
])}
= exp
{
− exp
{
−
(
y − log
n∑
i=1
exp {µi}
})}
Thus the maximum of n random variables {i}ni=1 distibuted mulitvariate extreme
value with location parameters {µi}ni=1 is distributed multivariate extreme value with
location parameter log
∑n
i=1 exp {µi}. The expression inside the brackets in equation
(1.C.4) is therefore distibuted multivariate extreme value with location parameter
−γ + log∑x∈X exp (µx). Since the expectation of any random variable distibuted
multivariate extreme value with location parameter µ is µ + γ, the social surplus
function from (1.C.4) can be written as:
E
{
max
x
µx +  (x)
}
= log
∑
x∈X
exp (µx) = log
∑
x∈X
exp [pi (x, s, β) + δEV (x, s)]
Following Theorem 1 in Rust (1987), the derivative of the social surplus function is
the choice probability:
P
(
xC |s, β) = SxC ([pi (s, β) + δEV (s)])
=
1∑
x∈X exp [pi (x, s, β) + δEV (x, s)]
· exp [pi (xC , s, β)+ δEV (xC , s)]
, and the function EV satisfies the fixed point equation:
EV (x, s) =
∫
s′
S ([pi (s′, β) + δEV (s′)]) f (s′|s, x)
=
∞∫
s′=0
log
{∑
x′∈X
exp [pi (x′, s′, β) + δEV (x′, s′)]
}
f (s′|s, x)
as desired.
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APPENDIX 1.D
Model Fit
In this appendix, I check how well the estimated parameters do at matching the
underlying data used to generate those parameters. Compared to the size of the
discrete choice problem, the simple model I estimate is unlikely to match specific
importer-exporter outcomes exactly. Thus I check model fit in three areas: how well
prices match, how well the percent of switching importers match, and how well the
percent of city-switching importers match. I begin by comparing prices.
As can be seen in Table 1.D.1, the model with the estimated parameters under-
predicts the true price index in the data. In most cases, the pattern is repeated at the
industry level- in other words, each industry price index predicted by the model tends
to be lower than its real-world counterpart. This is occurring for three reasons: first,
the discrete choice model places no distinction on different sizes of the importers- as a
precondition of solving the model, the fixed point problem (1.10) is solved assuming
that any two importers with the same state will make the same decision. However,
empirical results above show a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of
switching based on importer firm size. Thus the model may predict a particular large
firm to switch to a lower priced exporter, while in the data, this same firm is in fact
less likely to do so. Secondly, the decision of which exporter to use is based on expected
prices that are predicted with some error, rather than the true actual prices, again
giving the potential for prices to be misaligned. Thus the true received price is not
an object that I am trying to match through estimating parameters, and is rather an
outcome based on a probability distribution. Finally, I discretize the price space into
N + 5 intervals to estimate the model, applying the midpoint price for each interval,
rather than actual price data. This introduces another dimension for the model to
fall short.
Figures 1.D.1 and 1.D.2 present a separate summary measure: rather than sum-
marizing 1000 outcomes for each firm, I can alternatively create the price index P
across all firms and industries for each Monte Carlo run, and compare them. By
either taking the weighted average of the price across firms in an industry (Figure
D1), or the median price across firms in an industry (Figure 1.D.2), I can generate
density plots. Again, as the above results also show, the model generally tends to
underpredict the price index.
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The results for switching and city switching are more straightforward. For each
case, I simply calculate the overall number of firms in an industry predicted to switch
for each Monte Carlo run, and take either the median or the mean of that industry
percentage for each of 1000 runs. I then translate that into how many total firms
are predicted to switch in each industry, and sum together across industries to create
an overall measure of switching and city swiching behavior. It is clear to see that I
match the percentage of firms switching extremely well. I match less well the number
of firms switching city, underpredicting the true number by approximately 10%. This
is likely because predicting the city puts more pressure on the model of exporter choice
to pick the exporter more correctly, while the overall switching percentage does not
have to match the chosen exporter in the data as well.
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APPENDIX 1.E
Potential for Serial Correlation
In Section 1.3, I model the importer’s decision to choose a particular supplier
as a dynamic discrete choice model with switching costs, where one-period profits-
including an i.i.d. error term- take the following form:
pimt (x
m
t ,β) + 
m
x,t = ξ lnλx,t + βpE
[
ln pmx,t
]− βx1{xmt 6= xmt−1} − βc1{cmt 6= cmt−1}+ mx,t
(1.E..1)
One problem with the above equation is it excludes the possibility of serial corre-
lation in the error term. For example, if an importer chooses exporter x two periods
in a row, the model would interpret that as evidence for state dependence, when it
could be the case that importer has some characteristic- constant over time- that
makes them prefer exporter x in both periods. If the results are being driven by this
heterogeneity, then the switching cost estimates might be overestimated.
In order to account for such bias, it is possible to allow an importer-exporter
specific term to enter into the profit equation:
pimt (x
m
t ,β) + 
m
x,t = ξ lnλx,t + βpE
[
ln pmx,t
]− βx1{xmt 6= xmt−1} − βc1{cmt 6= cmt−1}+ αmx + νmx,t
(1.E..2)
A reduced form way to account for this issue is to include lagged quality λx,t−1 in
the profit equation. The idea is since lagged quality does not affect current profits
(something that is straightforward to test empirically), but is both exporter and
importer specific, it could be included as the α term in the above equation.
Alternatively, the α term in Equation (1.E.2) can be estimated as an additional
set of parameters via the maximum likelihood process. Each importer would have a
particular realization from the distribution of the exporter’s α. With an average of
35 exporters per product, this would mean 35 new state variables to include in the
dynamic programming problem (a 35-dimensional random effect). The brute force
method would be to calculate the distibutions of these 35 separate state variables
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(for example αMEAN and αSD for each exporter x = 1, ...35) as an additional loop
in the maximum likelihood problem, as the dynamic programming problem would
be different for each vector of α realization. Ackerberg (2009) presents a method to
simplify the problem through use of importance sampling to reduce the computation
time for such a problem.
A simplifying solution would be to assume that the individual realization of αmx is
not observed until the match is actually made- a “limited memory”. This would in-
crease the state space by only one variable, and we would be using the data to estimate
what those realizations must have been for the observed choices to have been made.
In this case, the α term in Equation (1.E.2) would be importer-exporter-relationship-
time specific. This would also account for the possiblity of serial correlation in the
error term of Equation (1.E.1).
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Figure 1.A.1: Sample Invoice
Note: Exporter specific information and location information from the invoicing party
is extracted from trade data.
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Table 1.A.1: Analysis of MIDs as Constructed from China Industrial Production
Data, Selected Industries
Panel A: Uniqueness of the “MID”, 2005
Industry (CIC) # of Exporters # of “MID”s %
CIC 3663 39 38 97.4
CIC 3689 27 26 97.3
CIC 3353 37 37 100
CIC 3331 35 35 100
CIC 4154 74 73 98.6
This panel uses name, address, and city information from China NBS firm data
to construct a “MID” for each firm, according to the rules laid out in U.S. CBP
Form 7501. In constructing the name of the firm in English, I use the Hanyu Pinyin
romanization of Chinese characters, with two to three characters per word of the
English name. The second column states the number of firms with positive export
values in the given industry in 2005. The third column states the number of unique
constructed “MID”s.
Panel B: Uniqueness of the City Code
Industry (CIC) # of Cities # of City Codes,2005 %
CIC 3663 22 21 95.5
CIC 3689 15 14 93.3
CIC 3353 28 24 85.7
CIC 3331 15 13 86.7
CIC 4154 19 18 94.7
Panel B uses city information from China NBS firm data to construct city information
as found in the MID, where only the first three letters of city are given. The second
column states the true number of cities with at least one exporting firm in the data
from 2005, while the third column states the number of unique city codes.
Panel C: Changes in the “MID” over Time, 2005-2006
Industry (CIC) # of Exporters # of with Identical “MID” %
CIC 3663 33 33 100
CIC 3689 26 26 100
CIC 3353 31 28 90.3
CIC 3331 20 17 85.0
CIC 4154 63 62 98.4
Panel C uses name, address, and city information from China NBS firm data to
track whether constructed “MID”s change over time for the same firm, identified
here using the “faren daima” firm identifier from the NBS data. The second column
states the number of exporting firms found in both 2005 and 2006, while the third
column states the number of firms that have identical “MID”s in both 2005 and 2006.
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics.
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Table 1.A.2: List of Industries Used in Counterfactuals
HS6 Code Description Share
291560 Butyric Acid, Valeric Acid, Their Salts and Esters 0.31%
291631 Benzoic Acid, Its Salts and Esters 0.25%
293629 Other Vitamins and Their Derivatives (Unmixed) 0.86%
340120 Soap in other forms 0.66%
392020 Other Plates, Sheets, Film, Foil, Tape, Strip of Propylene Polymers (Non-cell.) 0.83%
481810 Toilet paper 1.02%
481960 Box files, letter trays, storage boxes and similar articles, used in offices, shops 0.55%
490300 Children’s picture, drawing or coloring books 0.86%
520831 Plain Woven Fabrics, Cotton (Cotton 85% or More; Dyed; Not >100g/m2) 0.72%
560312 Nonwovens of man-made filament,>25g/m2 0.87%
570210 Kelem, Schumacks, Karamanie and Similar Hand-woven Rugs 0.65%
580639 Other Narrow Woven Fabrics of Other Textile Materials 0.62%
591190 Other Textile Products and Articles, for Technical Use 1.07%
610432 Women’s or Girls’ Jackets of Cotton, Knitted or Crocheted 0.66%
610791 Men’s or Boys’ Bathrobes, Dressing Gowns, of Cotton, Knitted or Crocheted 1.84%
620339 Men’s or Boys’ Jackets, Blazers, of Other Textile Materials 1.23%
621230 Corsets 0.59%
621490 Shawls, Scarves, Muﬄers, Mantillas, Veils, of Other Textile Materials 0.15%
640219 Other Sports Footwear, Outer Soles and Uppers of Rubber or Plastics 7.93%
640340 Other Footwear, Incorporating Protective Metal Toe-cap 10.65%
650699 Headgear of Other Materials 0.23%
650700 Headbands, Linings, Covers, Hat Foundations, Hat Frames, for Headgear 0.13%
670411 Complete Wigs of Synthetic Textile Materials 1.65%
730722 Threaded elbows, bends and sleeves, of Stainless Steel 0.18%
730830 Doors, windows and their frames and thresholds for doors, of Iron or Steel 0.87%
731814 Self-tapping screws of Iron or Steel 3.11%
731930 Other pins of Iron or Steel 0.21%
820310 Files, rasps, and similar tools 0.11%
820890 Other (including parts) (Knives and Blades for machines and appliances) X
830300 Armored/ reinforced safes, strong-boxes, safe deposit lockers, of base metal 4.44%
830990 Stoppers, Caps, Lids, Seals, Other Packing Accessories, of Base Metal 0.61%
841320 Hand Pumps for Liquids 0.18%
841360 Other Positive Rotary Displacement Pumps 0.42%
841370 Other Centrifugal Pumps 2.13%
841420 Hand or Foot Operated Air Pumps 0.46%
841850 Refrigerating, Freezing Chests, Cabinets, Display Counters, Show-cases & Sim. 2.46%
848110 Pressure-reducing Valves X
850650 Lithium primary cells and primary batteries 0.82%
850910 Vacuum Cleaners, With Self-contained Electric Motor 14.30%
850940 Food Grinders and Mixers; Fruit or Vegetable Juice Extractors 9.81%
853641 Relays, for a Voltage Not Exceeding 60v 2.01%
870893 Clutches and parts thereof 1.74%
871110 Motorcycles, Side-cars, Reciprocating Engine, cylinder cap. not >50 cc 3.33%
871120 Motorcycles, Side-cars, Reciprocating Engine, cylinder cap. >50 cc not 250 cc 7.10%
900580 Monoculars, Other Optical Telescopes; Other Astronomical Instruments 1.99%
902910 Revolution counters, production counters, taximeters, odometers, etc 0.60%
920590 Other wind musical instruments 0.60%
950631 Golf Clubs, Complete 4.60%
960321 Tooth Brushes 1.10%
960910 Pencils and Crayons, With Leads Encased in a Rigid Sheath 2.10%
These shares are the percent of import value compared to the total among these 50 industries. The number of importing firms in HS
848110 is too few to report importing information: the combined value share of HS 848110 and 820890 is 0.37%.
165
Figure 1.B.1: Year-to-Year “Staying” (New Definition) Percentages of U.S. Importers
from China
Importer_counts
0.607747 0.678628 0.438432 0.607747 0.678628
0.61823 0.690056 0.455178 0.61823 0.690056
0.60236 0.682333 0.436705 0.60236 0.682333
0.60379 0.690724 0.437227 0.60379 0.690724
0.629638 0.71328 0.472455 0.629638 0.71328
0.637585 0.717471 0.486013 0.637585 0.717471
0.619441 0.699596 0.458811 0.619441 0.699596
771673 354052 478006 539859
0.660314 0.720112
0.670386 0.731239
0.665186 0.730765
0.6642 0.738324
0.681172 0.753006
0.68892 0.756634
0.674447 0.742318
700095 385746 472177 519693
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Same Partner Same City Same Province
Page 3
Figure 1.B.2: Year-to-Year “Staying” Percentages of U.S. Importers from China,
Manufacturers Only Importer_counts
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Figure 1.B.3: Year-to-Year “Staying” Percentages of U.S. Importers from China,
Firm-HS6
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Figure 1.B.4: Year-to-Year “Staying” Percentages of U.S. Importers from China, In-
dividual Years
Importer_counts
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Importer Counts, Based on Being in Current Year and Previous Year
Total ImportersSame Partner Same City Same Province
2003 74406 32622 45220 50494 0.438432 0.607747
2004 92320 42022 57075 63706 0.455178 0.61823
2005 112300 49042 67645 76626 0.436705 0.60236
2006 139209 60866 84053 96155 0.437227 0.60379
2007 167836 79295 105676 119714 0.472455 0.629638
2008 185602 90205 118337 133164 0.486013 0.637585
Source: LFTTD, stata_results.log, Lines 296-474 0.458811 0.619441
771673
Importer Counts, Based on Being in Current Year and Previous Year, and Previous Partner Exists
2003 67059 35683 44280 4 290 0.532114 0.660314
2004 84056 45950 56350 61465 0.546659 0.670386
2005 100429 53811 66804 73390 0.535811 0.665186
2006 124738 66941 82851 92097 0.536653 0.6642
2007 153506 85876 104564 115591 0.559431 0.681172
2008 170307 97485 117328 128860 0.572407 0.688921
Source: LFTTD, stata_results.log, Lines 669-859 0.550991 0.674447
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Table 1.B.1: Determinants of Supplier Stay/Switch Decision
Dependent Variable: Stayed with Chinese Exporter Year-to-Year, 2005-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Price
1st Decile -0.0065 0.0176∗∗ 0.0143∗ 0.0137∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
2nd Decile -0.0115 0.0041 0.0044 0.0050
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
3rd Decile -0.0024 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
4th Decile -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
6th Decile -0.0128∗ -0.0131∗ -0.0132∗ -0.0132∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
7th Decile -0.0097 -0.0088 -0.0086 -0.0088
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
8th Decile -0.0141∗ -0.0126∗ -0.0135∗ -0.0136∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
9th Decile -0.0218∗∗ -0.0158∗∗ -0.0170∗∗ -0.0175∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
10th Decile -0.0414∗∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0293∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Log Supplier Size 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Supplier Age -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Importer Size -0.0410∗∗∗ -0.0396∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.4547∗∗∗ 0.0699∗∗∗ 0.1768∗∗∗ 0.1530∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Entry Year FE No No No Yes
N 93,530 93,530 93,530 93,530
R2 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the HS10 level in brackets. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant
at the 5% level. HS10 fixed effects are included. The sample is the universe of U.S. importers (HS10 product code
and fim combination) from China who are found 2005-2006. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the U.S. importer
had the largest (plurality) share of its total import value from the same Chinese supplier in both years, and equal to
0 if not. Log price is the log average unit value across transactions with its majority partner in the previous year,
standardized across products by subtracting the HS10 mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Supplier size is
the total estimated exports of a Chinese supplier in the HS10 product code in 2005, based on cross-section summation
of total exports to the U.S. Supplier Age is calculated using the first year the Chinese supplier appears in the U.S.
customs data, and subtracting it from 2005. Importer size is the total size of imports in that HS10 product code in
2005 for any U.S. firm. Importer Entry Year is the first year a U.S. importers is found importing from China. Any
importer that has the same share of imports from two separate Chinese suppliers is dropped.
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Table 1.B.2: Determinants of Supplier Stay/Switch Decision
Dependent Variable: Stayed with Chinese Exporter Year-to-Year, 2005-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Price -0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0116∗∗∗ -0.0121∗∗∗ -0.0121∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log Supplier Size 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0518∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Supplier Age -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Importer Size -0.0269∗∗∗ -0.0251∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.4425∗∗∗ 0.1392∗∗∗ 0.1823∗∗∗ 0.1560∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Entry Year FE No No No Yes
N 93,530 93,530 93,530 93,530
R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the HS10 level in brackets. *** significant
at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level. HS10 and year fixed effects are
included. The sample is the universe of U.S. importers (HS10 product code and fim
combination) from China who are found two years in a row. The dependent variable
is equal to 1 if the U.S. importer had the largest (plurality) share of its total import
value from the same Chinese supplier in both years, and equal to 0 if not. Log price is
the log average unit value across transactions with its majority partner in the previous
year, standardized across products by subtracting the HS10 mean and dividing by the
standard deviation. Supplier size is the total estimated exports of a Chinese supplier
in the HS10 product code in 2005, based on cross-section summation of total exports
to the U.S. Supplier Age is calculated using the first year the Chinese supplier appears
in the U.S. customs data, and subtracting it from 2005. Importer size is the total
size of imports in that HS10 product code in 2005 for any U.S. firm. Importer Entry
Year is the first year a U.S. importers is found importing from China. Any importer
that has the same share of imports from two separate Chinese suppliers is dropped.
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Table 1.D.1: Model Fit
Data
Median over
1000 runs %
Price Index
Weighted Average 84.6239 76.4979 90.4
Median 66.1725 61.7019 93.2
Data
Industry
Median %
Industry
Mean %
Total Switching Partner 714 711 99.6 708.85 99.3
Total Switching City 416 469 112.7 469.76 112.9
Notes: Objects computed by the model simulated with the estimated parameters are com-
pared to the same objects in the data. To compute the Price Index, I first take the median
received price across 1000 simulations for each importer. I then either weight each importer
by its industry share, and sum up (“Weighted Average”) or I simply compute the median
across importers in an industry. I then apply industry weights based on total trade among
along simulated industries to make an aggregate price index. The switching and city switch-
ing figures are the number of importers switching partner or city in the data compared to
either the mean number of firm switching/city switching for each industry, or the median
number of firms switching/city switching for each industry.
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Figure 1.D.1: Price (Weighted Average) Kernel Density Plot
Figure 1.D.2: Price (Median) Kernel Density Plot
Notes: These figures are the analogue of the weighted average and median price kernel
density plots described in Appendix 1.D.
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APPENDIX 2.A
Data Appendix
In this appendix, we describe how we created a baseline dataset of offshoring
plants.
Linking TAA to the Business Register
The operational information of manufacturing establishments used in this paper
is obtained from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and Annual Survey and
Census of Manufactures (ASM/CMF). The information on offshoring events is ob-
tained from the petition data of the Trade Adjustment Assistant program (TAA).
Unfortunately, direct matching of these two data are not possible because TAA pe-
tition data do not have establishment or firm identifiers. The information that can
identify a particular establishment is company name and address (state, city, street
address, and zip code), but neither the LBD nor the ASM/CMF contains address
information. For this reason, we first match the TAA petition data to the Business
Register (BR) using name and state, then match the merged data to LBD using plant
identifiers. The Business Register was formerly known as the SSEL.
Name and address matching between TAA petition data and the BR is imperfect
because TAA petitions are filed by workers and unions, rather than the authority that
generally responds to various surveys conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The
company names and address reported in the TAA petition form is not necessarily
the official name or address. Also, there is no rule against using P.O. Box address
for the purpose of survey response for both TAA petitions and any survey from
the Census Bureau. To avoid being too restrictive, we use only name and state as
matching criteria. Company names have inconsistencies and ambiguities too. The
majority of the issues here stems from variations in the legal endings of companies
such as ‘Limited,’ ‘Incorporated,’ ‘Corporation.’ We drop those legal endings before
merging. Other corrected issues, where possible, are numerics (e.g. ‘1’ v. ‘one’),
other abbreviations (mfg, tech, bros, and so on), and simple typos.
We made separate merging for petitions with different years. Since our petition
dataset contains petitions with impact date from 1999 to 2006, we performed merging
of eight separate years. TAA petitions with each impact year is merged with four BR
years surrounding the impact year; more specifically, two years prior to the impact
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year, impact year, and one year after. For instance, petitions with impact year of
2003 is merged with BR files from 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Using additional
matching criteria (zip code), we selected the year of the best match among these four
years merged and obtain plant identifiers from the corresponding BR files. Table A1
summarizes the matching rate for each impact year for aggressive matching. Out
of total of 19,603 petitions in our sample, 13,645 are matched to BR yielding a
matching rate of 69.61%. Among the matched petitions, 5,167 petitions are identified
as offshoring events.
Linking to LBD
In order to make a longitudinal link for surveys of different years for one estab-
lishment, we use the LBD. For each petition we match the petition information to
the LBD file of the year of best BR match rather than impact year because the plant
identifiers of the best BR year are most reliable. This BR-LBD matching rate is
76.41% for all sample. Since the first impact year of the petition data is 1999, and it
is matched to one of four years surrounding the impact year, the range of BR years
thus goes from 1997 to 2007. Merging is carried out for each year separately, then
was appended.
Once the establishment ID is retrieved for all offshoring events, we build the event
window of 13 years; six years before and six years after the event. Before we construct
the event window, we first deal with the issue of multiple petitions per establishment.
Some establishments file the petition more than once over time. All petitions are not
necessarily filed for the same reason. We give priority to offshoring event, import-
related event, and denied event. Among the petitions certified for the same reason,
or denied petitions, we keep the first event. For instance, if a plant A is certified for
import-related reasons in 2001, for an offshoring-related reason in 2003, and denied in
2004, we keep the 2003 event of offshoring. If a plant is certified for offshoring in 2002
and 2004, then we keep the 2002 event. Multiple offshoring events for a firm in the
same year are treated as one offshoring event for the firm since all analysis are carried
out at the firm-level. In construction of pseudo firms ( aggregation of non-offshored
plants of offshoring firms), all offshored plants are dropped. Table ?? summarizes
the total number of events after this sorting with petitions matched to LBD. At this
stage, we have 3,400 offshoring events, 1,618 import-related events, and 3,835 denied
petitions to be total of 8,853 petitions.
Building firm-level links
A firm link is built with the variable firmid in LBD. For each year, we group
all establishments by firmid, including non-manufacturing units. For each firm, we
construct three firm-level variables. We first construct firm-level employment by
aggregating all establishment-level employment. Average wage rate is constructed by
dividing the aggregate payroll by aggregate employment. Lastly firm-level 3-digit SIC
code is selected. We aggregate employment by industry within the firm, then select
the 3-digit SIC industry that has the largest employment in the firm. Offshoring firm
is selected by matching the firmid of the offshored establishment to the firm-level
data constructed as described above. The matching is obtained for the year before
the offshoring event. We build the event window of 13 years by adding six years
before and after the offshoring event.
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Table 2.A.1: Results of Aggressive Matching Procedure of TAA to Business Register
Among Matched Petitions
Total # of Matching Import
Impact Year Petitions # Certified # Offshored # Matched Rate (%) Offshoring Competition Denied
1999 998 328 200 803 80.46 153 118 532
2000 2,593 1,489 833 2,267 87.43 702 658 907
2001 3,329 1,094 794 2,090 62.78 810 275 1,005
2002 3,825 1,757 1,211 2,585 67.58 990 476 1,119
2003 2,505 1,266 887 1,718 68.58 733 271 714
2004 2,545 1,320 876 1,614 63.42 620 320 674
2005-6 3,808 1,853 1603 2,568 67.44 1,159 217 1,192
Total 19,603 9,107 6,404 13,645 69.61 5,167 2,335 6,143
Table 2.A.2: Counts of Offshoring Events Matched to LBD
# Import
Impact Year Total # Offshoring Competition # Denied
1999 503 96 82 325
2000 1,396 423 404 569
2001 1,269 490 162 617
2002 1,946 784 381 781
2003 1,125 492 202 431
2004 1,009 383 233 393
2005-6 1,606 732 154 719
All 8,853 3,400 1,618 3,835
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